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ABSTRACT 
Based on the construct of a culture of safety, the study purpose was to discern 
the relationships between Organization Support (OS) and Work Unit Support (WS) 
on Hospital Patient Safety.  OS and WS were operationalized using the National 
Database for Nursing Quality Indicators® (NDNQI®) RN Survey with Job 
Satisfaction Scales.  Patient Safety was operationalized using four Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators: Decubitus 
Ulcer, Selected Infections due to Medical Care, Failure to Rescue (FTR), and Deep 
Vein Thrombosis.  A structural equation model was developed with adequate fit 
indices (χ2 = 40.811, df= 27, p= 0.234; CFI=  0.930; RMSEA= 0.065; SRMR= 
0.074).  Unexpectedly, increased OS was associated significantly (p= .030) with 
increase Patient Safety events.  A promising, though non-significant finding, was 
increased WS and OS were associated with decreased FTR rates.  Teamwork, a 
component of WS was associated with decreased rates of FTR and Patient Safety 
events. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Health care providers, payers, policy leaders, and consumers increasingly are 
aware of the impact of adverse outcomes related to health care.  The literature is rife 
with references to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) reports that highlighted the issue 
beginning with To Err is Human (IOM, 1999) and followed by Crossing the Quality 
Chasm (IOM, 2001), Patient Safety: Achieving a New Standard of Care (IOM, 2003) 
and Preventing Medication Errors (IOM, 2006).  Although the interest in improving 
patient safety is evident, now nine years after the publication of To Err is Human 
(IOM, 1999), there is no evidence that overall errors have decreased (Leape & 
Berwick, 2005).   Still, little is known about designing safe health care systems.  
Much of the work done points to a culture of safety as the answer to decreasing 
complications and errors associated with health care.  Hospital leaders are advised to 
develop a culture of safety within their institutions (IOM, 2006), yet the relationships 
between the work environment characteristics thought to describe a culture of safety 
and the occurrence of adverse patient outcomes is not entirely clear.  A greater 
understanding of these relationships is needed to inform health care leaders and 
guide the development of safe health care systems. 
In addition to the challenge of identifying organization characteristics 
associated with a culture of safety, there is the difficulty of developing quantitative 
measures that are indicative of quality patient care.  The IOM (1999) recommended 
mandatory reporting of standardized measures representing adverse events that cause 
patient harm.  However, the lack of uniform methods by which care processes and 
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outcomes are captured and reported, the highly variable manner in which patient care 
is documented, and the difficulties in developing methods to conduct risk adjustment 
have made the development of measures used to compare quality of care across 
institutions challenging.  In response, a number of federal and private agencies 
developed measures to inform key stakeholders on the quality of care within health 
care institutions.  Such indicators are used by health care leaders to drive 
improvement efforts within organizations, by consumers to make health care 
decisions, and by policy leaders to focus public policy initiatives.   
Nurse researchers also have contributed to the development of quality 
measures, particularly measures purported to reflect the quality of nursing care 
provided within hospital settings.  The measures are thought to be sensitive to the 
level, amount, and processes of nursing care.  Others have studied the relationships 
between organization characteristics such as the number of nursing hours of care per 
patient day, nurse educational preparation, and perceptions of the work environment 
with outcome measures sensitive to nursing care (Aiken, Clarke, Cheung, Sloane, 
Silber, 2003; Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, 2002; Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Sochalski, & 
Silber, 2002; Aiken, Sochalski, & Anderson, 1996).  Reflecting the importance of the 
patient safety effort, national and regional databases such as the National Database 
for Nursing Quality Indicators® (NDNQI®) and the California Nursing Outcomes 
Coalition Database Project (CalNoc) are capturing nurse sensitive indicators.   
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Statement of the Problem 
The recent emphasis on patient safety has generated interest in defining the 
relationships between organization characteristics and patient outcomes.  Although 
the term culture of safety often is used in the literature, identification of the 
characteristics that support positive patient outcomes is needed to describe a health 
care culture of safety adequately.  A better understanding of the relationships 
between work environment characteristics with nurse sensitive outcomes is 
important for nursing leaders and other health care administrators.  Understanding 
these relationships is necessary so that informed decisions can be made regarding 
health care system design and the allocation of resources that support the work of 
nurses that result in positive outcomes for patients.      
Study Purpose 
The study purpose was to describe the impact of registered nurses’ 
perceptions of work environment characteristics conceptualized as Work Unit 
Support and Organization Support on Patient Safety within hospitals.  Instruments 
used were the:  
(a) National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators (NDNQI) RN 
Survey, Job Satisfaction with various work characteristics (e.g. 
Professional Development, Nursing Administration, Nurse-Nurse 
Interaction and Nurse-MD Interaction [Teamwork], Autonomy, 
Task, Decision Making, Supportive Nursing Management, Unit 
Quality of Care scales) and  
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(b) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) developed by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).  The selected 
indicators (e.g. Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue, Infection 
Resulting from Medical Care, and Postoperative Pulmonary 
Embolus/Deep Vein Thrombosis) represent conditions often cited 
as outcomes sensitive to nursing care (Clarke, & Aiken, 2003; 
Hugonnet, Chevrolet, & Pettet, 2007; Morrison, 2006; Needleman, 
Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, & Zelevinsky, 2002; Seago, 
Williamson, & Atwood, 2006). 
Background and Significance 
The publication of To Err is Human (IOM, 1999) focused national attention 
on the impact of medical errors with an error defined as “the failure of a planned 
action to be completed as intended (e.g., error of execution) or the use of a wrong 
plan to achieve an aim (e.g., error of planning)” (IOM, 1999, p. 54).  In addition, 
health care associated errors were identified as representing either “an act of 
commission or an act of omission” (IOM, 1999, p. 28).  Numerous references to the 
report were seen in the health care literature and the popular press.  The often quoted 
statistic of 44,000 to 98,000 deaths each year resulting from medical errors was 
staggering and changed the conversation at many levels regarding patient safety.  
Although health care providers had some knowledge regarding the occurrence of 
medical errors, prior to the initial IOM publication, the full impact of medical errors 
had not been reported widely.  Since the release of To Err is Human (1999) much 
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work has been done to reduce adverse events associated with health care.  However, 
the results of these efforts have fallen short of the goal established by the IOM 
(1999) to reduce medical errors by 50% in five years.    
With the publication of the IOM reports, the focus turned to the cause of 
errors, which was attributed to faulty processes (Reason, 1990).  The complexity of 
health care systems and the inability of humans to manage and oversee such 
processes were cited as the cause of errors (Reason, 1990; VanCott, 1994).  
Individual practitioners were no longer viewed as the source of most health care 
associated errors, but instead, the processes used to provide care were seen as the 
most common root cause.  Health care leaders called for action at the local and 
national level and suggested that the currently flawed health care system could be 
made safer through the use of system improvement strategies (IOM, 1999; 2001).  
Patient safety experts suggested that by developing processes that were inherently 
safe, rather than relying on individuals to work around faulty processes, errors could 
be reduced (IOM, 1999).  However, the steps necessary to achieve a safe health care 
system, not just individual processes, were not understood clearly. 
Many in health care turned to research conducted in other high risk systems 
for answers.  Organization researchers have sought to explain the workings of high 
risk systems and why some systems remain relatively error free despite their 
complexity and propensity for catastrophe.  This work resulted in the description of 
High Reliability Organization Theory (HROT).  Based on studies conducted within 
non-health care systems identified as both high risk and highly reliable, concepts of 
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HROT were described.  However, there is still much to learn regarding the 
relationships among these concepts within health care settings.  The complexity of 
health care systems is significant and possibly unique compared to other complex 
systems.  James Reason, as reported by Leape and Berwick (2005, p. 2387), 
“observed that health care is more complex than any other industry…in terms of 
relationships”.   
Research in the area of patient safety has increased tremendously since the 
publication of To Err is Human (1999) due in large part to government support for 
the patient safety research agenda.  Also, a great deal has been learned from quality 
improvement projects and across-institution collaboratives such as the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 100k Lives Campaign and 5 Million Lives Campaign.  
The lessons learned from these efforts are disseminated by agencies such as the IHI 
and AHRQ’s Center for Quality Improvement and Safety among others.  However, 
even with the strides made in selected areas, the sweeping improvements called for 
in the IOM reports have not been realized.  This has led some to express 
disappointment at the limited progress in improving patient safety and in the inability 
of the health care system to reach the five year goal of 50% error reduction as set in 
To Err is Human (Leape & Berwick, 2005).  Based on these mixed results, some 
speculate that we are only at the end of the beginning (Wachter, 2004). 
 Development of indicators to inform stakeholders regarding the quality of 
care also has progressed in recent years.  Based on work conducted by researchers at 
the University of California and funded by AHRQ, a set of Patient Safety Indicators 
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(PSIs) drawn from administrative data was developed (Miller, Elixhauser, Zhan & 
Meyer, 2001; Romano, et al., 2003).  A four phase process was used to develop the 
indicators using existing International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, 
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes that might be indicative of health care 
associated complications and to develop algorithms with specific inclusion and 
exclusion criteria.  The PSIs, meant to be used as screening indicators, were 
described as a case finding tool rather than a comparative tool.  The developers of 
the PSIs indicated that by conducting further analysis on the PSI cases, trends could 
be discovered and improvements initiated.  However, since their initial development 
PSIs have been used for comparison purposes.  PSI rates have been included in 
healthcare public reporting initiatives and used to suggest hospitals with low PSI 
rates provide superior quality of care (Healthgrades, 2007).     
Conceptual Framework 
The study framework was High Reliability Organization Theory (HROT), 
which originated from critical analyses of the concepts of Normal Accident Theory 
(NAT) described by sociologist, Charles Perrow (Roberts, 1990a; 2003).  Perrow 
(1984) described high risk systems as complex, meaning they contain highly 
interactive subsystems that respond nonlinearly to system failures, and as possessing 
tight coupling, referring to processes that contain time dependent, invariant steps.  
Based on observation of disasters associated with high risk systems such as nuclear 
power plants, chemical plants, and the space programs, Perrow suggested technology 
had progressed beyond humans’ ability to manage it safely and recommended 
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abandonment of some of these systems due to the inevitability of large scale 
accidents.  Although Perrow’s work resonated with many at the time, others (e.g. 
Roberts, 1990a, 1990b; Roberts & Bea, 2001; Roberts, Stout & Hapern, 1994) felt it 
contained gaps and some inaccuracies.  The researchers questioned what made some 
high risk systems highly reliable and set out to explain the reasons these 
organizations performed differently from the predictions of NAT (Roberts, 1990b; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obsfeldt, 2005).  Qualitative studies were conducted in high risk 
systems that had few errors, and from this work concepts that seemed to contribute to 
high reliability were described.  It is important to note that the original work done in 
this area was in non-health care settings.  Research was conducted within systems 
such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and the aviation industry.   
Culture of Safety as a HROT Construct 
A construct within high reliability organization theory is a culture of 
reliability or culture of safety.  The term culture of safety has gained popularity and 
is used commonly in the patient safety literature.  Organizations are encouraged to 
“adopt” a culture of safety (IOM, 2006).  However, what is meant by a culture of 
safety is not always defined clearly by quality improvement leaders and patient 
safety researchers.  One definition of a culture of safety developed by the Advisory 
Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations and adopted by AHRQ is: 
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an 
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organization's health and safety management. Organizations with a positive 
safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, 
by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the 
efficacy of preventive measures (ACSNI, 1993; AHRQ, 2004, November). 
Culture of Safety Concepts 
Although researchers have identified various concepts associated with 
HROT, these concepts can be included within the construct of a culture of safety.  
The concepts described in the initial research studies include redundancy, early 
identification of problems (vigilance), simultaneous centralization and 
decentralization of decision making, and organization knowledge/learning. (Bierly & 
Spender, 1995; Bigely & Roberts, 2001; Roberts, 1990a; 1990b; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001)  Others described the concepts of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify interpretation, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe 2001).  Some of these concepts are similar 
but the language to describe them varies across researchers.  See Table 1 (page 10) 
for HROT concept definitions. 
Redundancy refers to a back up system or ability to conduct multiple checks 
of a process either by people or through equipment.  Vigilance, sensitivity to 
operations, and preoccupation with failure can be described as a process of auditing 
or watching the system for expected or unexpected safety problems.  Having team 
members recognize failures in the system before an error occurs gives the team an  
 
     
10
Ta
bl
e 
1 
H
ig
h 
Re
lia
bi
lit
y 
Th
eo
ry
 C
on
ce
pt
 D
ef
in
iti
on
s 
 C
on
ce
pt
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 
R
ed
un
da
nc
y 
M
ul
tip
le
 c
he
ck
s u
si
ng
 v
ar
yi
ng
 m
et
ho
ds
 a
re
 b
ui
lt 
in
to
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 fo
r e
ar
ly
 d
et
ec
tio
n 
of
 sy
st
em
 
fa
ilu
re
s  
 
C
en
tra
liz
ed
 D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
le
ad
er
s e
st
ab
lis
h 
co
re
 v
al
ue
s, 
st
an
da
rd
s, 
an
d 
pr
io
rit
ie
s u
po
n 
w
hi
ch
 a
ll 
de
ci
si
on
s a
re
 
ba
se
d 
 
D
ec
en
tra
liz
ed
 D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
le
ad
er
s s
up
po
rt 
fr
on
t-l
in
e 
st
af
f d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
ba
se
d 
on
 in
di
vi
du
al
 a
nd
 g
ro
up
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
tra
in
in
g.
  D
ec
is
io
ns
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
at
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f g
re
at
es
t e
xp
er
tis
e 
 
Te
am
w
or
k/
G
ro
up
 M
in
d 
Th
e 
w
or
k 
gr
ou
p 
va
lu
es
 sa
fe
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 o
ve
r i
nd
iv
id
ua
l i
nt
er
es
ts
 a
nd
 u
se
s c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 g
ro
up
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
rly
 re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
de
te
ct
io
n 
of
 p
os
si
bl
e 
sy
st
em
 fa
ilu
re
s 
 
Tr
us
t 
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
he
ld
 b
y 
in
di
vi
du
al
s r
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
ei
r t
ea
m
 m
em
be
rs
, l
ea
de
rs
, a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
pr
oc
es
se
s a
nd
 b
el
ie
f i
n 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s o
f e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l L
ea
rn
in
g 
C
on
tin
ua
l t
ra
in
in
g 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 a
 h
ig
h 
de
gr
ee
 o
f s
pe
ci
al
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
am
on
g 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
.  
 
     
11
 
opportunity to address the problem before it is out of control.  Organization learning 
and training is a key concept in HROT.  Team members receive extensive training in 
formal processes and procedures, as well as, in the shared values of the organization.  
Therefore, when the unexpected occurs, those at the front lines are capable and ready 
to make good decisions.  Also, managers have knowledge of the big picture but trust 
staff to do their work, knowing that staff has been well trained.  Individuals and 
groups within HROs place a high value on teamwork and nurture relationships to 
build trust and effective communication patterns.    
Centralized and decentralized decision making seems contradictory, 
however, this concept refers to the context of decision making and includes several 
components.  The centralized aspect of decision making refers to the values, 
expectations, and standards as set by the organization’s leaders.  The decentralized 
component of decision making, sometimes referred to as a deference to expertise, 
refers to the organization support for decision making by individuals with the 
greatest knowledge or expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005).  Expertise occurs at varying levels in an organization and often front 
line workers are best prepared to make a decision due to their unique knowledge and 
on the centralized values upon which their decisions are based.  Complex issues or 
problems are brought to the experts, those individual(s) with the greatest knowledge.  
Rather than using a chain of command approach regardless of the problem, decisions 
are moved to the area of expertise.   Reluctance to simplify also refers to the decision 
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making process used in HROs.  In high reliability systems team members and/or 
disciplines are valued for their unique perspective.  Even though it may be easier and 
faster to develop a process or handle a problem without system-wide involvement, 
this approach is thought to lead to oversimplification and increased risk of error.   
Although there are many consistencies between the different researchers in 
their description of high reliability concepts, the relationships between the concepts 
have not been discerned fully.  Also, it is not clear if some of the concepts are more 
critically important, if the concepts translate to health care organizations, and how to 
create a highly reliable environment.  Even more challenging has been the 
measurement of high reliability concepts within an organization.  Researchers have 
begun to develop tools to measure a culture of safety within health care settings.  
However, it is unclear if the scores on these measures are associated with the 
incidence of negative patient outcomes.   
Empirical Indicators 
 
The empirical indicators for HROT can be drawn from the original 
qualitative studies conducted in systems demonstrating low incidence of errors.  
Evidence of staff’s ability to recognize potential errors in the system, use decision 
making appropriate for the situation, demonstrate commitment to using known safety 
practices, and support of team members in their use of safety practices was described 
in the early work done in HROs (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Bigely & Roberts, 2001; 
Roberts, 1990b; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  The presence of these characteristics 
could be obtained using observation and self reports from health care staff about the 
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processes used to provide care to patients.  The NDNQI RN Survey with Job 
Satisfaction scales measure concepts consistent with some of the concepts describing 
a culture of safety, and the scales were used in this study.  Measuring the 
consequences of a culture of safety could include evaluation of the occurrence of 
negative patient outcomes such as the incidence of specific clinical complications, 
for example, PSIs.    
Strengths and Weaknesses of HROT 
 The strength of HROT is in its relevance and perceived usefulness to health 
care providers.  The concepts seem applicable to what many health care providers 
experience when practicing within a highly complex system.  The numbers of 
publications, which reference high reliability or a culture of safety, attest to the 
connection health care providers feel to the theory.  Although originally developed to 
describe non-health care systems, the concepts do apply to other high risk systems 
including health care.  Another strength of the theory is that it can be used to make 
basic predictions.  It has been hypothesized that systems demonstrating high 
reliability concepts will have fewer health care associated errors.  However, within 
health care settings there is limited research to evaluate this relationship.    
Although HROT has garnered considerable attention among patient safety 
experts, there are some aspects of the theory that could be considered weaknesses.  
The language used to describe the concepts is not uniform: therefore, there seems to 
be overlap among the concepts when described by different researchers.  For 
example, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) described deference to expertise as a concept 
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within HROT.  Rather than using the same chain of command approach regardless of 
the problem, decisions are moved to the area of expertise.   Everyone working in the 
system has access to information on the functioning of the system and is ready to call 
in resources if a problem is detected.  Others described a process where problems 
migrate through the system until the individuals with the unique knowledge of the 
problem are located to solve it (Roberts, 1990b).  Also, the operational definitions of 
the concepts have not been established clearly.  For example, redundancy has been 
identified as a concept of HROT, yet within the literature redundancy is used to 
describe multiple checks of a high risk process and also has been used to describe the 
availability of adequate staffing (Roberts, 1990b; IOM, 2004).  In addition, further 
study is needed to define the relationships between the concepts.  The theory can be 
diagrammed although diagrams have not been found in the literature.  A diagram 
was developed by this researcher to illustrate the concepts and construct included in 
HROT (Figure 1, page 15).  Even though additional research is needed to further 
theory development, HROT resonates with many in the health care community and 
holds promise as a framework to increase our understanding of health care 
organizational culture and the occurrence of health care related adverse events.   
Theoretical Levels of HROT Concepts 
 Although the original studies describing HROT do not frame clearly the 
levels (individual, work group, organization) at which each of the concepts applies, it 
is implicit that the concepts occur at more than one level.  In these original studies 
some concepts were ascribed to individuals but within the context of the work group.  
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Organization level concepts also were described both in the manner in which work 
groups function in concert, and how leaders set priorities so that the concepts used to 
mitigate risk were valued and adhered to throughout the organization.   
 
 
Figure 1 
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In her original study conducted over a three year period on two West Coast 
based aircraft carriers and one East Coast carrier, Roberts (1990a; 1990b) described 
the concepts used to reduce the impact of complexity and tight coupling.  Roberts 
(1990a) described work group concepts when identifying these highly reliable 
organizations as having an extreme level of interdependence among individuals.  
Grabowski and Roberts (1997) further describe this interdependence by using the 
example of nuclear power plants in which the system is “only as strong as its weakest 
link” (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997, p.154).    
Redundancy. 
Redundancy is one concept frequently cited as present in High Reliability 
Organizations (HROs).  Redundancy could be described as either an individual, a 
work group, or an organization level concept.  Redundancy was used by organization 
leaders through system design and by individuals working in teams or via automation.  
Multiple checks of critical steps were incorporated in the process of HROs to reduce 
the occurrence of an error (Roberts, 1990b).  Task components were broken down and 
checked by individual team members.  Team members worked together to evaluate the 
entire process or task components as a group (Roberts, 1990a).  The team interaction 
is reflective of individual knowledge and action but also of individuals working 
effectively within the team to maintain the redundancy.   
Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making. 
Weick (1987) described decision making in a way that identified it as an 
individual and group level phenomenon.  He stated that decentralized decision making 
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begins with strong centralization where individuals are socialized on a set of core 
values.  Once this occurs individuals can improvise and act autonomously basing their 
decisions on the underlying values of the organization (Weick, 1987).  Grabowski and 
Roberts (1997) also describe this phenomenon in their discussions of autonomy and 
interdependence.  Decision making in HROs is often time compressed and therefore 
individuals work together to move a complex problem to the level with the greatest 
expertise.  If a routine problem is encountered, it is handled at the lowest level of the 
organization.  However unusual problems migrate through the organization to find the 
most knowledgeable individual to make the decision.  These descriptions reflect 
individual, work group, and organizational phenomena with the organization level 
phenomena being established through leadership prioritization and value setting.   
Trust/Communication/Teamwork/Group Mind. 
Several researchers describe a group of HRO concepts that appear to be 
related.  Weick (1987) described the unique knowledge and qualities of individual 
team members, and how this diversity within the team improved the team’s 
functioning.  With increased team complexity, the ability to increase the complexity of 
decision making was observed, thereby increasing reliability.  In addition, he 
described trust between team members as an essential component for the group level 
phenomenon (Weick, 1987).  Jeffcott, Pidgeion, Weymand, and Walls (2006) describe 
trust as expectations about other people but also about the organizational systems.  
Roberts (1990b) described the constant watchfulness that occurred among team 
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members within HROs.  Although individuals learn specialized skills they are applied 
within the context of the team performance.   
In addition, the constant communication among team members to keep the 
group informed of potential errors in the system is described by HROT developers 
(Roberts, 1990a; Weick & Roberts, 1993).  Weick and Roberts (1993) described the 
concept of group mind or mindfulness as a group level phenomena resulting from the 
product of individual actions. 
Organizational Learning/Training. 
Roberts (1990a) described the individual roles and continuous training of 
nuclear power plant operators, air traffic controllers and Navy aircraft operators.  The 
high degree of individual accountability and responsibility placed on low level 
employees in these organizations also was emphasized (Grabowski & Roberts, 1987).  
Roberts (1990a; 1990b) described the role of leaders within the organization.  During 
her study using crew interviews on Navy aircraft carriers, she identified the continuity 
of the management team as an important component of a culture of reliability 
(Roberts, 1990b).  Roberts (1990b) also suggested that management staff prioritized 
the constant learning and training of staff in HROs.  Organization learning seems to be 
observed at the work group and organization level with the organization level 
representing management commitment and support.  Overall mitigation of complexity 
and tight coupling were accomplished by individual training, a high degree of 
specialization and integration among team members, and a stable management team 
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that ensured an organization with a foundation of continuous training and use of 
strategies to decrease risk.   
Although the concepts described from the original research conducted within 
HROs seem to occur at multiple levels, the relationship between these levels is not 
explained.  It is unclear if the organization level concepts or work group concepts are 
of greater importance or if they must occur simultaneously for a culture of safety to be 
evident.   
Research Questions 
The study purpose was to describe the impact of registered nurses’ perceptions of 
work environment characteristics conceptualized as Work Unit Support and 
Organization Support on Patient Safety.   
1. What are the direct effects of Work Unit Support and Organization Support on 
Patient Safety? 
2. What effect does the indirect relationship of Organization Support on Work 
Unit Support have on Patient Safety? 
Definition of Research Terms - Organization and Work Unit Support 
A culture of safety is conceptualized by the current researcher as including 
organization level and work unit level characteristics.  The purpose of the study is to 
discern the relationships between Organization Support and Work Unit Support on 
Patient Safety.  Organization Support is measured by three scales including two 
(Professional Development and Nursing Administration) from the NDNQI adapted 
Nursing Work Index and one (Autonomy) derived from the NDNQI adapted Index of 
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Work Satisfaction.  Work Unit Support is measured by four scales (Task, Teamwork 
[Nurse-Nurse Interaction, Nurse-MD Interaction], Decision Making) from the 
NDNQI adapted Index of Work Satisfaction, one scale (Supportive Nursing 
Management) from the NDNQI adapted Nursing Work Index, and one scale from the 
Work Contextual items (Unit Quality of Care) used in the NDNQI RN Survey and Job 
Satisfaction scales.  Nurse sensitive outcomes are evaluated using four of the AHRQ 
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) including Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue, 
Infection Resulting from Medical Care, and Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or 
Deep Vein Thrombosis (AHRQ, 2007, March).   
Assumptions 
There were several basic assumptions related to the data used in the study.  
One assumption was that the NDNQI RN Survey data were collected as defined by the 
established standardized NDNQI processes.  Consistency in the manner in which the 
data were collected across participating hospital sites reduces the risk of bias or 
introduction of systematic error.  The PSI data were assumed to be collected using 
uniform coding methods from individual patient medical records.  The PSIs were 
assumed to be reliable measures with the ability to make valid inferences from the 
reported incidence. 
Summary 
The publication of To Err is Human (IOM, 1999), generated a sense of 
urgency among the health care community to improve the system and reduce adverse 
events associated with care.  Although progress has been made since the original IOM 
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reports were released, some have expressed dismay at the continued occurrence of 
medical errors (Leape & Berwick, 2005).  Clearly, the problem has not been an easy 
one to resolve.   
HROT has been used as a framework to understand the workings of a complex 
system such as health care and the possible concepts that might mitigate risk and 
reduce errors.  However, the research conducted to determine the concepts of HROT 
were done in non-health care settings.  Therefore, additional study is needed to 
determine the translation of these concepts to health care settings and to determine the 
concepts associated with a health care culture of safety.  A few instruments purported 
to measure a culture of safety have been developed.  However, a large sample data set 
inclusive of these measures is not readily available, and research to compare the 
instrument scores with patient safety outcomes by institution has not been thoroughly 
evaluated.  In this study, established measures of organization and work unit 
characteristics consistent with HROT and standard indicators developed to identify the 
incidence of health care related complications were used to examine the relationships 
between hospital characteristics and patient outcomes.  Understanding hospital work 
unit and organization characteristics and their relationship with possibly preventable 
complications of care is important to achieve a significant improvement in patient 
safety.  As health care systems become more complex, it is essential that health care 
leaders and policy makers understand where to allocate limited resources and what 
initiatives are important to reduce health care related errors and poor patient outcomes.  
Armed with a greater understanding of the relationships between a healthcare culture 
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of safety and the occurrence of preventable complications, leaders will be better 
prepared to support the development of hospitals that are safer for patients.   
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Chapter II 
Although overall awareness regarding medical errors and patient safety has 
increased, there is still much to learn regarding the characteristics that reflect a health 
care culture of safety and the development of safe clinical systems.  The review of the 
literature covers several areas beginning with what is known about adverse health care 
related events and patient safety science.  In addition, work done to develop measures 
and indicators that accurately describe the functioning of a health care system is 
discussed.  Third, the relationships between organization level characteristics that 
describe the culture of an institution and the measures used to describe health care 
outcomes are reviewed.  The gaps in our current understanding of these relationships 
will be presented. 
Adverse Events Associated with Health Care and Patient Safety Science 
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) landmark report, titled To Err is 
Human, opened the discussion regarding medical errors.  The reported estimates of 
44,000 but possibly as many as 98,000 deaths each year as a result of medical errors 
were a significant wake up call to health care providers and the public they serve.  
These estimates were extrapolated from two studies, one based on the percentage of 
medical errors at a Utah hospital and the other in a New York hospital (IOM, 1999).  
To Err is Human (1999) sent shock waves through the health care system that are still 
reverberating and influencing how health care providers view and address medical 
errors, also called adverse health events or health care related errors.  The IOM has 
continued its work in this area with the follow up reports Crossing the Quality Chasm: 
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A New Health System For The 21st Century (IOM, 2001), Keeping Patient’s Safe: 
Transforming The Work Environment Of Nurses (IOM, 2004), and most recently 
Preventing Medication Errors (IOM, 2006).   
Medical errors reported in the popular press also drew the public’s attention to 
the severity of the issue.  In 1994, at the Dana Farber Institute in Boston, one patient 
died and another suffered permanent injury after receiving an overdose of 
chemotherapy (Allen, 2004).   In 2001, Josie King, an 18 month old recovering from a 
burn injury, died as a result of a medical error at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in 
Baltimore, Maryland (Ayd, 2004).  These highly publicized cases led to a sense of 
urgency among health care leaders to prevent such devastating consequences of 
medical care.  Since then a multitude of local and national quality based initiatives 
have been launched.  However, recent cases, such as the September 2006 event when 
three infants cared for in an Indiana neonatal intensive care nursery died after 
receiving the incorrect concentration of heparin, and a strikingly similar event in 
California one year later led many to question the seeming lack of progress made in 
preventing errors (Davies, 2006; ISMP, 2007).  
Factors Thought to Contribute to Adverse Health Care Related Events 
The IOM reports and the resulting public discussions of adverse events spurred 
interest in defining what constitutes a medical error and the contributory factors.  
Errors are defined as “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (e.g., 
error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (e.g., error of 
planning)” (IOM, 1999, p. 54).  In this definition there is a distinction made between 
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the error and the intention.  Reason (1990) suggested errors were not the results of 
unintentional behaviors but rather result from actions that are inaccurately 
implemented or do not lead to the intended outcome (Reason, 1990).  Errors also have 
been categorized in two ways: latent and active errors (IOM, 1999).  Active errors 
refer to those that occur at the front-line of care also called the sharp end.  Active 
errors focus on the actions of individuals where latent errors are those that occur due 
to design flaws, faulty management, or poorly structured organizations (IOM, 1999).  
If a nurse fails to check a patient’s allergy status and as a result administers a 
medication to which that the patient is allergic, the error is an active error.  Whereas if 
a hospital uses different computer systems, one in the Emergency Department (ED) 
and another on the medical-surgical units with no transfer of information between 
systems the allergy information identified in the ED may not be accessible to the 
medical/surgical clinician.  If the lack of information results in the administration of a 
contraindicated medication, the error is a latent error.  Active errors tend to receive the 
greatest attention but latent errors pose the greatest threat because they often remain in 
the system even after active errors have been addressed (IOM, 1999).   
Adverse Events Viewed as a Personal Failing 
The perspective with which we have viewed adverse health events has evolved 
over the last few decades as more is learned about patient safety science.  Factors 
related to the individual, the system, the work environment, and the culture of an 
organization have all been used to explain and frame our understanding of why 
medical errors occur.   Viewing an error as a personal failing or resulting from an 
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individual’s poor performance is a long standing, though widely acknowledged 
ineffectual, way to view medical errors (Benner, 2001; IOM, 1999; Marx, 2003; 
Ottewill, 2003; Simpson, 2000).  The name, shame, and blame approach focused on 
individual failings such as negligence, carelessness, forgetfulness, or recklessness.  
This framework implicated the individual as personally responsible for medical errors.  
Some described an expectation that health care providers make no mistakes and a 
failure to meet this standard was seen as a character flaw (Simpson, 2000).  
Unfortunately, this approach may have contributed to provider reluctance to report 
errors or near misses, defined as errors that do not reach the patient, and served to hide 
the problem rather than provide opportunities to improve (Benner, 2001). 
Nursing, consistent with other disciplines, focused on the individual as the 
source of errors.  For example, during the early 1980’s, the journal Nursing had a 
regular monthly column addressing the issue of medication errors.  The articles 
included strategies to prevent errors, some of which might be interpreted as warnings 
or admonishments to nurses of their personal responsibility when administering 
medications (Cohen, 1979; Cohen, 1980).  Implicit in these writings was a message 
consistent with the beliefs of the time: good nurses do not make errors.  Although 
some authors identified system or processes, such as unclear orders and 
miscommunication, as contributing to errors, the overall message tended to emphasize 
the need for caregiver diligence to prevent errors.   
Provider education was the strategy often used to prevent errors.  By learning 
key facts associated with care, it was believed mistakes could be prevented.  For 
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example, learning to calculate medication doses accurately and memorizing specific 
information about medications were cited as strategies to prevent errors (Cohen, 
1980).  It seemed only memory and extreme care could ensure patient safety. A 
problem with these strategies was their narrow focus on active errors without 
consideration of the latent errors that remained in the system (IOM, 1999). 
Consistent with the attention on the individual practitioner as responsible for 
errors, the response to error events generally was aimed at the individual.  The 
removal of bad practitioners was believed to be a way in which to eliminate errors, 
therefore, it was not uncommon for health care providers involved in an error to be 
fired from their jobs.  In the Dana Farber chemotherapy errors, which occurred in 
1994, two of the involved physicians were dismissed, and at least 15 nurses received 
reprimands from the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Nursing (Watson, 2003).  
Even with the movement away from a culture of blame many, and particularly the 
public, may still frame errors as an individual failing.  An article published 10 years 
after the Dana Farber event highlighted the improvements made in patient safety since 
the devastating chemotherapy errors.  Allen (2004) wrote, “10 years ago, one patient 
died and another suffered irreversible heart damage at the Dana-Farber because the 
staff wasn't cautious enough…..none of the roughly 25 medical staff involved in their 
care noticed until weeks later. ‘It was a pretty public humiliation,’ recalled Dana-
Farber nurse Judith Prisby, expressing a view held by many staff members at the 
time.” (Allen, 2004).  These statements reflect an ongoing blame mentality.   
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Possibly the tendency to assign blame for the negative consequences of health 
care errors is rooted in Western philosophy (Benner 2001; Reason, 1990).  Reason 
(1990) suggested the manner in which we frame medical errors was based on our 
practice tradition in healthcare and Benner further described our history of competitive 
individualism as contributing to the blame culture.  Benner proposed that competitive 
individualism is consistent with Kantian philosophy.  Immanuel Kant linked moral 
agency to the intent of the individual and emphasized decisions and choices rather 
than action, communication, and relationships.  This competitive individualistic 
approach, Benner maintained, is not consistent with a culture of safety and ignores the 
importance of shared learning that fosters continual improvement in a practice 
community.   Benner suggested an Aristotelian philosophical approach that 
emphasized cooperation and ongoing experiential learning of the practice community 
as a preferred way to view adverse health care events.  This approach encourages 
system improvement and prevention of repeated errors rather than correction of an 
individual’s alleged character flaw (Benner; Simpson, 2000).  
Recently, some nursing leaders have suggested that although a culture of 
blame is undesirable, an environment without accountability is not beneficial either. 
(Beyea, 2004; Marx, 2003;Yates, Hochman, Sayles, & Stockmeier, 2004)  As an 
alternative a “just culture” has been suggested where the actions of the individual are 
evaluated based on specific criteria.  If policies or known safety practices are violated, 
the practitioner is held accountable and may be reprimanded or disciplined for the 
action.  However, some may argue this approach still fails to take into account other 
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factors that might have contributed to a health care practitioner’s non-adherence to 
known safety protocols. 
Adverse Events Viewed as a System or Process Failure 
More recently, the study of human factors, systems, processes and 
organizational culture have been identified as influencing the incidence of health care 
related errors.  Beginning in the late 1980’s and into the 1990’s systems analysis has 
surfaced as an important component of error evaluation.  Although framing errors 
within a systems perspective has been described in different ways and by differing 
terms and theories, each approach has its roots in General Systems Theory (GST) as 
originally described by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968).  Normal Accident Theory, 
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory, and High Reliability Organization Theory are all 
drawn from GST and have been used to evaluate medical errors.  Total Quality 
Management (TQM), another framework based on systems theory, has been used to 
explain and reduce the risk of errors.  W. Edwards Deming first developed and 
introduced TQM to Japanese industry (The W. Edwards Deming Institute®, n.d.).  The 
model is based on a systems approach with the intent of decreasing defects in 
manufacturing.  TQM focused on eliminating latent errors in a system and the 
approach was adopted by some American high-risk industries such as aviation before 
it was suggested as a method to improve health care processes (Deming, 1986).  These 
industries used a non-punitive approach and focused on understanding the built-in 
weakness within systems that lead to errors.   
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The framework used to describe adverse health care related events in To Err is 
Human (1999) was based on the work of James Reason who studied accidents to 
determine the role systems and human actions have in contributing to errors 
(IOM,1999).   Reason purported that humans make errors for a variety of reasons and 
inadequate systems can compound the error (Reason, 1990).  Health care and high 
technology industries both of which are extremely complex are thought to be more 
prone to error (Perrow, 1984).  Complex systems are described as having tightly tied 
components where there is little slack or room for error (Perrow, 1984).  Complex 
systems also are characterized by their unpredictable response to error.  In such 
systems a failure in one part of the system is thought to affect other parts of the system 
in unanticipated ways (IOM, 1999).  These concepts are congruent with Complex 
Adaptive Systems theory where small changes are described as having the ability to 
lead to large, non-linear, unpredictable outcomes (Ebright, Patterson & Render, 2002; 
Plesk, 2001).  The strategies used to reduce errors in other high risk systems and 
adopted for use in health care systems include: encouragement of open and non-
punitive error reporting, intense evaluation of near misses, analysis of processes, and 
continual improvement of high risk or new processes.  System based frameworks each 
focuses on analyses of processes to identify the weak points in the system where an 
error is more likely to occur. 
Adverse Events and the Work Environment 
Other factors cited as contributing to medical errors are associated with the 
work environment.  Although these factors might be categorized as systems issues, 
     
31
they differ somewhat from the discussions above because work environment factors 
focus on management and leadership decisions rather than specific processes that 
contribute to error.  Many latent factors associated with the work environment have 
been linked to an increase in adverse health care events (IOM, 2004).  Inadequate 
staffing, staff turnover, redesigned work, health care worker fatigue, increased patient 
acuity, and rapid turnover of patients all have been suggested as factors contributing to 
adverse health events (Gaba & Howard, 2002; IOM, 2004).  Nursing leaders 
particularly have been interested in the work environment and its impact on patient 
outcomes.  During the 1990’s, changes in healthcare reimbursement such as 
prospective payment by Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) increased the financial 
pressure on many health care institutions.  As a result, a number of organizations 
restructured their nursing care models with the goal of reducing costs (Buerhaus, 
1994a).  These efforts often led to reductions in nurse staffing and particularly in 
registered nurse staffing (Buerhaus, 1994b, 1995; Reardon & Reardon, 1995).  
Nursing administrators were not prepared to argue against such changes because little 
research had been done to evaluate the impact of nurse staffing on patient outcomes.   
Concerns also were raised that the changes made in staffing and the results of 
restructuring efforts contributed to a growing dissatisfaction among nurses and an 
overall deterioration in the work climate.  Aiken et al. (2001) evaluated the reported 
satisfaction of 43,000 nurses from over 700 hospitals across five countries.  The 
researchers found that fewer than half of the nurses in each country agreed that 
management was responsive to their concerns, provided opportunity for nurses to 
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participate in decision making, or recognized their contribution to inpatient care.  Only 
30 to 40% of nurses reported adequate staffing to provide high quality care (Aiken et 
al.).  Over 40 % of U.S. nurses reported dissatisfaction with their job and had high 
scores compared to norms on a measure of burnout (Aiken et al.).  Although the 
researchers did not evaluate the relationship between these variables and rates of 
adverse patient outcomes, they did include survey questions related to the occurrence 
of outcomes thought to be linked to poor quality care.  U.S. nurses reported the 
following indicators were “not infrequent”: medication errors (15.7%), nosocomial 
infections (34.7%), and patient falls with injury (20.4%) (Aiken et al.). 
Interest in discerning the relationships between the work environment and 
patient outcomes has led to an increasing number of studies with this focus conducted 
by nurse researchers.  Often these studies included work environment factors such as 
staffing, perceived satisfaction, and nursing’s control over practice and linked these 
variables with patient outcomes identified through publicly available discharge data.  
Kovner and Gergen (1998) studied the association between nurse staffing and adverse 
events after major surgery.  They found an inverse relationship between registered 
nurse hours per patient day (RNHPPD) and the occurrence of urinary tract infection 
(UTI), pneumonia, thrombosis, and pulmonary compromise (Kovner & Gergen, 
1998).  Consistent findings were reported in two other studies that evaluated hours of 
care provided by registered nurses and other nursing care providers with adverse 
outcomes such as UTI and  failure to rescue defined as a death from upper 
gastrointestinal bleeding, cardiac arrest, deep venous thrombosis, pneumonia, or sepsis 
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(Kovner, Jones, Zhan, Gergen, & Basu, 2002; Needleman, Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, 
& Zelevinsky, 2002).  The researchers reported an inverse relationship between 
RNHPPD and the rate of these complications (Kovner et al., 2002; Needleman et al., 
2002).  Aiken, Sloane, Lake, Sochalski, and Weber (1999) evaluated work 
environment factors such as staffing, nurse perceptions of control over practice, and 
organizational support with mortality of hospitalized AIDS patients.  They found that 
higher nurse to patient ratios reduced the odds of dying by one-half.  In another study 
conducted by Aiken, Clark, Sloane, Sochalski, and Silber (2002) nurse staffing was 
linked with the quality of patient care.  The results of the study suggested that patients 
in hospitals with the highest patient to nurse ratio (eight patients per nurse) had a 31% 
greater chance of dying than those in hospitals with four patients per nurse.  On a 
national scale staffing differences of this magnitude could result in as many as 20,000 
unnecessary deaths each year (Aiken et al., 2002).   
Unruh (2003) conducted a study in Pennsylvania hospitals to compare nurse 
staffing and the incidence of specific patient outcomes.  She found that those hospitals 
staffed with a greater proportion of licensed nurses had significantly lower rates of 
decubitus ulcers and pneumonia.  Also, hospitals with higher numbers of licensed 
nurses per patient had significantly lower incidences of atelectasis, decubitus ulcers, 
falls and UTI (Unruh).  Conversely, she found that those hospitals with more licensed 
nurses per patient had significantly higher rates of pneumonia (Unruh).  In a study 
conducted by Cho, Ketefian, Barkauskas, and Smith (2003) mixed results were 
reported when comparing nurse staffing with adverse patient outcomes.  Cho et al. 
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(2003) found an increase in RNHHPD and an increased RN proportion of total nursing 
care hours were related inversely to the rate of pneumonia.  However, they reported an 
increase in nursing hours per patient day was associated with a higher probability of a 
decubitus ulcer.  In 2003 an evidence report was published that synthesized results 
from a total of 26 studies on the relationship between nurse staffing and adverse 
outcomes (Hickam et al., 2003).  From this work the researchers concluded that lower 
nurse staffing levels were associated with higher incidence of negative outcomes 
(Hickam et al.).   
Adverse Events and Organizational Culture 
The culture of an organization also has been identified as a factor that 
contributes to the occurrence of errors.  Recently many patient safety initiatives have 
been aimed at creating a culture of safety.  Many of the concepts associated with a 
culture of safety have been included in the discussion above.  For example, patient 
safety established as a priority by senior leadership, a non-punitive environment with 
open reporting of errors, open communication, organization learning, vigilance for 
system failures, and use of systematic problem solving are commonly identified 
components of a culture of safety (Beyea, 2004; Paine, Baker, Rosenstein, & 
Pronovost, 2004; Weingart, Farbstein, Davis, & Phillips, 2004).   
The IOM report, Keeping Patient Safe (IOM, 2004) also addressed the 
importance of a culture of safety for nursing practice and suggested High Reliability 
Organization Theory (HROT) be used to frame this cultural transformation.  
Consistent with HROT, the IOM report authors suggested that a culture of safety 
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stems from leadership’s commitment to an empowered workforce where active 
vigilance is rewarded.  Open communication and non-hierarchical decision making 
were identified as important factors in the development of a system where constant 
watchfulness for potential failures is valued (IOM).  Errors are more likely to occur in 
systems where individuals are criticized or ignored when they speak up (IOM).  
Kerfoot (2004) suggested that organizations often work to silence individuals and it is 
a challenge for leaders to attend to weak signals and ensure important safety concerns 
are not ignored.  Recently The Joint Commission released a Sentinel Event Alert 
related to intimidating and disruptive behaviors in healthcare organizations citing 
these behaviors as contributing to medical errors (The Joint Commission, 2008).  This 
publication outlined organization requirements for addressing disruptive and 
inappropriate behaviors as well as recommended actions that should be taken to 
eliminate such behaviors and promote a culture of safety. 
The use of constrained improvisation also was identified as inherent in a 
culture of safety.  Constrained improvisation refers to the practice of bending the rules, 
based on knowledge of organization values and safety practices, in the interest of 
patient safety (IOM, 2004).  This concept also suggests a high degree of collaboration 
among coworkers to develop solutions as issues arise. The development of a learning 
organization is another concept consistent with a culture of safety (IOM).  Continual 
learning focused on the skills required to detect failures before they occur was a key 
component of this concept.  Leadership support for this type of learning organization 
includes support for in-depth analysis used to identify the root causes of errors and 
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near misses (IOM).  Non-punitive error reporting with responses to errors that are fair 
and just also was identified as part of a culture of safety.  Others have described 
similar components as essential to a culture of safety (Callahan & Ruchlin, 2003; 
Jeffs, Law, & Baker, 2007; Luria, Muething, Schoettker, & Kotagal, 2006; McKeon, 
Oswaks, Cunningham, 2006; Patterson, 2007; Singer et al., 2003).   
Although the patient safety experts seem to agree that a culture of safety leads 
to better patient outcomes and a reduction of errors, this relationship has been difficult 
to quantify.  Instruments purported to measure a culture of safety have been developed 
but only a few studies have examined the link between these measures and patient 
outcomes.  Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) developed a safety culture scale and reported 
higher scores were related inversely to medication errors and patient falls reported via 
an incident report system.  Zhohar, Livne, Tenne-Gazit, Admi, and Donchin (2007) 
evaluated a nursing climate scale and the adherence to specific patient safety practices.  
Patient safety practices were defined as documentation of appropriate medication 
storage and maintenance of resuscitation equipment.  They concluded that the scores 
on the climate scale predicted scores on patient safety practices and suggested these 
findings identify units where adverse events are more likely to occur (Zohar, et al., 
2007) 
There are many ways that adverse health events can be framed.  Although 
viewing errors as the responsibility of an individual is clearly ineffectual many of the 
more recent perspectives do not address all of the concepts included in a culture of 
safety model.  General Systems Theory gives a more inclusive view of adverse health 
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care events, when compared to the individual perspective, through its inclusion of 
concepts such as latent errors and its analysis of weaknesses in the system that 
contribute to adverse health events.  However, the Systems Theory models do not 
predict errors or identify how errors might be prevented.  High Reliability 
Organization Theory seems to be the most useful framework as described in Chapter I.  
HROT includes concepts associated with the individual, system, work environment 
and organizational culture thereby offers a comprehensive perspective of adverse 
health events.  The construct of a culture of safety is complex and contains many 
concepts.  The relationships between the concepts and the impact of individual 
concepts within the construct are still unclear.  Further research is needed to evaluate 
the health care culture of safety construct and the occurrence of adverse health events.   
Measurement of Adverse Health Events 
Hospital System Quality Measures 
Although the manner in which adverse events are viewed continues to evolve, 
the development of meaningful measures that inform health care leaders, consumers, 
and policy makers regarding quality of care has been equally challenging.  Many 
professional and independent groups have developed measures thought to be 
indicative of the quality and safety of an organization.  The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) developed a set of hospital quality measures that also were 
adopted as core measures by The Joint Commission (CMS, n.d.; The Joint 
Commission, n.d.).  Institutions caring for Medicare patients and those organizations 
that are Joint Commission accredited are required to submit data on these measures 
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with the organization’s performance publicly available through CMS’s web-based 
Hospital Compare program (CMS, n.d.).  The Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
(IHI) developed a set of voluntary evidenced based bundles to prevent specific adverse 
complications through their 100k Lives and 5 Million Lives from Harm campaigns 
(IHI, n.d.).  The National Quality Forum published a set of 30 voluntary consensus 
standards called safe practices in 2003 (NQF, n.d.).  These measures have been 
adopted by the employer driven initiative, the Leapfrog Group.  Leapfrog, also a 
voluntary program, established a set of four leaps that include the 30 NQF endorsed 
safety practices.  Comparative information and institution specific progress in 
achieving the safety practices are available on their website (Leapfrog Group, n.d.).   
Nursing Care Quality Measures - National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators®  
Nurse leaders also have participated in efforts to develop meaningful measures, 
often referred to as nurse sensitive measures.  The American Nurses Association 
(ANA) embarked on the development of a Nursing Care Report Card project in 1994 
(Gallagher & Rowell, 2003).  Indicators were selected because of their sensitivity to 
nursing care, as well as, their accessibility (Gallagher & Rowell, 2003).  In 1998, the 
National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators® (NDNQI®) was established with 
indicators conceptually based on the structure, process, and outcome model proposed 
by Avedis Donabedian (Dunton, Gajewski, Taunton, & Moore, 2004; Gallagher & 
Rowell, 2003; Jennings, Loan, DePaul, Brosch & Hildreth, 2001).  Organizations can 
choose from a list of indicators available for data submission.  The indicators include: 
Patient Falls, Patient Falls with Injury, Pressure Ulcers (Total rate, Hospital acquired 
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rate, Unit acquired rate), Nursing Staff Skill Mix, Nursing Hours per Patient Day, RN 
Surveys (Job satisfaction, Practice environment scale), RN Education and 
Certification, Pediatric Pain Assessment Cycle, Pediatric Peripheral IV Infiltration, 
Psychiatric Assault rate, Psychiatric Assault Injury rate, Restraint prevalence, Nursing 
Turnover, and Nosocomial Infections (Ventilator Associated Pneumonia (VAP), 
Catheter related Urinary Tract Infection (CAUTI), Catheter related Blood Stream 
Infection (CLABSI) (NDNQI, 2006).  In addition, Patient Days are collected to 
identify nurse staffing demand and the time period over which outcomes occur.   
Standardization of Language Describing Adverse Events 
The work done to establish quality measures also served to standardize 
reporting across institutions.  Further efforts were made to standardize the language 
and classifications of all adverse health care events.  Taxonomies and classification 
systems were developed for medication events, as well as, other adverse events or 
errors to facilitate comparison across institutions.  The National Coordinating Council 
for Medication Error Reporting (NCC-MERP), in collaboration with the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), established a uniform definition of a medication error 
and developed taxonomy to classify medication related events.  The FDA also adopted 
the NCC-MERP taxonomy as their method of classifying and reporting post-
marketing medication error events (NCC-MERP, 2005).  For non-medication event 
reporting the National Quality Forum (NQF) has endorsed The Joint Commission’s 
Patient Safety Event Taxonomy (NQF, 2006).   
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Barriers to Data Collection and Reporting 
The development of indicators that can be used to describe the safety of care 
within an institution has been challenging and mandated reporting has met resistance.  
Certainly the variable manner in which care is documented and adverse events are 
reported has made the process more difficult.  Many organizations do not have the 
resources or information systems to extract data efficiently for reporting.  Of particular 
concern is the growing number of entities interested in receiving data.  Many 
organizations must prioritize their participation in quality initiatives due to the 
resource requirements of data reporting.   Collection of event data often requires 
medical record review, a time intensive and burdensome process.  Further, reporting of 
adverse events is known to be low compared to the actual incidence (Olsen et al., 
2007).  Rozich, Haraden and Resar (2003) conducted a study using trigger tool 
methodology to identify adverse drug events.  Of the 274 events identified using the 
trigger tool only 1.8% were reported as incidents (Rozich, 2003).   
Quality measures that focus on processes of care can be particularly difficult to 
capture.  Often the contextual workings of a process are not available in medical 
records or other documents.  Time consuming methods often are required to obtain 
detailed process information and therefore result in the need for additional resources to 
perform these analyses.   
  Even though a recommendation from the IOM report To Err is Human 
specified the need for standardized mandatory reporting of health care related errors, 
progress on this initiative has been slow.  Some of the reluctance stems from concerns 
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associated with the comparability of the data across institutions (e.g. accuracy of 
administrative data and ability to account for case mix differences).  Other concerns 
are related to how the data will be used.  Although the emphasis within the patient 
safety literature has moved toward system analysis rather than a focus on individual 
clinicians, public reporting can be used to make judgments about providers or 
institutions.  Some have suggested open reporting will make health care providers and 
institutions more vulnerable to litigation and others have suggested that the shame of 
disclosure prevents open reporting of adverse health events (Leape, 1994).  In states 
where quality improvement data are discoverable and can be admissible as evidence in 
legal proceedings, the fear of reporting is significant.  
Fear associated with the consequences of reporting performance on quality of 
care measures and the use of data to compare organizations is still a concern for many 
health care leaders.  Although legislation meant to offer protection to reporting 
agencies was signed into law, the rules and regulations are not finalized making it 
difficult for many institutions to proceed with transparent sharing of information 
(Liang, Rutherford, & Hamman, 2007).  In July, 2005 President Bush signed into law 
the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) of 2005, PL 109-41.  The 
PSQIA is meant to provide legal protection for those reporting patient safety data and 
was designed to encourage voluntary reporting of medical errors.  The act allows 
health care providers to report data to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) certified 
through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).  The data, called 
patient safety work product (PSWP), are defined as non-discoverable by those 
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involved in civil lawsuits and in most administrative or criminal proceedings.  The 
Office for Civil Rights and Health Care Privacy (OCR) will develop and operate the 
enforcement program for the PSQIA. AHRQ gathered information to determine 
implementation rules and regulations for development of the PSOs (Feder, 2006).  The 
proposed rule was released in February, 2008 with a comment period ending April 14, 
2008 (Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Proposed Rule, 2008).  In November, 
2008 the final rule was published and will become effective January 19, 2009 (Patient 
Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 2008).  
State Legislated Initiatives 
Legislators also have become involved in selecting quality indicators for public 
reporting.  Many states have passed legislation mandating reporting of specific 
adverse outcomes or events. As of 2005, 24 states had instituted reporting of adverse 
events (23 mandatory systems and one voluntary system) with some states also 
including near misses as part of their reporting requirements (Rosenthal & Booth, 
2005).  For example, Minnesota, mandated reporting of significant adverse health 
events and published their error reports including organization specific performance 
(MDH, 2008).   
Administrative Data as a Source of Quality Measures 
Because clinical care is not documented in a uniform manner and data are 
often difficult to retrieve, some health care researchers have turned to alternate data 
sources when developing quality and safety measures.  Administrative data, or claims 
data, are one source used to develop standardized quality measures.  Administrative 
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data are based on standardized codes with the data generated for purpose of health 
care service reimbursement.  Using administrative data to identify possible adverse 
patient outcomes increased during the 1990’s although previously these data have 
been used to identify variations in clinical practice and in outcomes research (Zhan & 
Miller, 2003a).  Advantages of using administrative data are its accessibility, 
electronic format, low cost, and large population base (Zhan & Miller, 2003a).  The 
data are reported as International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical 
Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes, procedure codes, and some demographic 
information.  These data are submitted by provider organizations to third party payers 
as claims for payment and often to state and federal agencies.  AHRQ Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project (HCUP) includes discharge abstract data from over 30 
participating states and compiles the data into a research database (Zhan & Miller, 
2003a).    
Administrative data are not without limitations.  When used for quality or 
patient safety research it is important to recognize that only events for which there are 
corresponding ICD-9-CM codes will be available to the researcher.  The ICD-9-CM 
codes include a set of complication codes, as well as E codes that are used specifically 
to record an injury.  However, these codes do not cover all possible complications nor 
are the E codes used uniformly.  Also, errors can occur in coding.  An IOM study 
found 65.2% agreement on the principal diagnosis between the hospital report and 
secondary review conducted by the researchers (IOM, 1977).  In addition there are 
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limited fields to document secondary diagnoses and in the past there was not an ability 
to document the timing or onset of a complication.   
Some states have used a present on admission (POA) code in an attempt to 
clarify the onset of a diagnosis but the POA code has not been uniformly adopted.  A 
recent study conducted by Houchens, Elixhauser and Romano (2008) suggested the 
validity of certain quality indicators is impacted without the use of a POA code.  In 
October, 2007 CMS as part of their Hospital Acquired Conditions project required 
providers to begin using a code for present on admission on Medicare claims (CMS, 
2007).  The code is expected to assist in clarifying the onset of secondary diagnoses 
and will impact reimbursement (CMS, 2007).  Costs resulting from the treatment of 
defined preventable complications during an inpatient stay will not be reimbursed 
beginning in fiscal year 2009 (CMS Regulation 1533-FC, 2007). Some of the 
preventable complications targeted by CMS are consistent with the AHRQ PSIs.  
CMS has identified Catheter Associated Urinary Tract Infection, Pressure Ulcer, 
Serious Preventable Events (Blood Incompatibility, Object Left in During Surgery, 
Air Embolus), Surgical Site Infection, and Hospital Acquired Injuries (Fractures, 
Dislocations, Intracranial Injury, Crushing Injuries, Burns) as no longer reimbursable 
when occurring during a hospital stay.  Additional conditions under consideration for 
inclusion in the fiscal year 2009 list include Vascular Catheter Associated Infections, 
Pulmonary Embolus/Deep Vein Thrombosis, Ventilator Associated Pneumonia, 
Staphlococcus Aureus Septicemia, Closdridium Difficile Associated Disease, 
Methicillin Resistant Staphlococcus Aureus, and Wrong Site/Wrong Person Surgery.   
     
45
The early work using administrative data to screen for potentially preventable 
complications resulted in the development of the Complication Screening Program 
(CSP) (Iezzoni, 1997; Iezzonni, Daley, Heeren, Foley, Fisher, et al., 1994; Iezzonni, 
Daley, Heeren, Foley, Hughes, et al., 1994).  The CSP, a computerized method of 
identifying potentially preventable complications using ICD-9-CM codes contained 
within discharge abstracts, was developed to determine if administrative data could 
provide useful information on quality of care within hospitals (Lawthers et al., 2000; 
Weingart et al., 2000).  During the development of the CSP, algorithms using specific 
inclusion and exclusion criteria were established to focus the screen on cases more 
likely to represent adverse patient outcomes related to quality of care issues (Lawthers 
et al; Weingart et al.).  Lawthers et al. conducted a validation study of the CSP and 
evaluated the positive predictive value (PPV) of each indicator, defined as the 
probability that a medical record review supported the coding of the complication 
flagged by the CSP system.  They found that the PPV varied across complication type 
and the specific complication with the surgical complications having the highest PPV.  
Postoperative infection (97%) had the highest PPV among surgical cases.  A total of 
ten surgical case screens had a PPV of at least 88%.   However, only one medical 
screen, post-procedural hemorrhage or hematoma, appeared useful with a PPV of 
90.6% (Lawthers et al.).   These findings led Lawthers et al. to conclude that selected 
CSP screens could be used as a screening or case finding tool to conduct further 
quality review.   
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AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators 
  With the publication of the IOM reports the interest in developing a system to 
identify complications related to medical care accelerated.  AHRQ researchers used 
CSP as well as other sources to identify complications believed to be related to health 
care quality.  From this work 13 measures were identified.  AHRQ then contracted 
with the University of California San Francisco and Stanford to continue the safety 
indicator development process.  AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) were first 
published in 2002 based on the work done by these researchers (Miller, Elixhauser, 
Zhan, & Meyer, 2001).   
Since the initial studies conducted to develop and evaluate the use of the 
AHRQ PSIs a number of researchers have used the indicators to examine relationships 
between hospital level characteristics and PSI rates.  Zhan & Miller (2003b) studied 
the length of stay, charges, and mortality associated with PSIs using over 7 million 
hospital discharge abstracts.  They reported postoperative sepsis as having the greatest 
impact on length of stay, charges and mortality.  Zhan, Smith, and Stryer (2006) 
evaluated the PSI Accidental Iatrogenic Pneumothorax and identified the patient level 
characteristics associated with the highest incidence.  The researchers suggested the 
PSI could assist with determining patients at greatest risk for this complication.  
Thornlow and Stukenborg (2006) evaluated five categories of PSIs using three 
methods of risk adjustment.  The researchers found an inconsistent relationship 
between hospital ownership and teaching status with PSI rates.  More recently, Vartak, 
Ward, and Vaughn (2008) compared PSI rates between teaching and non-teaching 
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hospitals and evaluated the relation of hospital and patient factors on PSI rates.  They 
reported an inconsistent relationship between hospital teaching status and PSI rates 
and concluded that patient characteristics associated with hospital teaching status 
mediate the relationship between teaching status and PSI rates.  Li, Glance, Cai and 
Mukamel (2008) studied the relationship between specific PSI postoperative 
complications for patients with and without mental disorders undergoing coronary 
artery bypass graft.  They found a statistically significant increase in Decubitus Ulcer, 
Postoperative Hip Fracture and anesthesia complications for the patients with mental 
disorders. 
Grobman, Feinglass and Murthy (2006) evaluated the obstetric PSI in over 
175,000 deliveries in 142 Illinois hospitals.  The researchers concluded that the 
frequency of obstetric trauma was associated with patient-specific and hospital level 
factors and that ICD-9-CM coding was inadequate to find preventable obstetric 
complications.  Simonson, Ahern, and Hendryx (2007) used the obstetric PSIs to 
evaluate the complication rates for patients cared for by Certified Registered Nurse 
Anesthetist or anesthesiologist or a combination of the two providers.  They found no 
difference if the rates of complications between the staffing models (Simonson, 2007).   
Polancich and Prosser (2006) studied the flagged cases of the PSI Decubitus 
Ulcer and compared these to findings from a medical record review.  They found that 
some exclusion criteria, such as admission from a nursing home, were difficult to 
capture since these patients often entered the system through the emergency 
department.  The researchers concluded that the Decubitus Ulcer PSI should not be 
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used to measure the “true rate” of hospital acquired decubitus ulcers.  Another concern 
regarding the Decubitus Ulcer PSI is related to those cases that are present on 
admission.  Without accurate use of a filter such as the present on admission (POS) 
code there is the possibility of an inflated rate being attributed to the hospital.  
Houchens, Elixhauser and Romano (2008) evaluated PSI rates in two states that have 
used the POA code for over a decade although neither state has performed validation 
studies to determine if the code is used accurately.  The researchers reported that for 
most PSIs the impact of the POA code was moderate and over half of the safety events 
remained after deleting POA diagnoses.  However, weaknesses were reported in the 
Decubitus Ulcer, Deep Vein Thrombosis, and Hip Fracture indicators.  When POA 
cases were dropped from the analysis fewer than half of the cases were still considered 
potential safety problems attributable to the patient’s hospital stay. 
Level of Analysis 
 Organization phenomena often are conceptualized at multiple levels.  
Kozlowski and Klein (2000) described multilevel models as providing an integrated 
concept of organizations that is more relevant than the single level models used in the 
past.  Chao (2000) identified cultural research as requiring multilevel analysis because 
it describes individual and group level phenomena.  Because organizations are 
comprised of hierarchical nested systems, it would be difficult to find a single level 
phenomena that is unaffected by other levels.  The conceptual underpinnings of 
multilevel research are based on General Systems Theory as described by von 
Bertalanffy (1968) and are consistent with a world view in which the whole cannot be 
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reduced into its individual parts.  Kozlowski and Klein suggested this multi-level 
perspective provides a greater understanding of the phenomena that occur across 
levels within organizations.   
The research model for this study used multilevel concepts aggregated to the 
hospital level.  This model was consistent with a mixed-determinant model described 
by Kozlowski and Klein (2000).  A mixed-determinant model is defined as one in 
which multilevel determinants are used to evaluate a single level outcome.  Measures 
of hospital level nurses’ perceptions of the work environment were aggregated at the 
work unit level and organization level and evaluated for impact on occurrence of 
hospital level patient outcomes.  A model was developed to illustrate the proposed 
relationship between the variables (Figure 2, page 51).  Kozlowski and Klein (2000) 
also described the emergence of phenomena within organizations as either a 
composition or compilation processes.  The current research was consistent with a 
composition model in which the phenomena are isomorphic or remain consistent as 
they move upward through an organization.  In contrast, a compilation model 
describes a process where phenomena are distinctly different at varying levels of the 
organization.  Therefore, for example, in the composition model autonomy, measured 
using individual data, is conceptualized as the same phenomena across levels of the 
organization.  When evaluating a composition model the level at which concepts are 
measured must be taken into consideration and are used to evaluate the model.  The 
model includes tenets regarding the variation in emergence.  For example in the 
current research, individual data were conceptualized as representative of an emerging 
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shared property within a work group and organization.  Kozlowski and Klein 
described shared unit properties as emerging from individuals shared perceptions.   
Also, Chao (2000) suggested that the effects of culture on organization performance 
generally are measured by using individual responses aggregated at a higher level 
(Chao, 2000).   
When developing instruments intended to measure concepts at a particular 
group level, it is important to use the appropriate level referent during item generation.  
Verran, Mark and Lamb (1992) suggested creating items with group level referents 
rather than individual referents if the data will be aggregated at the group level.  As 
noted previously the NDNQI RN Survey with Job Satisfaction scales was adapted to 
include such item revisions.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
The characteristics of organizations, work groups, and individuals are 
purported to have an impact on patient outcomes yet these relationships have not been 
elucidated clearly.  Although a culture of safety has been viewed as essential to 
successful reduction of adverse patient care events, this relationship has not been 
established.  Further analysis of the relationships between the culture of safety 
concepts and adverse patient outcomes is needed to improve our understanding of the 
nature of a health care culture of safety.   
Preliminary studies evaluating such hospital level characteristics as teaching 
status and ownership on PSI rates have not found significant differences.  However, 
other relationships may exist that have not been discerned.  Evaluation of work 
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environment characteristics impacting nursing care and the rate of those PSIs 
conceptualized as sensitive to nursing care should be explored.  Such research could 
lead to a better understanding of the concepts that comprise a health care culture of 
safety and the manner in which these concepts contribute to patient outcomes.  In 
addition, knowledge gained from further study of the relationships between concepts 
of a culture of safety and patient outcomes could be used to inform health care leaders 
as they design systems where patients receive care.  
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Chapter III 
 Chapter III describes the study design, research sample, setting, measures, 
description of the data procedures, as well as the manner in which the data were 
analyzed to explore the relationships specified in the research questions.  Ethical 
considerations of the study are discussed. 
Overview of Research Design 
 A secondary data analysis of cross-sectional data was conducted for this 
exploratory study using three existing data sets.  A hypothesized multilevel causal 
model was used to guide the examination of relationships between Work Unit Support 
and Organization Support on hospital level Patient Safety.  Work Unit Support and 
Organization Support were operationalized using the 2005 National Database for 
Nursing Quality Indicators® (NDNQI®) RN Survey with Job Satisfaction scales, and 
Patient Safety was operationalized using the 2005 National Inpatient Sample (NIS) 
and State Inpatient Databases (SID).  Both the NIS and SID contain data needed to 
calculate the incidence of selected Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs).   
Sample and Setting 
 A convenience sample of 97 hospitals that participated in the NDNQI® RN 
Survey with Job Satisfaction scales during 2005 were matched by a hospital specific 
identifier number with data from either the 2005 National Inpatient Sample (NIS), or 
State Inpatient Databases (SID).  These 97 hospitals represented the final sample used 
in the study with individual hospitals as the unit of analysis.  Databases were merged 
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using a unique hospital identifier, the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
identification number, present in each of the data sets.  The ability to match the 
NDNQI hospitals was based on several factors but was dependent primarily on the 
hospital including their AHA number when reporting administrative data.  Some states 
do not submit data to either NIS or SID and some do not include hospital identifiers.  
Therefore, hospitals were excluded from the study if it was not possible to link the 
institution with their NDNQI data using the AHA number.  Also, the Patient Safety 
Indicators (PSIs) are specific to adult medical/surgical practice so pediatric institutions 
and psychiatric hospitals were eliminated.  Federal hospitals do not submit data to the 
NIS or SID.  Therefore, hospitals from this category also were excluded. 
The NIS data resulted in a match of 44 hospitals with the NDNQI data set.  
Subsequently SID data were obtained to increase the sample size used in the study.  
Like NIS data, the SID data include discharge abstract information.  However, the data 
are inclusive of all hospital discharges from the state, not a limited sample.   
Hospital characteristics 
 
   The participant hospital’s locations by state are listed in Table 2 (page 54) 
and other defining hospital characteristics are summarized in Table 3 (page 54).  
Hospitals located in 20 states were represented with the highest percentage of 
hospitals located in New York (19.6%), California (12.4%), New Jersey (12.4%), and 
Florida (9.3%).   Hospital Bedsize was categorized into one of six groups defined by 
the number of licensed beds reported by the NDNQI participating hospitals.   
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Table 2 
Hospital Location by State 
State n % of total 
Arkansas 1 1.0 
Arizona 6 6.2 
California 12 12.4 
Colorado 3 3.1 
Connecticut 1 1.0 
Florida 9 9.3 
Iowa 1 1.0 
Illinois 3 3.1 
Massachusetts 2 2.1 
Maryland 8 8.2 
Minnesota 2 2.1 
Missouri 2 2.1 
North Carolina 3 3.1 
New Hampshire 1 1.0 
New Jersey 12 12.4 
New York 19 19.6 
Rhode Island 1 1.0 
Utah 9 9.3 
Vermont 1 1.0 
Wisconsin 1 1.0 
Total N 97 100 
 
 
Table 3 
Hospital Characteristics 
Characteristics   
Hospital Bed Size n % of total 
0-99 14 14.5 
100-199 21 21.6 
200-299 18 18.6 
300-399 17 17.5 
400-499 10 10.3 
>500 17 17.5 
Magnet Status n % 
Not Magnet 70 72.2 
Designated magnet 27 27.8 
Teaching Status n % 
Academic 24 24.7 
Teaching 28 28.9 
Non-teaching 45 46.4 
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Sample hospitals ranged in size from the lowest category of 0-99 beds (14.5%) to the 
highest greater than 500 beds (17.5%) with the majority of hospitals (85.5%) having 
greater than 100 beds.  Most hospitals were identified as non-teaching (48%), although 
academic (24.7%) and teaching (28.9%) hospitals were similar in number.  The 
majority of hospitals had not received Magnet designation (72.2%). 
Unit Types 
NDNQI RN Survey data are derived from individual RN responses within 
hospitals.  Only units with a 50% response rate or greater were included in the study 
based on Elliott’s (2006) psychometric analysis of the NDNQI RN Survey Data 
aggregation.  Elliott concluded this level of participation was representative of the 
work group.  RN responses from seven different unit types were included:  Medical, 
Surgical, Medical/Surgical, ICU, Stepdown, Rehabilitation, and Surgical Services.  
These specific unit types were used because the four AHRQ PSIs included in the study 
represent potential quality of care issues experienced by hospitalized medical and 
surgical patients.  The unit types were chosen because the patient populations cared 
for on these units were consistent with the types of patients that may experience the 
selected PSIs.  Other unit types such as pediatrics, psychiatric, and outpatient clinic 
areas were excluded.    
Sample size 
Kline (2005) suggests several methods that may be used with structural 
equation modeling to conduct a power analysis.  A power analysis is used to determine 
the probability that the statistical results of the study will lead to a rejection of the null 
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hypothesis if the hypothesis is false (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).  One approach 
discussed by Kline (2005) involves a model level analysis first developed by 
MacCallum, Browne and Sugawara (1996).  The researcher specifies the alpha, 
degrees of freedom, desired power, and RMSEA.  Using these parameters, an 
adequate sample size is calculated based on the RMSEA and noncentral chi square.  
Publicly available software was used to conduct these calculations (Preacher, & 
Coffman, 2006) under the following specifications: power 80%, degrees of freedom 
101, null RMSEA 0.01, and alternate RMSEA 0.08.  The degrees of freedom were 
determined by subtracting the degrees of freedom in the saturated model (136) from 
the degrees of freedom in the hypothesized model (35).  The parameters identified for 
the null RMSEA (0.01) and alternate RMSEA (0.08) were chosen to specify a close fit 
in the population (Kline, 2005).  Based on these specifications a minimum sample size 
of 67 was identified.  Therefore, the final sample of 97 was considered adequate to 
conduct the analysis of the data based on the hypothesized model.   
Data Sources 
NDNQI Data 
The NDNQI resulted from the American Nurses Association’s (ANA) Nursing 
Report Card project and represents the only national U.S. nurse-sensitive database.  In 
1998, the NDNQI was established with indicators conceptually based on the structure, 
process, and outcome model proposed by Avedis Donabedian (Dunton, Gajewski, 
Taunton, & Moore, 2004; Gallagher & Rowell, 2003; Jennings, Loan, DePaul, Brosch 
& Hildreth, 2001).   Through the development of the NDNQI, the ANA intended to 
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meet two goals.  The first goal was to provide data that could be used within 
institutions in quality improvement activities.  The second goal was to establish a data 
resource for researchers studying specific relationships between nursing and patient 
outcomes.   
The NDNQI RN Survey with Job Satisfaction Scales includes several 
instruments measuring perception of the work environment, quality of care, and other 
work contextual items.  The scales include an NDNQI adaptation of selected items of 
the Nursing Work Index (Aiken & Patrician, 2000), the Index of Work Satisfaction 
(Stamps, 1997; Taunton et al., 2004), the NDNQI-adapted Job Enjoyment Scale 
(Brayfield, & Roth, 1951), and work contextual items, for example, situations on the 
last shift worked, unit quality of care, breaks (Rogers, Hwang, & Scott, 2004), and 
shift rotation.   
NDNQI participation is voluntary and may be supported by nursing leaders for 
a variety of reasons such as comparison of performance on nursing care indicators 
with other institutions, preparation for or meeting benchmarking requirements set by 
the American Nurses Credentialing Center’s (ANCC) Magnet Recognition Program®, 
and evaluation of internal organizational trends and performance.  An institution may 
participate in the entire survey including the NDNQI-Adapted Index of Work 
Satisfaction, NDNQI-Adapted Nursing Work Index, and the NDNQI-Adapted Job 
Enjoyment Scale or a short form of the survey.    
NDNQI data quality is enhanced through the use of automated tools available 
to hospital site coordinators and NDNQI staff.  Data are entered into a specific data 
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entry portion of the NDNQI web site by individuals that have demonstrated 
knowledge regarding the specific NDNQI protocol.  During data entry immediate 
automated feedback identifies missing or anomalous data.  In addition, automated data 
reports are employed for error checking and data proofing.   
NIS and SID Data 
The NIS and SID are two of the databases included in the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP) and were developed through a coordinated federal, state, 
and industry effort sponsored by AHRQ.   HCUP databases are intended to inform 
healthcare decision makers and to provide data for research.  HCUP includes five 
databases with the NIS and SID databases representing inpatient encounter 
information.  NIS and SID data include discharge abstract information from inpatient 
hospital stays.  Data submission is coordinated through individual state data 
organizations that have partnered with AHRQ.   The NIS data set approximates a 20% 
stratified sample of community hospitals.   The 2005 NIS data are supplied from 1054 
hospitals across 37 states (AHRQ, 2007, June).  The 2005 SID represents all inpatient 
hospitalizations from 38 participating states and includes over 90 percent of U.S. 
community hospital discharges.  Twenty-six of the participating states allow inclusion 
of hospital level identifiers.  The NIS stratified sample is drawn from the SID.  HCUP 
data undergo basic quality data checks such as determining diagnosis code validity 
and gender checks to evaluate diagnoses or procedures that are gender specific.   
NIS or SID data sets were used in the AHRQ sponsored development of the 
Patient Safety Indicators.  PSI rates for individual hospitals are determined by using 
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statistical analyses that apply PSI algorithms including specific inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to the data.  The PSIs were derived from billing codes and represent 
a set of potentially preventable complications associated with inpatient care.   Four 
PSIs (Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue, Infection Resulting from Medical Care, 
Postoperative Pulmonary Embolus or Deep Vein Thrombosis) purported as sensitive 
to nursing care (Clarke, & Aiken, 2003; Hugonnet, Chevrolet, & Pettet, 2007; 
Morrison, 2006; Needleman, Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, & Zelevinsky, 2002; Seago, 
Williamson, & Atwood, 2006) were used in the study.   
Measures 
Exogenous Variables 
The exogenous variables included in the research analysis model were derived 
from the NDNQI RN Survey with Job Satisfaction Scales data set.  NDNQI first 
offered the annual RN Survey with Job Satisfaction Scales in 2002 after extensive 
psychometric evaluation.   Taunton et al. (2004) reported the results of a pilot study 
and two additional studies conducted to evaluate the psychometric properties of the 
NDNQI adaptation of the Index of Work Satisfaction (IWS).  The IWS, developed by 
Stamps (1997), included scales measuring various components associated with 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the work environment.  With Dr. Stamps permission, 
NDNQI staff adapted the instrument to include group level rather than individual level 
referents, separated questions containing multiple concepts, and refined item wording.  
The pilot study to evaluate the adapted survey was conducted with 431 RNs from 10 
NDNQI participating hospitals.  Using exploratory principal components factor 
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analysis a six factor solution was identified as the most interpretable and each scale 
had an acceptable internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging 0.71 to 
0.87 (Taunton et al., 2004).   
Following the initial pilot, Study I using the adapted IWS tool was conducted 
to re-evaluate the instrument’s subscale structure and assess concurrent validity 
(Taunton et al., 2004).  Ten NDNQI participating urban hospitals volunteered with 
918 RNs responding to the survey.  A marker item was added to each subscale and 
served as a representative of the items specific to the focus of the subscale.  In 
addition, selected items from the Index on Job Satisfaction (Brayfield & Roth, 1951) 
were added to the survey to evaluate concurrent validity.  Truncated principal 
components analysis with Varimax rotation was used to evaluate the underlying 
structure of the survey.  A seven factor solution was determined to be the most 
interpretable and explained 53% of the variance for the IWS.  Cronbach’s alpha scores 
were identified as acceptable (> 0.7) for the scales of Task (0.77), Nurse-Physician 
Interaction (0.85), Decision Making (0.81), Autonomy (0.71), but not for Nurse-Nurse 
Interaction (0.66) and Professional Status (0.49).  The reliability of the composite was 
reported as 0.9 using theta.  Concurrent validity was supported using Brayfield and 
Roth’s (1951) job enjoyment items which explained 58% of the variance of the 
NDNQI IWS.   
Study II was conducted to confirm the dimensionality of the NDNQI-Adapted 
IWS, reexamine concurrent validity using the scores on the Index and Job Enjoyment, 
to evaluate scores on items with a group and an individual referent, and to determine 
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the feasibility of internet data collection (Taunton et al., 2004).  Eleven NDNQI 
hospitals volunteered to participate in Study II and 2277 RNs completed the survey.  
Internal consistency reliability was acceptable except for the Professional Status 
subscale (0.63).  Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to reevaluate the factor 
structure.  The statistical analyses supported the seven factor model of the IWS and the 
unidimensional structure for Job Enjoyment.  Concurrent validity was also supported 
with the IWS subscales explaining 56% of the variance in Job Enjoyment.   
The NDNQI adapted Nursing Work Index scales also have demonstrated 
internal consistency reliability.  Cronbach’s alpha scores were identified as acceptable 
(> 0.7) based on evaluation of the 2005 NDNQI RN Survey data for the Professional 
Development (0.876), Supportive Nursing Management (0.916), and Nursing 
Administration (0.874) scales.   
The NDNQI Job Satisfaction scales were used to operationalize Organization 
Support and Work Unit Support.  The response options for each item were represented 
by a six point Likert scale except for Quality of Care where a four point scale was 
used.  Higher scores represent positive responses.  Negatively worded items are 
reverse scored so that higher scores remain indicative of a positive response.  The 
scales to define Organization Support and Work Unit Support were chosen based on 
their consistency with HROT concepts at the work group level or the organization 
leadership level.   
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Organization Support 
Organization Support was measured using three scales including two 
(Professional Development and Nursing Administration) from the NDNQI adapted 
Nursing Work Index and one (Autonomy) derived from the NDNQI adapted Index of 
Work Satisfaction.     
The Professional Development scale contains items consistent with the culture 
of safety concepts of organization learning, as well as, the concept of deference to 
expertise described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001).  The individual items reflect 
leadership and organization level support for these concepts. Organization learning 
was identified in the original research conducted in high reliability systems and refers 
to the support for training and continual learning of all team members (Roberts, 
1990b).  A complementary concept to organizational learning was described by Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2001) as deference to expertise and refers to a system where problems 
are not handled in a hierarchical manner but rather migrate through the system to the 
individual(s) with the greatest expertise.    
The Nursing Administration scale is consistent with the concepts of centralized 
decision making with items reflective of hospital leadership support of these concepts.  
Centralized decision making was identified in the original studies of highly reliable 
systems as a strategy used by system leaders to set values and goals (Grabowski & 
Roberts, 1997; Weick, 1987).   
The Autonomy scale describes the level of control nurses have over their work 
and is consistent with the culture of safety concepts of autonomy (Grabowski & 
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Roberts, 1997) and decentralized decision making (Weick, 1987).  The items 
contained within the scale reflect leadership’s support of nurses’ control over day-to-
day practice.  Decentralized decision making is linked with centralized decision 
making in that leaders determine the underlying values and goals for the system but 
then support front line staff to make decentralized decisions based on their knowledge 
of the overall goals and specialized training (Weick, 1987).  These three scales were 
suggested to be representative of the Organization Support for a culture of safety. 
Work Unit Support 
Work Unit Support was measured using four scales (Task, Nurse-Nurse 
Interaction, Nurse-MD Interaction, Decision Making) from the NDNQI adapted Index 
of Work Satisfaction, and one scale (Supportive Nursing Management) from the 
NDNQI adapted Nursing Work Index.  Additionally, and one Work Contextual item 
specific to the quality of nursing care on the last shift worked (Unit Quality of Care) 
also was used from the NDNQI RN Survey.   
The Task scale is consistent with the concepts of redundancy, deference to 
expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) and decentralized decision making.  The items 
reflect work unit practices related to patient care.  Deference to expertise and 
decentralized decision making were described earlier.  Redundancy refers to the use of 
more than one method to check the accuracy of critical steps in high risk processes 
(Roberts, 1990b).   
Teamwork is a concept often cited as important to a culture of safety (Jeffcott, 
Pidgeion, Weymand, & Walls, 2006; Roberts, 1990a; Roberts, 1990b; Weick & 
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Roberts, 1993).  In the study, teamwork was measured using a composite of the Nurse-
Nurse Interaction and Nurse-MD Interaction scales.  Both scales include items 
reflective of the work group interactions and effectiveness.  To create the variable a 
series of steps were taken.  First a factor analysis was conducted using the Nurse-
Nurse Interaction, Nurse-Physician Interaction, and cross-products of the Nurse-Nurse 
Interaction and Nurse Physician Interaction standardized scores for each hospital.  
Initial factor analysis using principal components analysis with Varimax rotation and 
extraction of items with eigenvalue ≥ 1.0 resulted in a one factor solution.  By 
conducting a factor analysis using the three variables, an interpretation could be made 
regarding how well the hospital level scores group together and if the scores could be 
combined to reflect a composite hospital variable representing teamwork.  The one 
factor solution explained 85.7% of the variance and was further supported by 
evaluating the Scree plot.  Based on the factor analysis results it was determined the 
crossproducts of the Nurse-Nurse and Nurse-Physician Interaction scores would be 
used as the variable for Teamwork.   
The Decision Making scale is consistent with the concepts of reluctance to 
simplify (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) and trust.  Individual items reflect nurses’ ability to 
impact important policy decisions on the work unit.  Reluctance to simplify refers to 
the commitment of leaders and front line staff to obtain all the information needed to 
make accurate decisions (Weick & Sutcliffe).  This approach may not offer the most 
expedient resolution but is thought to contribute to safer more efficacious decision 
making (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Trust refers to individuals’ expectations of others 
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but also of their trust in organizational systems (Jeffcott, Pidgeion, Weymand, & 
Walls, 2006). 
The Supportive Nursing Management scale is consistent with the concepts of 
centralized and decentralized decision making and a reluctance to simplify.  The items 
in this scale refer to the unit manager or work group leader characteristics.   
One item identified as a work contextual item was included in the measure of 
work unit support for a culture of safety.  The item addresses the Unit Quality of Work 
and was conceptualized for this research as a global composite of the culture of safety 
construct. 
Other organization support variables were included in the model analysis 
including, Hospital Size, RN Staffing, Teaching Status, and Magnet Designation.   
These variables were derived from the NDNQI data set. 
Endogenous Variables 
 The outcome of interest is hospital Patient Safety as manifested by four of the 
AHRQ PSIs including: Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue, Selected Infections Due to 
Medical Care, and Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein Thrombosis.  
AHRQ PSIs were first published in 2002 based on the work done by Miller, 
Elixhauser, Zhan, and Meyer (2001) and are purported to represent potentially 
preventable iatrogenic events or complications associated with health care.  A four 
phase process was used in the development of the PSI’s.  Initially, an evaluation of 
existing measures and a literature review related to International Classification of 
Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes was conducted (Miller 
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et al.).  Phase Two included a hand search of the ICD-9-CM codes identified in phase 
one as potentially suitable patient safety indicators.  A subset of codes then was 
identified.  During Phase three inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed for 
each ICD-9-CM code in the subset.  Inclusion criteria were used to identify the type of 
discharge so that the appropriate risk pool of patients was included in the indicator.  
Exclusion criteria were used to remove PSI events deemed non-preventable or 
unrelated to a medical error (Miller et al.).  In the development of the inclusion criteria 
the researchers also decided if the ICD-9-CM code was only to be included in the 
indicator algorithm if it was listed as a secondary diagnosis.  Because secondary 
diagnoses generally represent a condition that has occurred during the hospital stay, 
the researchers took this conservative approach and excluded primary diagnoses that 
are most often present on admission.   
Phase Four involved testing of the PSI algorithms using HCUP data from the 
State of New York (Miller et al., 2001).  The researchers reported higher length of stay 
and greater mortality rates for discharges with PSI events.  Also, PSI events were 
associated with increasing age, male gender, white ethnicity, Medicare and private pay 
insurance, not-for profit hospital, major teaching status, higher nurse expertise, urban 
location, higher number of hospital beds, and institutions using a higher number of 
diagnosis codes (Miller et al.).  However, based on multivariate regression analysis 
they did not find a substantial predictive ability of these variables, which the 
researchers attributed to the many individual and hospital level factors not included in 
the administrative data set that may better predict the occurrence of PSIs.   
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Romano et al. (2003) refined the PSIs by adding codes to improve the 
identification of potential safety events.  Content validity of the indicators was 
evaluated using multi-disciplinary panels of reviewers.  PSIs were maintained if the 
reviewers could confirm the diagnosis in at least 75 % of the reported cases and 
physician reviewers more often identified flagged cases rather than controls as process 
of care failures (Romano et al.).  Face validity was evaluated using an expert coding 
consultant with consensual validation by eleven panels consisting of seven to nine 
clinicians nominated through their professional organizations.  After revision of the 
PSIs based on these findings, the 1995-2000 HCUP data were used to evaluate their 
performance.  Based on this analysis the researchers reported the individual PSI rates 
by hospital geographic location, owner status, and teaching status.  A higher incidence 
of many of the PSIs was found in urban teaching hospitals although the researchers 
noted that the limited ability to risk adjust administrative data was a limitation.  The 
researchers concluded that the AHRQ PSIs are appropriate as screening tools and 
would provide useful information on the epidemiology of patient safety (Romano et 
al.).  
 Subsequently, researchers have expanded their studies to examine the 
relationships between specific variables and the PSIs .  As described in Chapter 2, 
studies have evaluated the relationship between PSIs and inpatient length of stay, 
mortality, and hospital charges (Zhan & Miller, 2003b), the patient or hospital 
characteristics associated with PSIs (Grobman, Feinglass, & Murthy, 2006; Thornlow 
& Stukenborg 2006; Zhan, Smith, & Stryer 2006), the care delivery model and PSI 
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rates (Simonson, Ahern, & Hendryx, 2007), and the comparison between PSI 
Decubitus Ulcer rates and rates identified using medical record review (Polancich, & 
Prosser, 2006).   
 Four PSIs were used in this study to evaluate the quality of care at the hospital 
level including: Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue, Deep Vein Thrombosis, and 
Selected Infections due to Medical Care.  Each PSI has specific inclusion and 
exclusion algorithms based on ICD-9-CDM codes as part of the indicator.  These 
algorithms are included in publicly available AHRQ software and were used to 
calculate hospital rates for each indicator. 
The Decubitus Ulcer PSI is defined as hospital discharges with ICD-9-CM 
code of decubitus ulcer in any secondary diagnosis field among cases meeting the 
inclusion and exclusion rules for the denominator.  All medical and surgical 
discharges for patients 18 years of age and older are included in the denominator.  
Exclusions are characteristics such as a hospital stay of less than five days, admission 
from a long term care facility, and specific neurologic diagnoses.  The incidence of 
Decubitus Ulcer reported by AHRQ for 2004 equaled 26.051 cases per 1000 
discharges (AHRQ HCUPnet Decubitus Ulcer, n.d.).  However, in this report all age 
groups were included in the denominator.  A recently published HealthGrades (2007) 
report of the incidence of PSIs in U.S. hospitals using 2004 Medicare data identified 
decubitus ulcer rates as 31.994 cases per 1000 discharges. 
 Failure to Rescue, now identified as Death Among Surgical Inpatients with 
Serious Treatable Complications, is defined as all discharges with a disposition of 
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“deceased” among cases meeting the inclusion and exclusion rules.  All discharges 18 
years and older with potential complications of care are identified as failure to rescue 
cases.  Specific complications such as the following diagnoses: nosocomial 
pneumonia, deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolus, sepsis, acute renal failure, 
shock/cardiac arrest, or gastrointestinal hemorrhage/acute ulcer are included in the 
indicator (AHRQ, 2007, March).  Exclusion criteria include cases over age 75 years, 
transfers from a long-term care or another acute care facility, as well as, specific 
exclusion criteria for each diagnosis included in the failure to rescue definition.  
AHRQ reported the overall incidence of Failure to Rescue based on 2004 data as 
119.00 cases per 1000 population at risk with the age criteria applied as noted (AHRQ 
HCUPnet: Failure to Rescue, n.d.).  The Failure to Rescue incidence reported by 
HealthGrades (2007) using 2004 Medicare data was 131.903 cases per 1000 
discharges. 
 Selected Infections due to Medical Care includes all discharges with the ICD-
9-CM code of 999.3 (other infection after infusion, injection, transfusion, vaccination) 
or 996.62 (infection and inflammatory reaction due to other vascular device, implant, 
and graft) in any secondary diagnosis field among cases meeting the inclusion and 
exclusion rules for the denominator.  Included in the denominator are all surgical and 
medical discharges 18 years of age or older or Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) 14 
(pregnancy, childbirth, and puerperium) (AHRQ, 2007, March).   Exclusions include 
length of stay less than two days, and any ICD-9-CM code indicating an 
immunocompromised state or cancer.  AHRQ reported the 2004 incidence of this PSI 
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as 1.565 cases per 1000 discharges (AHRQ HCUPnet Selected Infections Due to 
Medical Care, n.d.).  However the age exclusion was not applied in the report.  
HealthGrades (2007) reported the incidence of Selected Infections Due to Medical 
Care as 2.241 cases per 1000 discharges using 2004 Medicare data. 
 Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein Thrombosis is defined as 
discharges among cases meeting the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the 
denominator with ICD-9-CM codes for deep vein thrombosis or pulmonary embolism 
in any secondary diagnosis field.  All surgical discharges age 18 or older are included 
in the denominator.  Excluded cases are those with a procedure code indicative of 
interruption of the vena cava and those with MDC 14 (pregnancy, childbirth, and 
puerperium).  AHRQ reported the incidence of this PSI as 8.947 cases per 1000 
discharges based on 2004 data, however as noted previously the age criteria were not 
applied to the data (AHRQ HCUPnet Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism, n.d.).  The 
HealthGrades (2007) report identified the incidence of Postoperative Pulmonary 
Embolism or Deep Vein Thrombosis as 11.998 cases per 1000 discharges using 2004 
Medicare data. 
Level of Analysis 
Data Aggregation - Indices of Reliability and Validity 
Aggregated data should meet certain criteria to insure shared property 
representation.  Aggregated item means are used to calculate reliability indices such as 
Cronbach’s alpha.  Inter-item correlations generally recommended between 0.30 to 
0.70 at the individual level should exceed 0.60 when evaluating aggregated data 
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because aggregated correlations are usually higher than those generated using 
individual responses (Verran, Mark, & Lamb, 1994).  Analysis of variance procedures 
are used to further evaluate reliability and validity.  For data aggregated at the group 
or organization level, less variation within the work unit compared to between units is 
expected.  A significant F ratio with a probability level of less than or equal to 0.05 is 
indicative of greater between-group than within-group variability.  A significant F 
ratio supports validity of the measure as a group phenomenon and suggests the mean 
can be used to represent group opinion (Forbes, & Taunton, 1994).  Glick (1985) 
identified an intraclass correlation (ICC[1,k]) greater than 0.60 as necessary to support 
aggregation of data to the group level.  Glick also suggested the ICC (1,k) measures 
aggregated reliability by giving an estimate of mean rater reliability rather than 
individual rater reliability (Glick, 1985).  The ICC (1,1), indicative of individual rater 
reliability, and the eta squared coefficient, an estimate of effect size, also are used to 
evaluate perceptual agreement (Hughes, & Anderson, 1994).  Scores for both ICC 
(1,1) and eta-squared range between 0 to 1 with 1 representing perfect perceptual 
agreement.  A recommended ICC (1,1) and eta-squared have not been established but 
lower scores are indicative of high variability within groups or low variability between 
groups (Hughes, & Anderson, 1994).   Omega-squared also has been identified as an 
indicator of effect size of an independent variable and is thought to be less likely to 
overestimate effect sizes as the number of groups increases (Forbes, & Taunton, 
1994). 
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NDNQI RN Survey Data Aggregation – Hospital Level 
In a recent study (Elliott, 2006) NDNQI RN Survey and Job Satisfaction 2004 
data were evaluated to determine the appropriateness of data aggregation at the work 
unit and hospital level.  These results were compared with the conceptualized level in 
the hypothesized model to evaluate consistency with the reported findings.  
Professional Development, Nursing Administration, and Autonomy are hypothesized 
as hospital level variables in the current research.  Indices of reliability and validity 
were assessed to determine the appropriateness of aggregating data at the hypothesized 
level (Elliott, 2006).  The data evaluated were based on 50 percent group participation 
in the survey.  Reliability was evaluated based on reported Cronbach’s alpha, interitem 
correlations, and percent of interitem correlations greater than 0.60.  Cronbach’s alpha 
was greater than 0.90 for all three scales indicating internal consistency reliability 
within the group, in this case, organization or hospital level.  Interitem correlations 
aggregated at the hospital level also were evaluated.  Nurse Administration interitem 
correlation ranged from 0.73 to 0.89, Professional Development 0.25 to 0.90 and 
Autonomy ranged from 0.50 to 0.82.  The percent of interitem correlations above 0.60 
was greater than 60 percent for both the Autonomy and Nurse Administrator scales.  
However, the Professional Development scale had 51 percent of the interitem 
correlations greater than 0.60.   
Indices of validity at the hospital level were also evaluated.  ICC (1,k) were 
greater than 0.60 for each scale (Autonomy (0.82), Professional Development (0.84), 
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and Nurse Administrator (0.89)), indicating stability across groups drawn from the 
same population.  ICC (1,1) were evaluated to determine hospital level perceptual 
agreement with all representing medium (0.12) to large (≥ 0.30) correlations thereby 
indicating perceptual agreement: Autonomy (0.29), Professional Development (0.32), 
and Nurse Administrator (0.43).  Eta squared and Omega-squared also were evaluated 
for the three scales at the hospital level and all showed a medium (η2 = 0.25, ω2= 0.25) 
to large (η2 = 0.40, ω2= 0.40) effect size indicating perceptual agreement: Autonomy 
(η2 = 0.3, ω2= 0.29), Professional  Development (η2 = 0.32, ω2= 0.32), and Nurse 
Administrator (η2 = 0.42, ω2= 0.41).  F ratios for each scale were significant at the 
0.05 level of probability. 
NDNQI RN Survey Data Aggregation – Work Unit Level 
Task, Nurse-Nurse Interaction, Nurse-MD Interaction, Decision Making, 
Supportive Nurse Management are conceptualized in the current research as work unit 
level indicators.  As with the conceptualized hospital level indicators, these were 
evaluated based on previous research finding to determine consistency with the 
proposed model (Elliott, 2006).  The data evaluated were based on 50 percent group 
participation in the survey.  Cronbach’s alpha was greater than 0.90 for all five scales 
indicating internal consistency within the group, in this case work unit level.  Interitem 
correlations aggregated at the work unit level also were evaluated.  Task interitem 
correlations ranged from 0.61 to 0.85, Nurse-Nurse Interaction 0.54 to 0.87, Nurse-
MD Interaction 0.74 to 0.92, Decision Making 0.55 to 0.80 and Supportive Nurse 
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Management 0.70 to 0.94.  All of the scales had interitem correlation of 0.60 for 
greater than 60 percent of items.   
Indices of validity at the work unit level also were evaluated.  ICC (1,k) were 
greater than 0.60 for each scale with Task (0.87), Nurse-Nurse Interaction (0.83), 
Nurse-MD Interaction (0.83), Decision Making (0.85), and Supportive Nurse 
Management (0.88) indicating stability across groups drawn from the same 
population.  ICC (1,1) were evaluated to determine hospital level perceptual 
agreement with all representing medium (0.12) to large (≥ 0.30) correlations, thereby 
indicating perceptual agreement: Task (0.30), Nurse-Nurse Interaction (0.28), Nurse-
MD Interaction (0.27), Decision Making (0.24), and Supportive Nurse Management 
(0.27).  Eta squared and Omega-squared also were evaluated for the five scales at the 
work unit level and all showed a medium (η2 = 0.25, ω2= 0.25) effect size indicating 
perceptual agreement: Task (η2 = 0.29 ω2= 0.29), Nurse-Nurse Interaction (η2 = 0.24, 
ω2= 0.24), Nurse-MD Interaction (η2 = 0.24, ω2= 0.24), Decision Making (η2 = 0.26, 
ω2= 0.26), and Supportive Nurse Management (η2 = 0.32, ω2= 0.32).  F ratios for each 
of the scales were statistically significant at the 0.05 level of probability.  Based on the 
evaluation of these indices data aggregation at the hypothesized level is supported. 
Procedures 
 The NIS and SID data sets were obtained from AHRQ after submission of an 
HCUP application.  Included in the application process is a requirement that all 
researchers involved in data analysis complete the AHRQ HCUP data use agreement 
training.  The on-line training emphasizes data protection, describes the individual 
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researcher’s responsibility in using the data, and is meant to reduce the risk of 
violations (AHRQ, HCUP Data Use Agreement Training, n.d.).  The data use 
agreement training was completed by the researcher and those identified to support the 
data analysis process.  The data were provided for the selected year in compact discs 
with compressed files in ASCII format.  Permission to use NDNQI data for the study 
was obtained after submission of a Student Research Scientist agreement outlining the 
study proposal.  The research proposal was submitted to the Health Subjects 
Committee of the University of Kansas Medical Center and approval obtained. 
Data Preparation 
 The NDNQI RN Survey and Staffing data sets were prepared for analysis 
using SPSS 15.0.  Variables were aggregated to the unit, unit type, and then hospital 
level.  The Teamwork variable was created as described earlier.  RN Hours Per Patient 
Day (HPPD) were calculated by unit and aggregated by unit type and then by hospital 
using the NDNQI Staffing data set.  The RN Staffing variable was created as 
described in the next section of this chapter.  After completion of the initial data 
preparation, the two NDNQI datasets were merged using the unique AHA hospital 
number.   
The NIS and SID datasets were used to calculate the AHRQ PSIs.  SAS v9.1 
was used with the AHRQ QI SAS modules (v 3.21a) to calculate the observed and risk 
adjusted rates for each of the four PSI indicators used in the study.  The software 
includes specifications to calculate risk-adjusted rates that adjust for case mix 
differences and expected rates that adjust for performance differences (AHRQ, 2007, 
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March 12). These data were exported to a Microsoft® Office Excel 2003 file and then 
imported into a SPSS 15.0 file.  The two SPSS datasets (NDNQI RN Survey and 
Staffing dataset and AHRQ PSI dataset) were compared to identify matching 
hospitals.  A final sample of 97 hospitals was included in the study.  Upon completion 
of data preparation the merged data set was converted to an ASCII file to allow 
structural equation modeling analysis using MPlus 5.1.   
Missing data 
The data were evaluated for missing values.  NDNQI RN Survey scores are 
calculated only if a given respondent has four or more items on a scale with a 
response.  These scales then were aggregated to the unit and then hospital level.  
Therefore, there were no missing survey data in this data set. However, decisions were 
required related to the creation of the RN Staffing variable.  Some hospitals had not 
submitted staffing data on each of the eligible unit types with staffing data (Medical, 
Surgical, Medical/Surgical, ICU, Stepdown, and Rehabilitation) within their 
institution.   Missing data were less than 6% for the eligible unit types present in the 
hospital except for Rehabilitation Units where the missing data figure equaled 30%.  
In addition, some institutions did not have each unit type within their institution.  
Therefore, these hospitals did not, nor could they have, reported staffing data for those 
unit types.  To address both of these issues, a composite RN Staffing variable was 
developed using the following approach.  A standardized z-score was created using the 
mean and standard deviation for each unit type.  The scores were aggregated to the 
hospital level thereby giving a summary of RN staffing adjusted for each unit type.  
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This became the RN Staffing variable for each hospital and eliminated the need to 
impute data to address these situations.     
 Although the strategy described above addressed issues related to differences 
between hospitals’ reporting of staffing data for eligible unit types, it did not resolve 
an issue of missing staffing data for five hospitals.  Three hospitals had not submitted 
staffing data during the third quarter of 2005 but had submitted staffing data earlier in 
the year, and two had not reported any staffing data.  Third quarter data were used in 
the study because collection occurred in close proximity (the quarter prior) to 
participants’ completion of the NDNQI RN Survey.  Three of the hospitals had 
reported staffing data for the second quarter of 2005 but third quarter data were not 
submitted.  A decision was made to use second quarter staffing data for these 
institutions as a proxy measure for the third quarter data.  Two hospitals had not 
reported any staffing data during 2005.  Imputed values were entered for these 
institutions using the following strategy.   A regression analysis was conducted using 
the 95 hospitals in the sample with staffing data.  Hospital size, Hospital teaching 
status, and Magnet status were regressed on the RN Staffing variable.  A RN Staffing 
value was calculated for the two hospitals based on their hospital characteristics.  The 
calculated value was imputed for these two institutions.    
Data Analysis 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to model the proposed 
relationships and to answer the research questions.   
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1. What are the direct effects of Work Unit Support and Organization Support on 
Patient Safety? 
2. What effect does the indirect relationship of Organization Support on Work 
Unit Support have on Patient Safety? 
The hypothesized model was tested using Mplus, a SEM package.  The SEM included 
an evaluation of the fit between the correlation matrix from the hypothesized model 
and the data as well as the strength of the saturated correlation matrix. SEM also was 
used to test the indirect effects specified within the research model.  The results of the 
initial analysis led to an exploration of alternate models and the development of a final 
alternate model that provided a reasonable fit with the data.     
Assumptions 
 Multivariate normality is a common assumption of SEM (Kline, 2005).  Kline 
(2005) recommends evaluating the impact of outliers as nonnormality can result in an 
underestimation of the model fit and standard errors.  The final dataset was evaluated 
for normality and interpretability.  To evaluate multivariate normality, probability 
plots were developed and skewness and kurtosis values were evaluated for each 
variable (See Tables 4 and 5, page 79).  Decubitus Ulcer (1.216) and DVT (1.433) 
were skewed positively but were still below an extremely skewed value of 3.0 (Kline, 
2005).   Decubitus Ulcer (2.114) and DVT (3.395) also had kurtosis values indicative 
of a positive kurtosis but were less than an extreme value defined by Kline (2005) as 
an absolute kurtosis above 8.0 (Kline, 2005).  Histograms were created for each 
variable to further evaluate data distribution.  No significant problems were identified 
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with data normality, therefore the basic assumptions of a structural equation analysis 
were supported.   
Structural Equation Model 
Figure 3 (page 80) depicts the hypothesized causal model and the relationships 
to be tested.  The model is recursive, reflecting unidirectional causation.  Three latent 
varaibles, depicted as circles, include Work Unit Support, Organization Support, and 
Patient Safety.  Each of the latent variables has identified empirical indicators that are 
the operational indicators for the factor.  Work Unit Support was defined using five of 
the NDNQI RN Survey with Job Satisfaction scales (Task, Teamwork, Decision 
 
Table 4 
Exogenous Variables: Survey Statistics by Dimension   
Variables Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Quality of Care 3.29 0.1745 0.03 -0.324  0.887 
Task 3.17 0.2642 0.07 -0.025  0.242 
Teamwork 4.08 0.2009 0.04  0.087  0.205 
Decision Making 3.20 0.2548 0.07 -0.123  0.267 
Supportive Nursing Management 4.04 0.3235 0.11 -0.207  0.153 
Professional Development 4.14 0.2618 0.07 -0.504  1.202 
Nurse Administration 3.68 0.3543 0.12 -0.143 -0.538 
Autonomy 3.45 0.1944 0.04  0.101 -0.152 
Note. SD= standard deviation 
 
Table 5 
Endogenous Variables:Risk Adjusted PSI Rates 
Variables Mean SD Variance Skewness  Kurtosis 
Decubitus Ulcer 0.0243 0.0128 0.0001635  1.216  2.114 
Failure to Rescue 0.0914 0.0635 0.0040299 -0.164 -0.893 
Infections due to Medical 
Care 
0.0024 0.0014 0.00000019  0.336 -0.346 
Postoperative Pulmonary 
Embolus or Deep Vein 
Thrombosis 
0.0113 0.0061 0.0000037 1.433 3.695 
Note. SD= standard deviation 
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Making, Supportive Nurse Management, and Unit Quality of Work).  Organization 
Support, the second latent variable was operationalized using three scales 
(Professional Development, Nursing Administration, and Autonomy).  Patient Safety 
was operationalized by the selected AHRQ PSIs.  Each of the scales used as indicators  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
has an error term associated with it to designate the unexplained variance for observed 
variables.  The latent variables have an associated disturbance term used to designate 
unexplained variance in the latent variables. Four manifest or observed variables are 
represented by boxes and include: Hospital Bedsize, Teaching Status, RN Staffing, 
and Magnet Status. The RN Staffing variable was created using RN Hours Per Patient 
Day (HPPD) data reported for the quarter prior to the administration of the NDNQI 
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RN Survey.  RN HPPD were aggregated by unit type by hospital so that each hospital 
had the potential of six RN staffing variables.   The six unit types included Medical, 
Surgical, Medical-Surgical, ICU, Rehabilitation, and Stepdown.  An assumption of 
perfect measurement is made with these variables because there is not a mechanism to 
evaluate their reliability.  The latent variables of Organization Support and Work Unit 
Support directly affect Patient Safety.  In addition, it is hypothesized that Organization 
Support indirectly affects Patient Safety through Work Unit Support.    
Statistical Analysis 
To evaluate the extent that the data are consistent with the hypothesized model, 
specific goodness of fit indexes were used including chi-square, Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) and Root Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA).  The criterion for 
each index was established to determine adequacy of model fit to the data.  A small 
nonsignificant maximum likelihood chi square statistic was established as a criterion 
representative of good fit.  A non significant chi square suggests there is no statistical 
difference between the hypothesized model and the data.  In addition, a CFI of 0.90 or 
higher was used to indicate a reasonably good fit of the proposed model (Kline, 2005).  
The CFI evaluates the data fit to the hypothesized model compared to an independence 
model.  Often a null model is used as the independence model with the null model 
representing no relationship between the variables.  The RMSEA was also used with a 
value below 0.05 indicative of a close approximate fit (Kline, 2005).  The RMSEA 
evaluates the degree of falseness of the null hypothesis by approximating a non-central 
chi-square distribution.  If the null hypothesis is not supported by the data, the 
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RMSEA value increases as the non-central chi-square distribution is shifted to the 
right compared to the central chi-square distribution.  Higher values indicate a poorer 
fit, while low values, less than 0.05, indicate a close approximate fit (Kline, 2005).   
Assessment of the structural model also was accomplished by examining the 
regression aspects of the model.  By using structural equation modeling in the data 
analysis all of the hypothesized relationships represented by equations were solved 
simultaneously rather than serially as in regression analysis.  The strength of the 
causal paths, direct and indirect, will be assessed by the path coefficient (β).  Beta 
weights will be evaluated to determine the contribution of exogenous variables to the 
model.   
Ethical Considerations              
 The ethical considerations in this study are consistent with those in any study 
using hospital level administrative data and primarily center on confidentiality.  Three 
unique hospital numbers are included in HCUP data and were used to link with other 
data sets.  These hospital identifiers included “the HCUP Partner’s own number 
scheme for identifying hospitals and facilities, the hospital identifier used by the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) and, a unique HCUP hospital identifier” 
(AHRQ, 2007, June).  As required by the HCUP Data Use Agreement, these data were 
not used to report or identify individual hospital performance.  In addition, the NIS 
and SID data sets contain encrypted patient identifiers so that multiple admissions 
within and across hospitals can be linked without the ability to access unique patient 
identifying information.  However, the NIS and SID excludes data elements that could 
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identify individual patients.  Data were not analyzed at an individual patient level 
within the study.  The study was reviewed approved by the Health Subjects 
Committee of the University of Kansas Medical Center as an exempt study. 
Summary 
 The purpose of the study was to evaluate the relationships between variables 
associated with a culture of safety and specific adverse patient outcomes sensitive to 
the care provided by nurses.  A secondary analysis using cross-sectional data was used 
in this exploratory study to evaluate the relationships between independent variables 
consistent with the concepts of HROT and the culture of safety construct and outcome 
variables which describe the occurrence of complications and adverse events 
associated with the provision of health care.  Three existing data sets were used 
including selected scales from the NDNQI full RN Survey and Job Satisfaction scales 
and the AHRQ HCUP NIS and SID data sets.  The NIS and SID represent inpatient 
encounter data and were used to determine the occurrence of four AHRQ PSIs.  The 
selected NDNQI scales measure nurses’ perceptions of the work environment and are 
consistent with concepts associated with a culture of safety.  The AHRQ PSIs 
represent potentially preventable adverse patient outcomes which the nurse researchers 
have suggested are sensitive to nursing care.   
 Data were prepared and the data sets merged prior to analysis.  Multivariate 
analyses were performed to test the research questions.  The unit of analysis was 
individual hospitals and a model of the proposed relationship between the variables 
was developed (Figure 3, page 80).  Although there is an interest in developing a 
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culture of safety within health care settings, little is known about the relationships 
between the culture of safety concepts and outcomes associated with patient care. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 Chapter IV presents the results of analyses of the hypothesized and alternative 
models.  The analyses were conducted to evaluate the research questions: 
1. What are the direct effects of Work Unit Support and Organization Support on 
Patient Safety? 
2. What effect does the indirect relationship of Organization Support on Work 
Unit Support have on Patient Safety? 
Work Unit Support and Organization Support were derived from the 2005 NDNQI® 
RN Survey with Job Satisfaction Scales data set.  Patient Safety was operationalized 
using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety 
Indicators (PSIs) of Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue (identified as Death Among 
Surgical Inpatients with Serious Treatable Complications beginning in 2008), Selected 
Infections due to Medical Care, and Pulmonary Embolus/Deep Vein Thrombosis.  The 
study purpose was to describe the impact of registered nurses’ perception of work 
environment characteristics conceptualized as Work Unit Support and Organization 
Support on Patient Safety. 
 
Description of Variables 
 Variables included in the study were based on the proposed model depicted in 
Figure 3 (page 80).  The exogenous and manifest variables included in the research 
analysis model are derived from the NDNQI RN Survey with Job Satisfaction Scales 
data set.   
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Exogenous Variables 
In the hypothesized model (Figure 2, page 51) Quality of Care, Task, 
Teamwork, Decision Making, and Supportive Nurse Management scales defined the 
latent variable Work Unit Support.  The Nursing Administration, Professional 
Development, and Autonomy scales defined the latent variable Organization Support.  
Descriptive statistics for each scale are included in Table 4 (page 79).  Mean scores for 
each variable were aggregated to the unit and then hospital level.  Items within each 
scale were scored using a six point Likert scale except for Quality of Care where a 
four point scale was used.  Higher scores represent a higher amount of the respective 
variable.    
Endogenous Variables 
 The outcome of interest is hospital Patient Safety as operationalized by four of 
the AHRQ PSIs including: Decubitus Ulcer, Failure to Rescue, Selected Infections 
Due to Medical Care, and Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein 
Thrombosis.  Risk adjusted PSI rates were calculated for each hospital. Descriptive 
statistics for the PSIs are listed in Table 5 (page 79).  These events represent relatively 
rare occurrences and have a small variance.  Muthén & Muthén (2007) recommend 
that when using MPlus the variables are kept on a scale where their variances are 
between 1 and 10 to reduce the risk of computational difficulties.   Therefore, 
following calculation of the risk adjusted rates for each of the PSIs by hospital, 
standardized z scores were calculated.  The use of standardized scores allowed for 
convergence when conducting the structural equation modeling analysis.   
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Manifest variables 
Four manifest variables were used in the analyses and describe the hospital 
characteristics of interest for the sample.  These variables included: Hospital Bedsize, 
Hospital Teaching Status, RN Staffing, and Magnet Status.  Each of these variables 
was derived from the NDNQI RN Survey with Job Satisfaction Scales or Quarterly 
Staffing data.   
Analysis of Original Hypothesized Model 
 
The hypothesized model proposed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3, page 80) was used to 
evaluate the relationships between Work Unit Support and Organization Support on 
Patient Safety.  The model, as originally specified, was entered into the structural 
equation software and the results were analyzed.   Covariance and correlation indices 
were evaluated.  There were significant moderate and strong correlations among the 
scales used to operationalize the latent variables of Work Unit Support and 
Organization Support.  The strongest correlations were noted in the latent variable, 
Work Unit Support, between Decision Making and Supportive Nursing Management 
(0.73), Decision Making and Task (0.70), and Task and Quality of Care (0.66) (See 
Table 6, page 89).  In addition, correlations across the three latent variables, Work 
Unit Support, Organization Support, and Patient Safety, were evaluated and significant 
moderate to strong correlations were noted between Autonomy and Task (0.84), 
Autonomy and Decision Making (0.82), Autonomy and Teamwork (0.78), Autonomy 
and Supportive Nursing Management (0.63), Autonomy and Quality of Care (0.67), 
Professional Development and Decision Making (0.73), Professional Development 
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and Supportive Nursing Management (0.73), and Decision Making and Nursing 
Administration (0.66).  Correlations of this magnitude suggest multicolinearity and 
resulted in an error message during the computation of the model indicating the model 
was not positive definite.  Kline (2005) suggests correlations of 0.85 or higher are 
indicative of extreme multicollinearity.   Although none of the correlations between 
variables reached this magnitude, an analysis of the latent variable correlation matrix 
indicated the correlation between Work Unit Support and Organization Support to be 
greater than 1.0 (r= 1.09).  Therefore, the parameter estimates could not be computed.  
To address this issue a revision to the hypothesized model such as removal of collinear 
variables was necessary (Brown, 2006) (Table 6, page 89 and Table 7, page 90).   
Evaluation of Original Model Fit 
The goodness of fit indices indicated the model did not fit the data adequately 
(χ2 = 394.868, df = 95, p <0.001; CFI =  0.636, RMSEA = 0.180, 90% confidence 
interval [CI] = 0.162-0.199, p [RMSEA ≤  0.05] < 0.001).  See Table 8 (page 90) for 
the fit indices for both the original and final alternate model.  The nonstandardized 
parameters were reviewed and Organization Support (r= 5.113, p= 0.029) and Work 
Unit Support (r= -7.465, p= 0.036) had a significant direct impact on Patient Safety.    
However the model results could not be used because the covariance matrix was not 
positive definite as described earlier.  Also a negative residual variance for the latent 
variable Work Unit Support was noted in the hypothesized model.  The findings of a  
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Table 7 
Hypothesized Model Correlations Between Manifest Variables and All Other Variables 
Variable Hospital Bed 
size 
Hospital 
Teaching 
Status 
Magnet 
Status 
RN Staffing 
Hospital Bed size  1.000    
Hospital Teaching Status -0.571  1.000   
Magnet Status  0.181 -0.221 1.000  
RN Staffing  0.007 -0.270 0.084  1.000 
QOC -0.316  0.680 0.246  0.267 
Task -0.253 -0.049 0.136  0.471 
Team -0.236  0.118 0.007  0.092 
Decision Making -0.014  0.007 0.129  0.137 
Supportive Nursing 
Management 
-0.005  0.092 0.065  0.130 
Professional Development  0.316 -0.220 0.185  0.111 
Nursing Administration -0.034  0.049 0.024 -0.209 
Autonomy -0.251  0.099 0.118  0.319 
DU  0.219 -0.280 0.098 -0.101 
FTR  0.188 -0.045 0.059 -0.309 
IMC  0.488 -0.344 0.193  0.242 
DVT  0.392 -0.394 0.256  0.069 
Note. QOC= Quality of Care, Team= Teamwork, DU= Decubitus Ulcer, IMC= Infections due 
to Medical Care, DVT= Pulmonary Embolus or Deep Vein Thrombosis  
 
Table 8 
Fit Indices for Original and Final Alternate Models 
Indices Original Model Final Alternate Model 
χ2 394.868* 40.811** 
CFI 0.636 0.930 
RMSEA 0.18 0.065 
Confidence 
Interval 
0.162 - 0.199 0.000-0.108 
p [RMSEA ≤  0.05] ≤ 0.001 0.282 
SRMR    0.137 0.074 
Note. *p≤ 0.001; **p= 0.072 
 
not positive definite covariance matrix and negative residual variances indicated a 
problem with fit of the model to data (Muthén & Muthén, 2007).  As a result, alternate 
models were considered based on High Reliability Organization Theory (HROT) and 
the theoretical constructs of a culture of safety.   
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Development of the Final Alternate Model 
Data analysis using structural equation modeling includes model 
respecification if the hypothesized model does not represent an adequate fit (Hoyle, 
1995; Kline, 2005).   In this study the original hypothesized model represented a poor 
fit with the data and the number of high correlations between variables suggested 
redundancies.  In addition, when structural equation computations were attempted, the 
resulting output indicated there were linear relationships preventing statistical 
evaluation of the defined model.  Alternate models were explored with the goal of 
developing a parsimonious theory driven model.  Development of the final alternate 
model was pursued using HROT to guide the process followed by the consideration 
and introduction of modifications suggested from the Structural Equation Modeling 
(SEM) output.  Modification indices give information regarding the expected change 
in χ2 when the identified modifications are made to the model.  Changes to the model 
based on modification indices were introduced only after determining their 
consistency with HROT and the construct of a culture of safety.  Alternate models 
were explored and the results evaluated.   
The process used to identify a final alternate model was iterative.  Different 
models were run using SEM and evaluated for their fit with the data.  Of the many 
models explored, some were separate models where individual PSIs, such as Failure to 
Rescue were included as observed variables.  Also models with respecified Patient 
Safety latent variables were tested by using different combinations of PSIs.  Although 
some of these models seemed promising from a theoretical perspective none resulted 
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in an improved fit with the data when compared with the final alternate model.   
Models in which the Decision Making and Autonomy scales were included in either 
Work Unit Support or Organization Support and models in which one of these scales 
was eliminated were tested.  Inclusion of either of these scales individually or together 
resulted in a not positive definite error message or nonconvergence.  The researcher 
also considered a model that did not include work unit support and organization 
support as two separate variables, each with unique impact on patient safety.  The 
correlation between the latent variables Work Unit Support and Organization Support 
was evaluated, and a high/moderate correlation was noted (r= 0.696).  Consideration 
was given to the possibility that one variable may reflect hospital or institution level 
support better.  A single variable called Institutional Support was developed by 
combining the scales used to operationalize Work Unit Support and Organization 
Support.  The model was tested but resulted in a poorer fit than when the two level 
latent variables were used suggesting that the single institutional support variable did 
not explain the relationships between hospital level characteristics and patient safety 
outcomes adequately.  See Table 9 (pages 93 and 94) for a sample of the models tested 
and results.   
Revision of Latent Variables 
The original model using HROT as a framework was developed to reflect 
factors that describe work unit and organization level influences on specific outcomes 
of patient care.  Individual work units were conceptualized as having a local culture 
that impacts patient safety.  The latent variable of Work Unit Support was developed 
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to represent the manner in which a group of people interact and coordinate their efforts 
to provide care to patients.  Organization support was conceptualized as the manner in 
which hospital leaders develop a work environment based on HROT concepts so that 
care can be provided in a safe manner.  The Work Unit Support and Organization 
Support variables were used to describe the level at which a hospital’s work units and 
the overall organization possess key characteristics consistent with HROT and the 
relationship between the level of support and adverse patient outcomes.  This 
conceptualization was used throughout the development and evaluation of alternate 
models to describe the relationships between variables.   
To develop a final alternate model, the first step was to evaluate the variables 
used to describe the latent variable Work Unit Support.  Strong correlations (> 0.60) 
were found among the job satisfaction scales used to define Work Unit Support.  
Scales with high correlations were evaluated by reviewing the items comprised within 
each scale to identify similar concepts across scales.  For example, the Decision 
Making and Task scales were highly correlated.  The items in both scales were 
compared and on initial review did not appear similar in concept.  Task items reflect 
staff perceptions on having adequate time to provide care to patients. The items that 
comprise the Decision Making scale are focused on independent decision making and 
the opportunity to participate in decision making.  However, nurses’ perceptions 
regarding having adequate time to provide patient care may be predicated on their 
perceptions of management’s provision of work related resources and having a voice 
in decision making.  Decision Making also was correlated highly with the Supportive 
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Nurse Management variable.  After review of the items contained in these two scales it 
was noted that Decision Making and Supportive Nurse Management had potential 
redundancy.  Both scales include items evaluating nurses’ perception of the support 
they receive from mangers regarding the decisions they make and management’s 
inclusion of staff in decision making.   Task also had a strong correlation with the 
Quality of Care item.  Similarities between Task scale items and the Quality of Care 
item were considered.  Task and Quality of Care may be strongly correlated in that 
staff’s perception of having adequate time to provide care could be tied to their 
perception of the ability to provide quality care.  
Next, the variables with strong correlations across the latent variables of Work 
Unit Support and Organization Support were evaluated. The Autonomy variable was 
strongly correlated with the Task, Decision Making, Teamwork, and Supportive Nurse 
Management variables.  The Autonomy scale items reflect staff nurses’ perceived 
authority to make independent decisions and have control over practice.  The 
Autonomy scale items were considered similar to those in the Decision Making scale 
that reflect support by nurse managers and administrators of nurses’ decisions and 
Task scale items that could reflect control over practice based on adequacy of time to 
provide patient care.  The strong correlation between the Autonomy and Teamwork 
variable was unanticipated because these concepts seem dissimilar.  However, the 
items within the Autonomy scale focus on having control over practice and input into 
care decisions.  This may be consistent with nursing’s role being recognized as an 
essential component of the healthcare team.   
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      The Professional Development variable was strongly correlated with the 
Decision Making and Supportive Nursing Management variables.  The items within 
the Professional Development scale focus on continual learning and support for these 
endeavors within the organization.  The ability to participate in educational activities 
is typically dependent on support from hospital management as reflected in the 
Supportive Nursing Management Scale.  Professional Development and Decision 
Making items could be considered to have similarities in that both require a degree of 
support from managers and administrators.  Overall the variables with the highest 
correlations were Decision Making, Autonomy, and Task.  When these variables were 
included in the SEM computations, an error message of nonconvergence or not 
positive definite resulted.    
Based on the comparison of items across highly correlated scales, revisions to 
the Work Unit Support and Organization Support latent variables were made.  Work 
Unit Support was redefined to include three variables: Teamwork, Quality of Care, 
and RN Staffing.  Teamwork was retained because it is consistent with HROT and had 
fewer redundancies to other scales.  Teamwork has been identified by safety experts as 
a key component to reliable and accurate execution of high risk processes and is a 
concept within HROT (Dixon & Shoffer, 2006; Frankel, Leonard, & Denham, 2006).  
Some have suggested teamwork is the most essential element to providing safe patient 
care and includes a number of subcomponents including the ability to communicate 
effectively, manage conflict, demonstrate mutual respect among members, and 
identify shared values (Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 
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2004).   The Quality of Care item “In general how would you describe the quality of 
nursing care delivered to patients on your unit?” with response options of excellent, 
good, fair, and poor was considered a reflection of several scales and was retained as a 
component of Work Unit Support.  This item had fewer strong correlations with the 
other scales and may represent a composite of factors that influence nurses’ perception 
regarding their ability to provide quality care.  RN Staffing, originally included in the 
model as a control variable, was reevaluated and included as a component of Work 
Unit Support.  This is consistent with the HROT concept of redundancy.  In the IOM 
report Keeping Patients Safe: Transforming the Work Environment for Nurses (2004) 
adequate staffing is suggested as an example of redundancy.  Checks within the 
system often are done by more than one staff member watching for potential failures 
in a system.  Also, increased staffing may allow nurses to be more vigilant and thereby 
support early recognition of subtle changes in patient status or the development of 
patient complications.  This activity is applied at the work unit level, therefore seemed 
to fit conceptually with Work Unit Support.  Based on this interpretation, RN Staffing 
was included within the latent variable of Work Unit Support.    
The latent variable of Organization Support also was revised after evaluation 
of those variables with high correlations.  Organization Support was modified to 
include Professional Development, Supportive Nursing Management, and Nurse 
Administration.  Based on the concepts of HROT, leaders support front-line staff and 
set the expectation that safety strategies will be used to prevent errors and system 
failures.  Leaders also encourage reporting of potential problems in the system.  These 
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HROT concepts were considered as revisions were made to the latent variable 
Organization Support.  Autonomy was removed based on the redundancy with other 
Work Unit Support variables.  Supportive Nursing Management was determined to 
have a better fit both conceptually and based on SEM model fit indices when included 
within the Organization Support latent variable.  Supportive nurse management may 
be more reflective of organization level influences rather than work unit.  Nurse 
managers are often responsible for one or several clinical work units.  Therefore their 
impact on patient safety may be more consistent with organization factors.  The 
factors that influence staff nurses’ perception of nurse manager support may be more 
reflective of the organization level rather than unit level influences.  Nurse Managers 
are in a unique position often called middle or lower level management where they are 
accountable to staff and administrative levels within the organization.  To be 
successful in the role, a nurse manager must have the ability to meet expectations of 
both groups.  Possibly the manner in which this is demonstrated is more consistent 
with organization level influences.  Nurse Administration was retained as a variable 
within Organization Support.   
As noted above, the RN Staffing variable was included in the latent variable 
Work Unit Support but the other control variables included in the original model also 
were reconsidered.  Hospital Bedsize and Hospital Teaching Status were removed 
from the model because they did not offer any additional information or explanation to 
the model.  Neither represented significant findings and inclusion of these variables 
represented a poorer fit with the data.  The findings for Hospital Teaching status were 
     
100 
consistent with previous research where teaching status and PSI rates associations 
were inconsistent (Thornlow & Stukenborg, 2006; Vartak, Ward, & Vaughn, 2008).  
The researcher decided to remove the Magnet Status variable also.  It was recognized 
during data analysis that the variable did not clearly differentiate hospitals that had 
achieved a Magnet status from those that had not and were not pursuing Magnet 
status.  This was determined to be problematic.  NDNQI hospitals report if they have 
or have not achieved Magnet designation.  However, it was recognized that some 
hospitals identified as not having Magnet status were likely “Magnet aspiring”.  The 
inability to cleanly differentiate hospitals using this variable was concerning and 
therefore it was decided to remove it from the model. 
The latent variable of Patient Safety also was evaluated based on SEM results 
and conceptual congruence between the variables.  As alternate models were 
considered, it was noted that the latent variable Patient Safety had a better fit with the 
data when Failure to Rescue was removed. Models with varying combinations of the 
four PSIs describing Patient Safety were evaluated and Failure to Rescue continued to 
represent a poorer fit.  The researcher considered the differences between the four 
variables used to operationalize Patient Safety.  Failure to Rescue was determined to 
be different than the other PSIs in several ways.  Failure to Rescue was developed to 
flag potentially preventable deaths (Clarke, 2004).  The other indicators represent 
complications but do not all result in death as defined by AHRQ.  In addition the PSIs 
Decubitus Ulcer, Infections due to Medical Care, and Deep Vein Thrombosis all 
represent complications or conditions that have been found to be preventable when 
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evidenced based interventions are used.  Certain patient populations are recognized as 
at risk for these complications and the ability to determine which patients are at risk is 
established.  Protocols have been developed based on scientific evidence to prevent 
these three complications and nurses are typically familiar with such practice 
interventions and when to implement them.  However, preventive strategies are not so 
clearly established with Failure to Rescue which incorporates several complications 
that may be experienced by patients postoperatively.  These conditions may be more 
difficult to anticipate and an established protocol may not be available to prevent their 
occurrence.  Rather, their identification requires a constant watchfulness or vigilance 
by the nurse so that early detection and treatment can be implemented.  For example, 
the complications included within this PSI are pneumonia, gastric hemorrhage, sepsis, 
and shock (AHRQ, 2007, March).   These complications may develop quickly or 
subtly over time but require the constant watchfulness or vigilance of skilled care 
providers (Bobay, Fiorelli, & Anderson, 2008; Clarke, 2004; Manojlovich & Talsma, 
2007; Meyer & Lavin, 2005; Meyer, Lavin, & Perry, 2007).     
A model was developed that retained the latent variables of Work Unit Support 
and Organization Support as described above but modified the Patient Safety variable 
to include Decubitus Ulcer, Infections due to Medical Care, and DVT.  Failure to 
Rescue was included in the model as an observed variable.  The decision to remove 
Failure to Rescue from the latent variable of Patient Safety is consistent with recent 
work done by AHRQ in the development of a composite patient safety indicator.  In 
March, 2008, AHRQ published a paper describing the efforts to use a group of PSIs as 
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a composite to evaluate patient safety (AHRQ, 2008, March).  The authors suggest the 
composite indicator may be useful to consumers, providers, policy makers, and 
purchasers of health care services as they make healthcare choices and prioritize 
quality initiatives and programs.  The PSIs included in the AHRQ composite indicator 
are Decubitus Ulcer, Postoperative Respiratory Failure, Iatrogenic Pneumothorax, 
Postoperative Pulmonary Embolus or Deep Vein Thrombosis, Selected Infection Due 
to Medical Care, Postoperative Sepsis, Postoperative Hip Fracture, Postoperative 
Wound Dehiscence, Postoperative Hemorrhage or Hematoma, and, Accidental 
Puncture or Laceration.  Failure to Rescue (PSI 4), now identified as Death Among 
Surgical Inpatients with Serious Treatable Complications, was not included in the 
composite. 
 After evaluation of model variations the final alternate model was identified 
(Figure 4, page 103).  The model includes respecified latent variables of Work Unit 
Support, Organization Support, and Patient Safety.  Failure to Rescue is included as an 
observed variable.   
Results of the Final Alternate Model 
 The final alternate model included 10 variables with 3 continuous latent  
variables.  The variance for all three latent variables was constrained to 1.0 which was 
done to allow better interpretation of the associations among the latent variables.  By 
fixing each latent variable to 1.0 the latent variables are standardized which allows 
interpretation of relationships based on an established scale (Hoyle, 1995).     
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Model Fit and Direct Effects 
Correlation and covariance matrices were evaluated.  Moderate correlations 
still were present in the revised model.  The highest correlation within the Work Unit 
Support variable was between Teamwork and Quality of Care (r= 0.539).  Correlations 
between indicators of Organization Support were highest for Supportive Nursing 
Management and Professional Development (r= 0.550) and lowest for Supportive 
Nurse Management and Nursing Administration (r= 0.342).  Correlations across latent 
variables were all below 0.5 with the highest between Teamwork and Supportive 
Nurse Management (r= 0.487).  Patient Safety correlations were highest for DVT and 
Infection due to Medical Care (r= 0.233) lowest for Decubitus Ulcer and Infections 
-0.087 
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due to Medical Care (r= 0.118).  See Table 6 (page 89) for correlation matrix and 
Appendix A (page 135) for the covariance matrix  
The goodness of fit indices suggested the model reasonably fit the data (χ2 = 
40.811, df = 29, p= 0.234; CFI =  0.930; RMSEA = 0.065, 90% confidence interval 
[CI] = 0.000-0.108, p [RMSEA < .05] = 0.282; SRMR= 0.074).  See Table 8 (page 90) 
for the fit indices for both the original and final alternate model.  The apriori criteria, 
CFI > 0.90; RMSEA < 0.08, established to evaluate the model fit were met.  The 
confidence intervals for RMSEA reflect the amount of uncertainty associated with 
RMSEA as a point estimate at the 90% level of statistical confidence.  The lower 
bound confidence interval is at 0.00 therefore the null hypothesis of close fit could not 
be rejected.  However, the upper bound confidence interval is slightly greater than 
0.10.  Therefore the hypothesis of poor approximate fit cannot be rejected.  This 
indicates that the RMSEA is subject to some sampling error and may be reflective of 
the small sample size (Kline, 2005).    
Table 10 (page 105) presents the unstandardized model parameters and the 
standardized effect, StdYX, which depicts the amount of standardized change in an 
outcome variable per standard deviation unit of a predictor variable.  See Figure 4 
(page103) for both the unstandardized and standardized direct effects for the final 
alternate model variables.  All model inferences were derived from the unstandardized 
effects, therefore statistical significance is reported using the unstandarized 
coefficients only.   
Table 10 
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Final Alternate Model Parameters 
Variable Unstandardized Standardized 
 Est S.E. Est/S.E. Two-tailed 
p-Value 
StdYX 
Work Unit Support by 
indicators 
     
QOC 0.111 0.022 7.765 <.001 0.638 
Teamwork 0.169 0.019 5.960 <.001 0.846 
RN Staffing 0.194 0.086 2.250 0.024 0.252 
Organization Support by 
indicators 
     
Supp. Nurse 
Manage 
0.176 0.028 6.344 <0.001 0.708 
Prof Develop 0.157 0.030 5.266 <0.001 0.781 
Nsg Admin 0.156 0.035 4.512 <0.001 0.569 
Patient Safety by indicators      
DU 0.229 0.099 2.308 0.021 0.312 
INMC 0.226 0.100 2.255 0.024 0.308 
DVT 0.553 0.202 2.745 0.006 0.754 
Organization Support On 
Work Unit Support 
0.819 0.246 3.334 0.001 0.633 
Pt Safety On Work Unit 
Support 
-0.935 0.524 -1.783 0.075 -0.689 
Pt Safety On Organization 
Support 
0.892 0.412 2.167 0.030 0.851 
Failure to Rescue On Work 
Unit Support 
-0.084 0.173 -0.486 0.627 -0.084 
Failure to Rescue on 
Organization Support 
-0.087 0.134 -0.646 0.518 -0.113 
Note. Est = estimate; SE = standard error of the estimate; QOC= Quality of Care, Team= Teamwork 
Supp Ns Manag= Supportive Nursing Management, Prof Develop= Professional Development, Nsg 
Admin= Nursing Administration, Auton= Autonomy, DU= Decubitus Ulcer, IMC= Infections due to 
Medical Care, DVT= Pulmonary Embolus or Deep Vein Thrombosis 
 
The effect of Organization Support on Patient Safety was significant  
(p= 0.030), but the effect of Organization Support on Failure to Rescue was not  
(p= 0.518).  However the findings were contradictory.  As Organizational Support 
increased Patient Safety Events increased.  In contrast increased Organization Support 
was associated with a decreased, though not statistically significant, decrease in 
Failure to Rescue.   
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Work Unit Support did not have a statistically significant direct effect on 
Patient Safety (p= 0.075) or Failure to Rescue (p= 0.627).  However, the direct effect  
of Work Unit Support on Patient Safety at a statistical significance below  
p< 0.100 could be interpreted as a promising finding.  The relationship between 
increased Work Unit Support and decreased Patient Safety was fairly strong (see 
Table 10).  Though not statistically relevant, the findings are consistent with those 
anticipated based on HROT.  This finding warrants further exploration.   
The association between Work Unit Support variables and Patient Safety 
variables were evaluated using the correlation matrix to discern the relationships.  
Increased scores on Teamwork, Quality of Care, and RN Staffing resulted in lower 
rates of Decubitus Ulcer, Infections due to Medical Care, DVT, and Failure to Rescue 
with a few exceptions.  As Quality of Care scores increased so did the rate of  
Infections due to Medical Care.  Increased RN Staffing was associated with increased 
rates of Infections due to Medical Care and DVT.  The indicators of Organization 
Support had mixed relationships with Failure to Rescue and the indicators used to 
describe Patient Safety.  Increased rates of Supportive Nursing Management were 
associated with decreased rates of Decubitus Ulcer, and Failure to Rescue but with 
increased rates of Infections due to Medical care and DVT.  Increasing rates of 
Professional Development were associated with decreasing rates of Failure to Rescue 
but increasing rates of all three Patient Safety indicators.  As Nurse Administration 
scores increased rates of Infections due to Medical Care and Failure to Rescue 
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decreased but DVT and Decubitus Ulcer rates increased.  See Table 11 (page 107) for 
estimated covariance and correlation matrices for the latent variables. 
Indirect Effects 
The final alternate model also contained one hypothesized indirect effect as defined in 
the second research question “What does the indirect relationship of Organization 
Support on Work Unit Support have on Patient Safety?”   The indirect effect (-0.7657) 
for this path indicated increased Organization Support through Work Unit Support was 
 
Table 11 
Final Alternate Model: Estimated Covariance and Correlations for the Latent 
Variables 
Latent Variable Work Unit 
Support 
Organization
Support 
Patient 
Safety 
Failure to 
Rescue 
  
Covariance Matrix 
Work Unit Support  1.000    
Organization Support  0.819  1.670   
Patient Safety -0.204  0.725  1.838  
Failure to Rescue -0.155 -0.213 -0.413 0.990 
  
Correlation Matrix 
Work Unit Support  1.000    
Organization Support  0.633  1.000   
Patient Safety -0.151  0.414  1.000  
Failure to Rescue -0.156 -0.166 -0.306 1.000 
     
 
 
associated with a  decreased rate of Patient Safety adverse events. Therefore, even 
though the direct relationship between Organization Support and Patient Safety 
indicated both increase together, once Work Unit Support was included, the effect of 
Work Unit Support resulted in a decrease in Patient Safety events.    
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To determine if Work Unit Support acted as a mediator, several criteria were 
evaluated (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981).  First, a correlation between 
Organization Support and Patient Safety was established.  Second Organization 
Support must be correlated with the hypothesized mediator, in this case Work Unit 
Support, and Work Unit Support also must affect Patient Safety.  These criteria were 
met.  The Sobel test determines whether the impact of the independent variable, in this 
case Organization Support, is significantly reduced in the presence of the mediator, 
Work Unit Support.  The unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for each of 
the following relationships were entered into an interactive calculation tool: 
Organization Support on Work Unit Support (0.819), Work Unit Support on Patient 
Safety (-0.935), standard error of Organization Support on Work Unit Support (0.246) 
 and standard error of Work Unit Support on Patient Safety (0.524).  Sobel =                
-1.5727096; p= 0.11578608 indicating a mediator effect was not present (Preacher & 
Leonardelli, 2006).  A Sobel test also was conducted to evaluate the relationship of 
Work Unit Support as a possible mediator of Organization Support on Failure to 
Rescue.  As described above the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors of the 
following relationships were entered into an interactive calculation tool: Organization 
Support on Work Unit Support (0.819), Work Unit Support on Failure to Rescue (-
0.084), standard error of Organization Support on Work Unit Support (0.246) and 
standard error of Work Unit Support on Failure to Rescue (0.173).  Sobel =  
-0.48046625; p= 0.6308959 indicating a mediator effect was not present (Preacher & 
Leonardelli, 2006).   Based on this analysis it was determined Work Unit Support did 
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not act as a mediator of Organization Support on Patient Safety nor of Organization 
Support on Failure to Rescue.   
Summary 
 The analysis of the relationships between Work Unit Support and Organization 
Support on Patient Safety resulted in the identification of a final alternate model that 
provided a reasonable fit with the data.  The final alternate model was developed using 
the framework of HROT to guide evaluation of alternate models.  The only 
statistically significant effect was that of Organization Support on Patient Safety with 
increasing levels of Organization Support co varying with increased rates of negative 
Patient Safety events.  Although this relationship was unanticipated, the direction of 
Work Unit Support suggested some promising considerations for future exploration.  
As Work Unit Support increased Patient Safety events decreased and when the impact 
of Organization Support on Patient Safety was evaluated through Work Unit Support 
the directional relationship changed to decreased Patient Safety events.  This 
relationship was not statistically significant but supports further study to determine the 
impact of a Work Unit culture and an Organization level culture on Patient Safety.  
The final chapter incorporates these findings into a discussion of the significance and 
contribution of the final alternate model.   
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Chapter V 
 
 
 This chapter presents a discussion of the research findings based on the study 
questions.  The contribution of an final alternate model depicting the relationships 
between hospital level characteristics suggested as descriptors of High Reliability 
Organization Theory (HROT) concepts and the incidence of patient safety events is 
also presented.  Two research questions were posed in the study.  The first related to 
the direct effect of Work Unit Support and Organization Support on Patient Safety 
whereas the second related to the indirect effect of Organization Support through 
Work Unit Support on Patient Safety.  The limitations of the study and 
recommendations for further research also are presented.   
Previous studies have focused on measurement of the individual or group level 
characteristics associated with the provision of safe care and others have reported the 
incidence of specific patient safety events.  However, very little work has been done to 
evaluate organization level characteristics consistent with HROT concepts compared 
with the occurrence of specific patient safety events (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; 
Zhohar, Livne, Tenne-Gazit, Admi, & Donchin, 2007).  An understanding of these 
relationships is essential to the development of hospital systems and work 
environments that mitigate the risk of poor outcomes and support safe patient care.   
Significance of the Study 
 Although a focus on the quality of care provided within hospitals has increased 
over the last decade, there is still a lack of understanding regarding the characteristics 
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of work environments that promote safe care.  A culture of safety, a construct of 
HROT, has been suggested as the type of work environment where errors are less 
likely to occur.  Health care leaders have suggested that HROT, although originally 
derived from non-healthcare settings, can be used to guide our understanding of 
complex high-risk environments considered characteristic of healthcare facilities.  
However, the concepts associated with a health care culture of safety and the 
mechanisms to develop or promote such a culture still contain knowledge gaps.  In 
addition, the relationships between the concepts describing HROT have not been 
discerned fully.  As errors continue to plague healthcare institutions almost a decade 
after the publication of the IOM (1999) report To Err is Human, it is evident that there 
remains much to learn regarding the development of safe health care systems.   
 The goal of the study was to evaluate the relationships between HROT 
concepts as identified during the theory’s development and the occurrence of patient 
safety events that describe potential quality of care concerns. The findings of the study 
add to the body of knowledge regarding these relationships and can be used to guide 
further work on the topic. 
Interpretation of the Results 
 A hypothesized model depicting the relationships between Work Unit Support, 
Organization Support, and Patient Safety was developed (Figure 3, page 80).  
Structural equation modeling was used to examine these relationships.  The 
hypothesized model had a poor fit with the data therefore alternate models were tested.  
Based on the analysis of the data and guided by the theoretical constructs of a culture 
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of safety and HROT, a final alternate model with reasonable fit indices was developed.  
The interpretation of the results addresses the research questions individually. 
Direct Effects of Work Unit Support and Organization Support 
on Patient Safety and Failure to Rescue 
Organization Support had a statistically significant direct effect on Patient 
Safety.  However, the findings were unanticipated because Patient Safety events 
increased with increased levels of Organization Support. It was expected that higher 
scores on the scales used to depict Organization Support would be associated with 
lower Patient Safety events.  The NDNQI® RN Survey and Job Enjoyment scales used 
to operationalize Organization Support were Supportive Nursing Management, Nurse 
Administration, and Professional Development.   The correlations between the 
individual Organization Support scales and the Patient Safety events were evaluated to 
determine particular patterns.  Mixed results were noted in the directional correlation 
between the scales used to operationalize Organization Support and Patient Safety 
events. As Supportive Nursing Management scores increased Decubitus Ulcer rates 
decreased.  Increasing Nursing Administration scores were associated with lower rates 
of Infections due to Medical Care.  All other correlations between the variables used to 
describe Organization Support and the Patient Safety increased together, meaning as 
the individual Organization Support scale scores increased so did the incidence of 
Patient Safety events.   
There was no statistically significant relationship between Organization 
Support and Failure to Rescue (p= 0.518), however the correlations between the 
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Organization Support scales and Failure to Rescue were consistent.   With increasing 
Supportive Nursing Management, Nursing Administration, and Professional 
Development scores, the rates of Failure to Rescue decreased. This inverse 
relationship was anticipated but as noted failed to reach statistical significance.   
Based on HROT concepts leaders must support front-line staff by establishing 
systems where known safety practices are implemented and staff are held accountable 
for their use.  In high reliability systems, leaders encourage reporting and early 
recognition of potential problems in the system.  Leaders also discourage silence and 
reward staff for detecting and reporting system failures regardless of the rank or 
position of the staff member.  In such systems, safety is more highly valued than 
maintaining hierarchical relationships within the group.  It could be that the scales 
used to define Organization Support measure concepts other than those associated 
with the HROT concepts.    
The individual scale questions were reexamined and considered in light of the 
unexpected study findings.  Supportive Nursing Management scores increased with 
increased Infections due to Medical Care and DVT.  Nurse Administration scores 
increased along with increased DVT.  Increased Professional Development scores 
were associated with higher rates of Decubitus Ulcer, Infections due to Medical Care, 
and DVT.  These NDNQI RN Survey and Job Enjoyment scales are comprised of 
items measuring characteristics of professional nursing practice environments and 
relate to nurses’ relationship with the nurse manager or nurse administrators within 
their hospital and work unit.  Though aspects of the work environment should be 
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important to a culture of safety, the items were not developed with the intent of 
measuring a culture of safety or HROT.  Possibly the scale items are not reflective of 
how well leaders establish expectations and processes that support a culture of safety.  
The items as developed may measure more specifically the approachability or 
responsiveness of management to staff needs.  Therefore, the items may measure the 
quality of the relationship between clinical staff and management or administration.  A 
positive relationship with management and management’s development of systems 
that support the concepts consistent with HROT may be very different.  The 
Professional Development scale questions are related to ability of nurses to advance 
within the organization and to avail themselves of educational opportunities.  This 
researcher suggested that the scale was consistent with the concept of a learning 
organization as described in HROT.  Weick and Sutciffe (2001) also describe a 
concept of preoccupation with failure that is similar to a learning organization.  Both 
concepts related to support for staff to learn continually from error and for the lessons 
learned to be used to improve processes within the system.  The specificity of this type 
of learning may not be captured with the Professional Development scale.  Therefore 
scales used to operationalize Organization Support may not measure the concepts as 
described in the study design.   
Although the relationships between the Organization Support scales and 
Patient Safety events were mixed, this was not the case with Failure to Rescue.  
Failure to Rescue rates uniformly decreased with increased Organization Support scale 
scores.  The relationship was not statistically significant but the consistency of the 
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relationships was of interest.  Failure to Rescue has generated a great deal of attention 
in recent years.  It has been used as a nurse sensitive measure and as an outcome 
measure in studies evaluating the impact of work environment and staffing patterns.  
Possibly Failure to Rescue is more sensitive to the relationships staff have with 
managers and administrators than those indicators used to describe the latent variable 
Patient Safety.   
Failure to Rescue seems to be a more complex concept and may require a 
higher functioning organization as defined by diverse measures of the work 
environment including staff’s perception of leaders.   Failure to Rescue does not have 
a set of evidenced based prevention strategies.  Rather, Failure to Rescue prevention 
seems influenced by vigilance of clinicians with the knowledge and skill to recognize 
clinical patterns indicative of an impending complication.  Prevention of Decubitus 
Ulcer, DVT, and Infections due to Medical Care requires clinical staff to identify 
patients at risk, implement established prevention strategies, and periodically reassess.  
These three preventable complications have been the focus of recent national quality 
initiatives such as the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 5 Million Lives 
Campaign and were targeted recently by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) as Hospital Acquired Conditions (CMS, 2007).  With each of these 
conditions, Decubitus Ulcer, DVT (within Ventilator Associated Pneumonia 
prevention), and Infections due to Medical Care, the IHI published a bundle or set of 
interventions to prevent their occurrence.  The bundles are evidenced based and 
include interventions often established in clinical care plans or protocols used by 
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nursing staff.  Unlike Failure to Rescue, these complications generally do not require 
constant watchfulness for onset of subtle signs that can quickly escalate to serious 
clinical deterioration and death.  Failure to Rescue seems to represent a more complex 
complication and likely requires highly skilled or expert staff along with adequate 
staffing to ensure early recognition and intervention.  The organization support to 
establish an environment that supports staff attaining this level of functioning may be 
more complex as well.  Additional indicators representative of management’s ability 
to establish a work environment that promotes strong clinical skills, effective 
communication, and the availability of specialized experts when needed could be 
important components to include in the model.  Further exploration of alternate 
models is needed.    
Work Unit Support had no statistically significant effect on Patient Safety (p= 
0.075) or Failure to Rescue (p= 0.627), however, as Work Unit Support scores 
increased the incidence of the Patient Safety events and Failure to Rescue decreased.  
Although the overall inverse relationship was expected, there were mixed relationships 
between the individual scales within Work Unit Support and Patient Safety events.  
The scales used to operationalize the revised Work Unit Support latent variable were 
Teamwork, the Quality of Care item, and RN Staffing.  As Teamwork scores 
increased all three Patient Safety events decreased as well as Failure to Rescue.  These 
inverse relationships between Teamwork and the outcomes of interest were expected.  
Teamwork reflects the ability of a group to coordinate efforts at the location of care 
delivery also called the sharp end of the process.   Effective teamwork is used to 
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describe high reliability organizations.  The Teamwork variable was developed as a 
composite of the NDNQI RN Survey Nurse-Nurse Interaction and Nurse-MD 
Interaction scales.  Teamwork, as a study variable, was developed as a composite of 
the two scales because effective working relationships within the discipline and across 
disciplines was conceptualized as important to the functioning of an effective team. 
The finding regarding teamwork is consistent with a considerable body of research 
conducted to evaluate the relationships between nurse-physician collaboration and 
negative patient outcomes.  Decreased mortality (Knaus, Draper, Wagner & 
Zimmerman, 1986; Mitchell, Armstrong, Simpson, & Lentz, 1989), fewer ICU 
readmissions (Baggs, Ryan, Phelps, Richeson, Johnson, 1992; Baggs et al., 1999), and 
shorter risk adjusted length of stay (Shortell et al., 1994) have all been associated with 
increased levels of collaboration, or concepts similar to collaboration such as 
communication and coordination.   
Review of the items within the Nurse-Nurse Interaction and Nurse-MD 
Interaction scales suggested these questions were aligned closely with the concept of 
teamwork described in the theory.  The items focus on the respect physicians have for 
nurses and their unique knowledge, the ability of team members to work together 
when the workload increases, and the ability of the group to support new team 
members.  These questions are consistent with those concepts describing a culture of 
safety.  Also, some have suggested that teamwork describes a local level or work unit 
culture that is consistent with the use of this variable to describe work unit support 
(Frankel, Leonard, & Denham, 2006).   
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Although teamwork could be considered a unique concept of HROT, many 
other HROT concepts could be linked to the effectiveness of team functioning.  For 
example, the concepts of Trust, Organization Learning, and Decision Making 
(Decentralized and Centralized) all have connections to the ability of team members to 
cooperate and coordinate their efforts to prevent errors.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
use the concepts reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, preoccupation with 
failure, and deference to expertise as concepts associated with high reliability 
organizations.  These concepts could be predicated on how effectively teams work 
together.  The team members must move key decisions to the members with the 
highest knowledge regardless of hierarchy (deference to expertise and sensitivity to 
operations), report and address errors cooperatively (preoccupation with failure), and 
have respect for individual level knowledge (reluctance to simplify).  Systems such as 
the airline industry have considered the concept of teamwork as an important 
contributor to air travel safety and have described a flattened hierarchy where anyone 
within the system has the authority to stop a process if a safety concern is identified 
(Nash, 2008).  Healthcare leaders and regulators have suggested this concept is 
important to a healthcare culture of safety (Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006).  Many of the 
safety processes prescribed by the Joint Commission through their National Patient 
Safety Goals are dependent on team cooperation for implementation.  For example, 
development of a program, such as a Rapid Response Team, whereby a deteriorating 
patient’s condition can be escalated to the attention of experts by any health care 
worker is a 2009 National Patient Safety Goal.  Implementation of such a goal requires 
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effective team functioning.  This concept may be one of the most important when 
considering a healthcare culture of safety and therefore have a greater association with 
patient safety.   
Increased Quality of Care scores were correlated with decreased Decubitus 
Ulcer and DVT rates as well as Failure to Rescue but were correlated with increased 
rates of Infections due to Medical Care.   An inverse relationship between the Quality 
of Care item and the Patient Safety variables was expected.  It may be that nurses 
involved in direct care of patients are uniquely qualified to evaluate the quality of care 
provided and the level at which patient complications are prevented. The underlying 
determinants of the assessment are not identified through this global question.  
Therefore, it would be of value to analyze the contributing factors associated with 
nurses’ perception of quality of care further.  The positive correlation between Quality 
of Care and the rate of Infections due to Medical Care was unexpected.  Possibly 
Infections due to Medical Care, which is primarily indicative of central line catheter 
bacteremia, is an outcome more greatly influenced by group level care rather than 
individual nursing care provided in a particular work unit.  If so, nursing’s perception 
of quality of care may not capture the care provided by multiple disciplines to prevent 
central line catheter bacteremia.  The bundles of care used in recent patient safety 
campaigns such as the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 100k Lives campaign 
and 5 Million Lives Campaign describe interventions that are required of multiple 
providers.  Therefore, this outcome may be less sensitive to the Quality of Care item.  
The question directs the respondent to describe the quality of nursing care delivered 
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on the work unit and therefore would not necessarily reflect quality of care provided 
by other groups.     
RN staffing has been suggested to be an important factor in prevention of 
patient complications and early recognition of problems arising during the course of 
hospitalization.  Although staffing is not defined explicitly as a concept of HROT it is 
implied in the concept of redundancy.  Some have considered staffing levels to act as a 
type of redundancy suggesting that the staffing pattern must be able to support the 
level of assessment and monitoring needed to identify changes in patient status (IOM, 
2004).  In this study increased levels of RN Staffing were associated with decreased 
rates of Decubitus Ulcer and Failure to Rescue but conversely increased RN Staffing 
was correlated with slightly increased rates of Infections due to Medical Care and 
DVT. 
Previous studies have evaluated the relationship with nurse staffing and the 
occurrence of negative patient outcomes.  Hickam et al. (2003) synthesized results 
from a total of 26 studies on the relationship between nurse staffing and adverse 
outcomes.  These researchers concluded that lower nurse staffing levels were 
associated with higher incidence of negative outcomes (Hickam et al.).  Increased 
staffing also has been associated with decreased rates of various complications such as 
urinary tract infection, pneumonia, pulmonary compromise, mortality, and Failure to 
Rescue, defined as a death from upper gastrointestinal bleeding, cardiac arrest, deep 
venous thrombosis, pneumonia, or sepsis (Aiken, Clark, Sloane, Sochalski, & Silber, 
2002; Aiken, Sloane, Lake, Sochalski, 1999; Kovner & Gergen, 1998 Kovner, Jones, 
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Zhan, Gergen, & Basu, 2002; Needleman, Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, & Zelevinsky, 
2002).  However, some researchers have reported mixed results when comparing nurse 
staffing and patient outcomes.  Unruh (2003) reported hospitals staffed with a greater 
proportion of licensed nurses had significantly lower rates of decubitus ulcers and 
pneumonia.  Conversely, she found that those hospitals with more licensed nurses per 
patient had significantly higher rates of pneumonia (Unruh).  Cho et al. (2003) found 
increased RN staffing to be related inversely to the rate of pneumonia.  However, they 
reported an increase in nursing hours per patient day was associated with a higher 
probability of a decubitus ulcer.   
The relationship between nurse staffing and Failure to Rescue found in this 
study is consistent with other research findings.  Previous studies have reported 
increased mortality, sometimes defined as Failure to Rescue, with lower staffing levels 
(Aiken, Sloane, Lake, Sochalski, & Weber,1999; Aiken, Clark, Sloane, Sochalski, & 
Silber, 2002; Needleman, Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, & Zelevinsky, 2002).  Recently, 
a study conducted by Friese, Lake, Aiken, Silber and Sochalski (2008) found a 
significant reduction in Failure to Rescue for surgical oncology patients based on 
higher levels of nurse staffing, educational preparation, and the practice environment.  
Failure to Rescue requires a degree of vigilance and monitoring that may require more 
robust staffing models.  Overall Failure to Rescue may be more sensitive to staffing 
levels than other adverse outcomes.   
It was disappointing that neither Decision Making nor Autonomy scales were 
able to be included in the model.  Although there were problems with the model being 
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not positive definite with these scales included, the concepts remain of interest and 
need further exploration.  The HROT concept related to decision making is focused on 
decisions being made at the level of expert knowledge regardless of individual rank.  
The theoretical concept is descriptive of decision making guided by the values and 
standards set by leadership.  The items within the Decision Making scale focus on 
nurses’ opportunity to participate in decision making and managers’ seeking staff 
input prior to making decisions.  One item specifically relates to nursing 
administrators backing up staff.  This item is aligned with the HROT concept that 
leadership staff supports decision making of front line staff.   However, the other items 
are more general and not specifically related to the expectation that staff members 
either have the expert knowledge or access to those that do and leadership supports 
decision making at this level.  Autonomy is closely aligned to decision making in 
HROT.  Leaders support the decision making done by front-line staff members 
because they recognize in high risk environments conditions may change rapidly 
requiring immediate action based on system level values, training, and expert 
knowledge.  The Autonomy scale items focus on the control staff nurses have over 
their work and the input they have in the care for patients.  There seem to be some 
redundancies with the Autonomy scale and Decision Making scale and as noted above 
the concepts are closely aligned in HROT as well.  Possibly items specifically related 
to HROT would include both the knowledge and authority to make decisions under the 
concept of decision making.     
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In summary, although the relationships between the scores for the individual 
scales used to operationalize Organization Support and Work Unit Support and the 
rate of Patient Safety events were mixed, this was not the case for Failure to Rescue.  
Failure to Rescue rates decreased with each of the scales used to describe Organization 
Support and Work Unit Support.  Although this did not represent a statistically 
significant relationship, it is interesting that the directional relationships were 
consistent with each of the scales. As noted, consistent relationships between the 
scales and the Patient Safety indicators were not demonstrated possibly related to the 
use of measures representative of satisfaction with the professional work environment 
rather than HROT concepts.  In contrast, decreased Failure to Rescue rates may be 
associated with the presence of HROT concepts within a system and other components 
reflected within the work environment scales.  As suggested previously, Failure to 
Rescue may represent a more complex concept than the Patient Safety indicators and 
be associated with many work environment factors.  Also the model may not include 
key factors associated with mortality as reported by other researchers such as nurses’ 
level of education, certification, or years of experience.    
Indirect Effects of Organization Support through Work Unit Support  
on Patient Safety and Failure to Rescue 
 The second research question was related to the relationship of Organization 
Support through Work Unit Support on Patient Safety and Failure to Rescue.  The 
indirect effect (-0.7657) for this path indicated increased Organization Support 
through Work Unit Support was associated with a decreased rate of Patient Safety 
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adverse events and Failure to Rescue (-0.0687). Therefore, even though the direct 
relationship between Organization Support and Patient Safety events indicated both 
increase together, once Work Unit Support was included, the effect of Work Unit 
Support resulted in a decrease in Patient Safety events.  With Failure to Rescue the 
indirect relationship was consistent with the direct relationship.  Increased 
Organization Support through Work Unit Support resulted in a lower rate of Failure to 
Rescue.  However, a mediating effect was not found.  A test was conducted to 
evaluate the relationship and a mediating effect was not supported.  The coefficients 
and methods used to conduct the Sobel test are described on page 108.  These results 
could be related to the measures used to operationalize Organization Support and 
Work Unit Support.  As suggested earlier the scales used to define Organization 
Support may be more representative of the perception staff have of their relationship 
with managers and administrators rather than the support those leaders give to HROT 
concepts.  The scales used to define Work Unit Support may be more consistent with 
HROT concepts and thereby result in a decrease in Patient Safety events and Failure to 
Rescue when the effect of Organization Support is evaluated through Work Unit 
Support.  Although leadership influences are considered an important aspect of a 
culture of safety, possibly the ability of the work unit to function as an effective team 
is the most significant factor in how well preventive practices are carried out.  These 
findings suggest the development of effective work groups could be an important 
component to development of a culture of safety.    
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Limitations 
 Several study limitations were identified.  Limitations were related to the 
variables used to operationalize Patient Safety, Failure to Rescue, Work Unit Support 
and Organization Support. Also, limitations were identified with the final sample size 
when evaluated using the parameters of the final alternate model.  Generalizability of 
the study also is limited based on the sample used. 
Variable Limitations 
 Limitations of the study included the use of administrative data to determine 
the incidence of specific health care related complications as defined by the PSIs.  
Administrative data are collected primarily for the purpose of billing for health care 
services and were not developed for use as a quality improvement or patient safety 
tools.  Although hospital staff members involved in coding of healthcare services 
receive specialized training and use standard codes, there is a risk of variability in 
coding methods within and across institutions.  Variance in coding can introduce 
random error, systematic error, or both.  An early study reported 65.2% agreement on 
the principal diagnosis between the hospital report and secondary review conducted by 
the researchers therefore it is recognized that coding variability within and across 
institutions is likely (IOM, 1977).  In addition, administrative data are coded based on 
medical record documentation.  Inadequate documentation of patient care and 
condition during hospitalization can impact coding and inaccurately represent the 
occurrence of PSIs within an organization.  AHRQ has begun additional validity 
testing of the PSIs.  In the first phases of this study both Selected Infections due to 
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Medical Care and DVT underwent further study.  Flagged cased were evaluated via 
medical record abstraction to validate if the case actually had the event.  Based on this 
work the positive predictive value (PPV) for Selected Infections due to Medical Care 
= 61%, PPV for DVT  = 83% (AHRQ, 2008, September). 
Another limitation associated with administrative data is the ability to identify 
complications that occur during a patient’s hospital stay rather than those that are 
present on admission.  The algorithms developed by AHRQ attempted to identify and 
remove these present on admission cases.  Prior to 2008, the PSI algorithms addressed 
this issue by using secondary diagnoses and other parameters to make it more likely 
the complication was one that had occurred during hospitalization, rather than one the 
patient experienced prior to hospital admission.  For example, patients admitted from 
certain locations were excluded from some of the PSIs.  Patients admitted from 
nursing homes were excluded from the denominator of cases used to determine the 
Decubitus Ulcer rate for a hospital.  During the development of the indicator, it was 
considered that these patients may be more likely to have a Decubitus Ulcer present on 
admission; therefore they were excluded from the indicator.   However, beginning in 
October, 2008 hospitals were required to submit a Present on Admission code for 
those conditions that occurred prior to the patient’s admission to the hospital.  Recent 
studies have suggested that without the use of a present on admission code the 
accuracy of some PSIs such as Decubitus Ulcer is compromised (2008).  Therefore it 
is likely that error has been introduced without the use of the present on admission 
code.  However, because the code was not included in the algorithms the error was 
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present across all institutions.  In the future the use of the present on admission code 
should improve the accuracy of the cases flagged by the PSI algorithms.  However, as 
noted with all administrative data, the adequacy of clinical documentation will 
continue to be a factor.  The ability to identify a condition as present on admission is 
dependent on the clinical documentation reflecting the time of onset of complications.  
The present on admission code will not be applied by coders if the documentation 
does not reflect clearly that the patient had the condition on admission to the hospital.   
Another limitation is that the NDNQI RN Survey and Job Satisfaction scales 
were developed to measure nurse satisfaction and perception of the work environment.  
These measures are not direct measures of a culture of safety.  Instruments purported 
to measure a culture of safety have been developed.  However, a large sample of 
hospitals where culture of safety survey results from one of these instruments could be 
matched with patient outcomes data was not readily accessible.  Therefore the scales 
included in the survey were evaluated for congruence with the concepts of a culture of 
safety and used as a proxy for these concepts.  Also, although a standardized process is 
used to collect NDNQI RN Survey data, if variance in data collection procedures 
occurred bias may be introduced and threaten validity of the inferences drawn from 
the measures.    
Limitation of Sample Size 
The sample size was another study limitation.  Because the level of analysis 
was at an institution or hospital level, the availability of a large sample size was 
difficult to obtain.  An inadequate sample size could limit the ability to detect 
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statistically significant relationships between the exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Although there was no statistically significant direct effect of Work Unit Support on 
Patient Safety (p= 0.075) the relationship could be interpreted as a promising finding.  
Sample size could have contributed to the lack of significance, but also further study 
with additional components representative of HROT should be considered.   
During the development of the study design and the hypothesized model, an 
evaluation was conducted to determine the minimum sample required to evaluate the 
model under the following specifications: power 80%, degrees of freedom 101, null 
RMSEA 0.01, and alternate RMSEA 0.08.  Publicly available software was used to 
conduct these calculations (Preacher, & Coffman, 2006).  A sample size of 67 was 
determined based on these criteria.  Once the model was respecified a power analysis 
of the final alternate model was conducted under the following specifications: power 
80%, degrees of freedom 29, null RMSEA 0.01, and alternate RMSEA 0.08.  The 
same software as noted above was used to conduct the calculations and resulted in 135 
as the minimum sample.  Therefore the sample size for the final alternate model was 
inadequate making it less likely that significant relationships could be detected in the 
statistical analysis.   
Study Generalizabiltiy 
The generalizability of the study is limited by the self selected sample of 
hospitals participating in the NDNQI.  The NDNQI hospitals may have inherent 
characteristics not uniformly represented in hospitals throughout the United States.  
By nature of their participation, it might be concluded they have an increased 
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commitment to quality improvement and self assessment.  Hospitals that submit data 
to the NDNQI may possess unique work environment and organization factors as 
compared with hospitals that do not participate in the NDNQI.   
Implications 
 The study has implications for health care leaders as they strive to create a 
culture of safety within their organizations.  Although a statistically significant 
relationship was not found between Work Unit Support and Patient Safety or Failure 
to Rescue, the relationships between the measures used to define the latent variables 
does lead to some further considerations.  The consistent relationship between an 
increase in Teamwork and a reduced rate of each of the indicators used to define 
Patient Safety, as well as Failure to Rescue was an interesting finding.  The 
development of effective work teams has been cited by researchers as a key 
component to reduction of errors and patient harm.  These correlations support the 
suggestions of patient safety experts that teamwork is an important HROT concept.  
Many healthcare providers were educated and socialized to act independently rather 
than work cooperatively in teams.  Hospitals are complex systems where patients are 
cared for by multiple providers often in various geographic locations within an 
institution.  The need for groups to communicate effectively and coordinate their 
unique knowledge and skills may be of particular importance in a healthcare culture of 
safety.  Possibly health care leaders could best develop a culture of safety by 
establishing programs focused on the development of effective team skills.  Helping 
team members use processes that support clear communication, effective conflict 
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management, and encourage all team members to speak up if an impending error is 
recognized would be the most successful strategy to reduce poor outcomes of care. 
The relationship between increased scores for the Quality of Care item and 
decreased rates of two Patient Safety indicators (Decubitus Ulcer and DVT) and 
decreased rate of Failure to Rescue suggest that seeking feedback from front line staff 
on quality of care could be helpful to leaders.  Staff’s assessment of the quality of care 
provided on the unit may be associated with patient outcomes.  The Quality of Care 
item may act as a proxy measure for various factors that contribute to patient care 
processes within a given work unit.    
Although there were mixed relationships between RN Staffing and the 
indicators used to define Patient Safety, the correlation between staffing and Failure to 
Rescue was consistent with other studies.  Increased RN Staffing levels were 
correlated with decreased rates of Failure to Rescue.  Failure to Rescue represents 
cases of mortality and the factors contributing to this indicator may be particularly 
sensitive to staffing levels.  Failure to Rescue requires a constant vigilance so that 
early recognition and intervention can occur when complications arise.  The ability to 
be vigilant may be more sensitive to staffing and therefore the provision of adequate 
staffing levels is an important implication for health care leaders in their efforts to 
reduce patient mortality.  Administrators should continue to prioritize the need for 
effective RN staffing models to reduce the risk of hospital mortality and Failure to 
Rescue.     
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Recommendations 
The research findings can be used to guide further study of the culture of safety 
construct and its relationship to negative patient outcomes.  Three areas for further 
exploration are proposed.   
First, further study is needed to determine the relationship between the 
organization level and work unit level factors on patient safety outcomes.  During the 
data analysis using SEM, an alternate single level model in which the scales used to 
operationalize Work Unit Support and Organization Support were combined into one 
Institutional Support latent variable was explored but did not result in an improved fit 
with the data.  System level influences and local work area influences are consistent 
with HROT and the impact of these levels should be evaluated further in healthcare 
settings.  
The strength of the relationship between increased Work Unit Support and 
decreased Patient Safety events warrants further study.  The relationship is consistent 
with HROT and the culture of safety construct.  The low sample size might have 
contributed to the lack of a statistically significant finding.    The direct relationship 
between Work Unit Support and Patient Safety events coupled with the indirect 
relationship of Organization Support through Work Unit Support on Patient Safety 
reinforced the impact the local culture or work group has on patient safety.  Although 
HROT concepts require leadership support, the location of care delivery could be the 
most significant aspect to the model.  The relationships between work unit and 
     
132 
organization level factors that contribute to a healthcare culture of safety need further 
exploration. 
Second research using measures that are aligned more closely to the HROT 
concepts, particularly those attributed to leadership influence in supporting a culture of 
safety is needed.  Instruments purported to measure a culture of safety are available, 
however the data across multiple organizations has not been available readily.  The 
instruments currently available have some similarities in their dimensions, but are not 
identical.  It would be valuable to evaluate the most commonly used instruments and 
organization level outcomes across a large number of institutions.  Joint Commission 
(2008) and others have suggested using instruments to evaluate the culture of safety 
within an organization and use the findings to guide development of a stronger culture 
of safety.  However, only with further evaluation of the relationship between the 
instrument scores and patient outcomes will leaders be able to determine what factors 
are most significant in contributing to positive patient outcomes.  Also, the 
instruments most commonly used to measure a culture of safety do not specify if the 
survey dimensions reflect a particular level of functioning with the organization.  As 
suggested earlier, evaluation of the organization level at which culture of safety 
concepts occur requires further exploration.  Possibly using these established 
instruments with consideration of the levels they may represent would be meaningful.   
Third, further study is needed of the relationships between the construct of a 
culture of safety and specific patient outcomes. The associations between the 
indicators used to define Organization Support and Work Unit Support with the 
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indicators defining Patient Safety varied.  The relationship between the Organization 
Support and Work Unit Support indicators with the outcome of Failure to Rescue was 
particularly interesting in that Failure to Rescue rates decreased as each of the 
Organization Support and Work Unit Support indicators increased.  Although this 
researcher has suggested the indicators defining Organization Support may not have 
adequately operationalized the HRO concepts associated with leadership support of a 
culture of safety, they may measure organization level factors associated with Failure 
to Rescue.  Possibly some concepts have a greater impact on particular outcomes and 
one model may not adequately represent those factors associated with all negative 
patient outcomes.  Further evaluation of models that include additional latent variables 
should be considered.   
Conclusions 
 The descriptive correlational study using secondary data analysis made several 
contributions to the area of patient safety outcomes research.  Few studies have used 
measures purported to describe concepts associated with HROT and compare these 
with preventable complications of care.  An alternate model that provided adequate fit 
of the data added to the understanding of the relationships of these variables and the 
impact on patient safety.  The Organization Support variable had an unanticipated 
relationship with Patient Safety events.  Increased levels of Organization Support and 
increased Patient Safety events were correlated at a statistically significant level.  
Upon further evaluation the indicators used to define Organization Support may have 
reflected staff nurses’ satisfaction with leaders rather than the leaders’ support of 
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HROT concepts.  However, a promising finding, although not statistically significant, 
was noted with increased Work Unit Support being associated with decreased rates of 
Patient Safety events and Failure to Rescue.  Also Organization Support through Work 
Unit Support resulted in a reduced rate of Patient Safety events and Failure to Rescue 
but also was not statistically significant.  The association between the indicators used 
to describe the latent variables of Organization Support and Work Unit Support with 
those used to describe patient outcomes also suggested some interesting patterns.  
Increased Teamwork scores were consistently correlated with reduced Patient Safety 
and Failure to Rescue rates.   
The findings of this study can be used to guide further exploration of the 
relationships at a work unit and organization level on patient safety outcomes.  
The ability to develop systems that support positive patient outcomes and reduce the 
rate of error continues to be a high priority for healthcare consumers, providers, 
leaders, and policy makers.  Development of a culture of safety is purported to be 
associated with positive patient outcomes.  Continued exploration of the relationships 
between the concepts of HROT and specific patient outcomes will assist healthcare 
leaders as they determine what organization characteristics are of greatest importance 
in promoting patient safety.  Informed by this knowledge healthcare leaders will be 
able to make better decisions that support the work of nurses and all healthcare 
providers and lead to systems that are safer for patients. 
     
135 
REFERENCES 
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installation (ACSNI). (1993). 
Organizing for Safety: Third Report of the ACSNI Study Group on Human 
Factors. Health and Safety Commission (of Great Britain). Sudbury, England: 
HSE Books. 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (2008, March).  Patient Safety  
 Quality Measures Workgroup: Final Report. Retrieved October 26, 2008, 
 from 
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/AHRQ_PSI_Workgroup
_Final.pdf 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (2007, June). Introduction to  
 the National Inpatient Sample (NIS) 2005. Retrieved  August 31, 2007, from  
 http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/db/nation/nis/NIS_Introduction_2005.pdf 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). (2007, March 12). AHRQ 
 quality indicators: Patient safety indicators, Technical specifications.  
 Retrieved April 16, 2007, from  
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/downloads/psi/psi_technical_specs_v31
.pdf 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (2004, November). Hospital  
 survey on patient safety culture: Introduction. Retrieved  July 4, 2007, from 
 http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/hospculture/hospcult1.htm 
     
136 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (n.d.). HCUP data use  
agreement training. Retrieved  July 4, 2007, from http://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/tech_assist/dua.jsp 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (n.d.). HCUPnet: National  
Quality Indicators 2004 Statistics: Decubitus Ulcer. Retrieved August 25, 
2007, from  
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp?Id=58115FEB63AC353E&Form=SelPS
Is1&JS=Y&Action=%3E%3ENext%3E%3E&_QITables=PSI03 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (n.d.). HCUPnet: National  
Quality Indicators 2004 Statistics: Failure to Rescue. Retrieved August 25, 
2007, from 
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp?Id=6448C78B018DC19C&Form=SelPS
Is1&JS=Y&Action=%3E%3ENext%3E%3E&_QITables=PSI04 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (n.d.). HCUPnet: National  
Quality Indicators 2004 Statistics: Postoperative Pulmonary Embolus. 
Retrieved August 25, 2007, from 
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp?Id=EFE35CA9E4D62BAF&Form=SelP
SIs1&JS=Y&Action=%3E%3ENext%3E%3E&_QITables=PSI12 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (n.d.). HCUPnet: National 
Quality Indicators 2004 Statistics: Selected Infections Due To Medical Care. 
Retrieved August 25, 2007, from 
     
137 
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp?Id=C724DC4C224DD898&Form=SelP
SIs1&JS=Y&Action=%3E%3ENext%3E%3E&_QITables=PSI07 
Aiken, L.H., Clarke, S.P., Cheung, R.B., Sloane, D.M., & Silber, J.H. (2003).  
Educational levels of hospital nurses and surgical patient mortality. JAMA, 
290, 1617-1623. 
Aiken, L.H., Clarke, S.P., Sloane, D.M., Sochalski, J.A., Busse, R, Clarke, H. et al.  
(2001). Nurses’ reports on hospital care in five countries. Health Affairs, 20(3), 
43-53. 
Aiken, L.H., Clarke, S.P., & Sloan, D.M. (2002). Hospital staffing, organization, and  
quality of care: Cross-national findings.  International Journal for Quality in 
Health Care, 14, 5-13. 
Aiken, L.H., Clarke, S.P., Sloane, D.M., Sochalski, J., & Silber, J. (2002). Hospital  
nurse staffing and patient mortality, nurse burnout, and job dissatisfaction. 
JAMA, 288, 1987-2954. 
Aiken, L., & Patrician, P.A. (2000). Measuring organizational traits of hospitals: The  
 revised Nursing Work Index. Nursing Research, 49, 146-153. 
Aiken, L.H., Sloane, D.M., Lake, E.T., Sochalski, J. & Weber, A.L. (1999).  
Organization and outcomes of inpatient AIDS care. Medical Care, 37, 760-
772. 
Aiken, L.H., Sochalski, J., & Anderson, G.F. (1996). Downsizing the hospital  
 nursing workforce. Health Affairs, 15, 88-92. 
Allen, S. (2004, November 30). With work, Dana-Farber learns from ’94 mistakes. 
     
138 
Boston Globe. Retrieved May 12, 2007, from 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2004/11/30/with_work_dana_farbe
r_learns_from_94_mistakes?pg=full 
Ayd, M.A. (2004, Spring/Summer). A remedy of errors. Hopkins Medicine.  
Retrieved May 12, 2007, from 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/hmn/S04/feature1.cfm 
Baggs, J.G., Ryan, S.A., Phelps, C.E., Richeson, J.F., & Johnson, J.E. (1992). The  
association between inter-disciplinary collaboration and patient outcomes in 
medical intensive care. Heart Lung, 21, 18-24. 
Baggs, J.G., Schmitt, M.H., Mushtin, A.I., Mitchell, P.H., Eldredge, D.H., Oakes, D.  
et al. (1999). Association between nurse-physician collaboration and patient 
outcomes in three intensive care units. Critical Care Medicine, 27, 1991-1998. 
Baker, D.P., Day, R., & Salas, E. (2006). Teamwork as an essential component of  
 high-reliability organizations, Health Services Research, 41, 1576-1598. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986).  The moderator-mediator variable distinction  
in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical 
considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
Benner, P. (2001). Creating a culture of safety and improvement: a key to reducing  
 medical error. American Journal of Critical Care. 10, 281-284. 
Bierly, P.E., & Spender, J.C. (1995). Culture and high reliability organizations: The 
case of the nuclear submarine. Journal of Management, 21, 639-656.  
Bigley, G.A., & Roberts, K.H. (2001). The incident command system: High- 
     
139 
reliability organizing for complex and volatile task environments.  Academy of 
Management Journal. 44, 1281-1299. 
Beyea, SC. (2004). Creating a just safety culture. AORN Journal, 79, 412-414. 
Bobay, K.L., Fiorelli, K.L., & Anderson, A. (2008). Failure to rescue: A preliminary  
 study of patient-level factors. Journal of Nursing Care Quality, 23, 211-215. 
Brayfield, A., & Rothe, H. (1951). An index of job satisfaction, Journal of Applied  
 Psychology, 35, 307-311. 
Brown, T. A. (2006). Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research.  New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
Buerhaus, P.I. (1994a). Economics of managed competition and consequences to 
 nurses: Part I. Nursing Economics, 12, 10-17. 
Buerhaus, P.I. (1994b). Economics of managed competition and consequences to  
 nurses: Part II. Nursing Economics, 12, 75-80, 106 
Buerhaus, P.I. (1995). Economics and reform: Frces affecting nurse staffing.  
 Nursing Policy Forum, 1, 9-14. 
Callahan, M.,& Ruchlin, H. (2003). The role of nursing leadership in establishing a  
 safety culture. Nursing Economics. 21, 296-297. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (2007, May 11). Present on  
 admission  indicator. Retrieved May 13, 2007,  
 from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/transmittals/downloads/R1240CP.pdf 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (n.d.) Hospital compare.  
 Retrieved May 13, 2007, from   
     
140 
http://www.medicare.gov/Hospital/Search/Welcome.asp?version=default&bro
wser=IE%7C7%7CWinXP&language=English&defaultstatus=0&pagelist=Ho
me 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Regulation1533-FC. (2007,  
August 22). Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems 
and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates. Retrieved September 3, 2007, from  
 http://www.cms.hhs.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/downloads/CMS-1533-FC.pdf 
Chao. G.T. (2000). Multilevel issues and culture: An integrative view. In K.J. Klein  
& S.W.J. Kozlowski (Eds.), Multilevel Theory, Research and Methods in 
Organizations (pp. 3-90). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Cho, S., Ketefian, S., Barkauskas, V.H., & Smith, D.G. (2003). The effects of nurse 
staffing on adverse events, morbidity, mortality, and medical costs. Nursing 
Research, 52, 71-79. 
Clarke, S.P. (2004). Failure to rescues: Lessons learned from missed opportunities of  
 care. Nursing Inquiry, 11, 67-71. 
Clarke, S.P., & Aiken, L.H. ((2003). Failure to rescue. American Journal of Nursing,  
 103(1), 42-47. 
Cohen, M.R. (1979) Medication errors: Make it a ritual: Chart medication doses 
 immediately after administering them. Nursing, 9(12), 24. 
Cohen, M.R. (1980) Medication errors: Don’t be misled by a number preceding a  
 drug name. Nursing, 10(12), 74-6. 
Davies, T. (2006, September 23). Fatal drug mix-up exposes hospital flaws. CBS  
     
141 
News Healthwatch. Retrieved May 12, 2007 from 
http://wwwimage.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/23/ap/health/mainD8KA8UD0
0.shtml 
Deming, E.W. (1986) Out of the Crisis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Dixon, N.M. & Shofer, M. (2006). Struggling to invent high-reliability organization  
in health care settings: Insights from the field. Health Services Research, 41, 
1618-1632. 
Dunton N., Gajewski B., Tanton R. L., & Moore J. (2004) Nurse staffing and patient  
 falls on acute care hospital units. Nursing Outlook, 52, 53-9. 
Ebright, P.R., Patterson, E.S., & Render, M.L. (2002). The “new look” approach to  
patient safety: a guide for clinical nurse specialist leadership. Clinical Nurse 
Specialist. 16, 247-253. 
Elliott, C.G.S. (2006). Using aggregated micro-level data as measures of macro-level  
phenomena: The case of the NDNQI-RN Satisfaction Survey. Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas, Lawrence. 
Feder, H.M. (2006). Implementation of patient safety organizations expected by end  
 of year. Journal of Health Care Compliance, 8, 49-50, 80. 
Forbes, S., & Taunton, R.L. (1994). Reliability of aggregated organizational data: An  
evaluation of five empirical indices. Journal of Nursing Measurement, 2, 37-
48. 
Frankel, A.S. Leonard, M.W., & Denham, C.R. (2006). Fair and just culture, team  
     
142 
behavior, and leadership engagement: The tools to achieve high reliability. 
Health Services Research, 41, 1690-1709. 
Gaba, D.M. & Howard, SK. (2002). Patient safety: Fatigue among  
clinicians and the safety of patients. New England Journal of Medicine, 347, 
1249-55. 
Gallagher, R.M., & Rowell, P.A. (2003). Claiming the future of nursing through  
nursing-sensitive quality indicators. Nursing Administration Quarterly, 27, 
273-284. 
Glick, W.H. (1985). Conceptualizing and measuring organization and psychological  
climate: Pitfalls in multilevel research. Academy of Management Review, 10, 
601-616. 
Grabowski, M. & Roberts, K. (1997). Risk mitigation in large-scale systems:  
Lessons from high reliability organizations. California Management Review, 
39(4), 152-162. 
Grobman, W.A., Feinglass, J., & Murthy, S. (2006). Are the Agency for Healthcare  
Research and Quality obstetric trauma indicators valid measure of hospital 
safety? American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology, 195, 868-874 
Healthgrades. (2007, April). Healthgrades quality study: Fourth annual patient  
safety in American hospitals study. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from 
http://www.healthgrades.com/media/dms/pdf/PatientSafetyInAmericanHospita
lsStudy2007.pdf 
Hickam, D.H., Severance, S., Feldstein, A., Ray, L., Gorman, P., Schuldheis, S., et  
     
143 
al. (2003). The effect of health care working conditions on patient safety. 
Evidence report/technology assessment Number 74. Retrieved May 12, 2007, 
from http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/worksum.htm 
Houchens, R.L., Elixhauser, A., & Romano, P.S. (2008). How often are potential  
patient safety events present on admission? The Joint Commission Journal on 
Quality and Patient Safety, 34 (3), 154-158. 
Hoyle, R.H. (Ed.) (1995). Structural equation modeling: Concepts, issues and  
 applications. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Hughes, L.C., & Anderson, R.A. (1994). Issues regarding aggregation of data in  
 nursing systems research. Journal of Nursing Measurement, 2, 79-101. 
Hugonnet, S., Chevrolet, J.C., & Pittet, D. (2007). The effect of workload on 
 infection risk in critically ill patients. Critical Care Medicine, 35, 76-81. 
Iezzonni, L.I. (1997). Assessing quality using administrative data. Annals of Internal  
 Medicine, 127, 666-674. 
Iezzonni, L.I., Daley, J., Heeren, T., Foley, S.M., Hughes, J.S., Fisher, E.S., et al. 
(1994). Using administrative data to screen hospitals fro high complication 
rates. Inquiry, 31, 40-55. 
Iezzonni, L.I., Daley, J., Heeren, T., Foley, S.M., Fisher, E.S., Duncan, C., et al.  
(1994). Identifying complication of care using administrative data. Medical 
Care, 32, 700-715. 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI). (n.d.) 5 Million lives from harm 
     
144 
  campaign. Retrieved May13, 2007, from 
 http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Programs/Campaign/ 
Institute of Medicine (IOM). (1977). Reliability of hospital discharge abstracts.  
 Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine. (1999). To err is human: Building a safer health care system.  
 Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine. (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: a new health system for  
 the 21st century. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine. (2003). Patient Safety: Achieving A New Standard of Care.  
 Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine (IOM). (2004). Keeping patients safe: Transforming the work  
 environment  for nurses. Washington D.C. National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine (2006). Preventing Medication Errors. Washington D.C.  
 National Academy Press. 
Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP). (2007, November 27). Another  
heparin error: Learning from mistakes so we don’t repeat them. Retrieved July 
6, 2008, from 
http://www.ismp.org/Newsletters/acutecare/articles/20071129.asp?ptr=y 
Jeffcott, S., Pidgeon, N., Weyman, A., & Walls, J. (2006). Risk, trust, and safety  
 culture in U.K. train operating companies. Risk Analysis, 26, 1105-1121. 
Jeffs, L., Law, M., & Baker, G.R. (2007). Creating reporting and learning cultures in  
 health-care organizations. The Canadian Nurse, 103, 16-17, 27-28 
     
145 
Jennings, B. M., Loan, L. A., DePaul, D., Brosch, L. R., & Hildreth, P. (2001). 
Lessons learned while collecting ANA indicator data. Journal of Nursing 
 Administration, 31, 121-129. 
Judd, C. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1981).  Process analysis: Estimating mediation in  
 treatment evaluations. Evaluation Review, 5, 602-619. 
Kerfoot, K. (2004). Attending to weak signals: The leader’s challenge. Pediatric 
 Nursing, 30, 79-81. 
Kline, R.B. (2005). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
Knaus, W.A., Draper, E.A., Wagner, D.P., & Zimmerman, J.E. (1986). An  
evaluation of outcome from intensive care in major medical centers. Annals of 
Internal Medicine, 104, 410-418. 
Kozlowski, S.W.J., & Klein, K.J. (2000). A multilevel approach to theory and  
research in organizations: Contextual, temporal, and emergent processes. In 
K.J. Klein & S.W.J. Kozlowski (Eds.), Multilevel Theory, Research and 
Methods in Organizations (pp. 3-90). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Kovner, C., & Gergen, P.J. (1998). Nurse staffing levels and adverse events  
following surgery in U.S. hospitals. Image, Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 
30, 315-321. 
Kovner, C., Jones, C., Zhan, C., Gergen, P.J., & Basu, J. (2002). Nurse staffing and  
postsurgical adverse events: An analysis of administrative data from a sample 
of U.S. hospitals, 1990-1996. Health Services Research, 37, 611-629. 
     
146 
Lawthers, A.G., McCarthy, E.P., Davis, R.B., Peterson, L.E., Palmer, R.H., &  
Iezzoni, L.I. (2000). Identification of in-hospital complications from claims 
data: Is it valid? Medical Care, 38, 785-795. 
Leape, L. (1994). Error in Medicine. JAMA. 272,1851-1857 
Leape, L. L., & Berwick, D.M. (2005). Five years after To Err Is Human: What have 
 we learned? JAMA, 18, 2384-2390. 
Leapfrog Group (n.d.) Leapfrog Group Fact Sheet. Retrieved May 13, 2007, from  
 http://www.leapfroggroup.org/about_us/leapfrog-factsheet 
Leonard, M., Graham, S., Bonacum, D. (2004). The human factor: the critical  
importance of effective teamwork and communication in providing safe care. 
Quality and Safety in Health Care, 13, i85-i90 
Li, Y., Glance, L.G., Cai, X., & Mukamel, D.B. (2008). Adverse hospital events for  
mentally ill patients undergoing coronary artery bypass surgery. Health 
Services Research, 43, 2239-2252. 
Liang, B.A., Riley, W., Rutherford, W., & Hamman, W. (2007). The Patient Safety  
and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: Provisions and potential opportunities. 
American Journal of Medical Quality, 22, 8-12.  
Luria, J.W., Muething, S.E., Schoettker, P.J., & Kotagal, U.R. (2006). Reliability  
science and patient safety. Pediatric Clinics of North America, 53, 1121-1133. 
MacCallum, R.C., Browne, M.W., & Sugawara, H.M. (1996). Power analysis and  
determination of sample size for covariance structure modeling. Psychological 
Methods, 1, 130-149. 
     
147 
Manojlovich, M. & Talsma, A. (2007). Identifying nursing processes to reduce  
 failure to rescue. Journal of Nursing Administration, 37, 504-509. 
Marx, D. (2003). How building a ‘just culture’ helps an organization learn from  
 errors. OR Manager, 19(5), 13-19. 
McKeon, L.M., Oswaks, J.D., & Cunningham, P.D. (2006). Complexity science,  
high reliability organizations, and implications for team training in healthcare. 
Clinical Nurse Specialist, 20, 298-304. 
Meyer, G.A. & Lavin, M.A. (2005). Vigilance: the essence of nursing. Online  
Journal of Issues in Nursing, 10, Retrieved October 22, 2008 from 
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPe
riodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Volume102005/No3Sept05/ArticlePreviousTo
pic/VigilanceTheEssenceofNursing.aspx  
Meyer, G.A., Lavin, M.A., Perry, A.G. (2007). Is it time for a new category of  
nursing diagnosis? International Journal of Nursing Terminologies and 
Classifications, 18(2), 45-50. 
Miller, M.R., Elixhauser, A., Zhan, C. & Meyer, G.S. (2001). Patient safety  
indicators: Using administrative data to identify potential patient safety 
concerns. Health Services Research, 36, 110-132. 
Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) (2008). Adverse health events in  
Minnesota: Fourth annual report. Retrieved December 27, 2008, from 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/patientsafety/ae/aereport0108.pdf 
Mitchell, P.H., Armstrong, S., Simpson, T.R., & Lentz, M. (1989). American 
     
148 
Association of Critical-Care Nurses Demonstration Project: Profile of 
excellence in critical care nursing. Heart Lung, 18, 219-237. 
Morrison, R. (2006). Venous thromboembolism: Scope of the problem and nurse’s  
role in risk assessment and prevention. Journal of Vascular Nursing, 24, 82-
90. 
Muthén , L.K. & Muthén, B.O. (2007). Mplus®: User’s guide (4th ed.). Los Angeles,  
 CA: Muthén & Muthén. 
Nash, J.J. (2008). Why hospitals should fly. Bozeman, MT: Second River Healthcare  
 Press. 
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention  
(NCC-MERP). (2005, December). NCC-MERP the first 10 years: Defining the 
problem and developing solutions. Retrieved on May 13, 2007, from 
http://www.nccmerp.org/pdf/reportFinal2005-11-29.pdf 
National Database for Nursing Quality Indicators® (NDNQI®). (2006, October).  
Guidelines for Data Submission on Quarterly Indicators. Kansas City, KS: 
Author. 
National Quality Forum (NQF). (2006, February, 13). NQF releases standardized  
patient safety classification system: Taxonomy would lead to better quality, 
reduced errors. Retrieved on May 12, 2007, from 
http://216.122.138.39/pdf/news/taxonomy2-13-06.pdf 
National Quality Forum. (n.d.). Safe Practices for Better Care. Retrieved May 12,  
 2007, from http://www.qualityforum.org/projects/completed/safe_practices/ 
     
149 
Needleman, J., Buerhaus, P., Mattke, S., Stewart, M., & Zelevinsky, K. (2002).  
Nurse-staffing levels and the quality of care in hospitals. New England Journal 
of Medicine, 346, 1715-1722. 
Olsen, S., Neale, G., Schwab, K., Psaila, B., Patel, T., Chapman, E.J., et al. (2007). 
Hospital staff should use more than one method to detect adverse events and 
potential adverse events: incident reporting, pharmacist surveillance and local 
real-time record review may all have a place. Quality and Safety in Health 
Care, 16, 40-44. 
Ottewill, M. (2003). The current approach to human error and blame in the NHS.  
 British  Journal of Nursing, 12, 919-924. 
Paine, L.A., Baker, D.R., Rosenstein, B., & Pronovost, P.J. (2004). The Johns  
Hopkins hospital: Identifying and addressing risks and safety issues. Joint 
Commission Journal on Quality and Safety. 30, 543-550. 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQI) of  2005, PL 109-41. Retrieved  
on May 13, 2007 from, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=publ041.109&directory=/d
iskb/wais/data/109_cong_public_laws 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 42 C.F.R. (2008, November21).  
Retrieved on December 27, 2008 from, 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-27475.pdf 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Proposed Rule, 42 C.F.R. (2008, February  
     
150 
 12). Retrieved on May 13, 2007 from, 
 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-2375.pdf 
Patterson, E.S. (2007). Communication strategies from high-reliability organizations:  
 Translation is hard work. Annals of Surgery, 245, 170-173. 
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies. New York: 
 Basic Books. 
Plesk, P., (2001). Redesigning Health Care with insights from the science of  
complex adaptive systems. In Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system 
for the 21st century. (pp 309-322). Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.  
Polancich, E.R., & Prosser, J. (2006). Cautious use of administrative data for  
decutbitus ulcer outcome reporting. American Journal of Medical Quality, 21, 
262-269. 
Preacher, K. J. & Coffman, D. L. (2006, May). Computing power and minimum  
sample size for RMSEA [Computer software]. Available from 
http://www.quantpsy.org/. 
Preacher, K.J. & Leonardelli, G.J. (2006). Calculation for the Sobel test: An  
interaction calculation tool for mediation tests. Retrieved October 20, 2008 
from http://www.people.ku.edu/~preacher/sobel/sobel.htm).   
Reardon, J., & Reardon, L. (1995). The restructuring of the hospital services  
 industry. Journal of Economic Issues, 29, 1063-1081. 
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Roberts, K.H. (1990a). Managing high reliability organizations. California  
     
151 
 Management Review, 101-113. 
Roberts, K.H. (1990b). Some characteristics of one type of high reliability  
 organization. Organization science, 1, 160-176. 
Roberts, K.H. (2003). HRO has prominent history.  Retrieved August 1, 2006 from 
 http://www.apsf.org/resource_center/newsletter/2003/spring/hrohistory.htm 
Roberts, K.H., & Bea, R.G. (2001). When systems fail. Organizational dynamics,  
 29, 179-191. 
Roberts, K.H., Stout, S.K., & Hapern, J.J. (1994). Decision dynamics in two high 
  reliability military organizations. Management Science. 40, 614-624. 
Rogers, A.E., Hwang, W., & Scott, L.D. (2004). The effects of work breaks on staff  
 nurse performance. Journal of Nursing Administration, 34, 512-519. 
Romano, P.S., Geppert, J.J., Davies, S., Miller, M.R., Elixhauser, A., & McDonald,  
K.M. (2003). A national profile of patient safety in U.S. hospitals. Health 
Affairs. 22, 154-166. 
Rosenthal, J., & Booth, M. (2005, October). Maximizing the use of state adverse  
event data to improve patient safety (National Academy for State Health 
Policy). Retrieved May 13, 2007 from 
http://www.nashp.org/Files/Patient_Safety_GNL61_for_web.pdf 
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R.L. (1991). Essentials of behavioral research: Methods  
 and data analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rozich, J.D., Haraden, C.R., & Resar, R.K. (2003). Adverse drug event trigger  
     
152 
tool: A practical methodology for measuring medication related harm. Quality 
and Safety in Health Care, 12, 194-200. 
Seago, J.A., Williamson, A., & Atwood, C. (2006). Longitudinal analyses of nurse 
staffing and patient outcomes: More about failure to rescue. Journal of Nursing 
Administration, 36, 13-21. 
Shortell, S.M., Zimmerman, J.E., Rousseau, D.M., Giles, R.R., Wagner, D.P.,  
Draper, E.A. et al. (1994). The performance of intensive care units: Does good 
management make a difference? Medical Care, 32, 508-525. 
Simonson, D.C., Ahern, M.M., & Hendryx, M.S. (2007). Anesthesia staffing and  
anesthetic complications during cesarean delivery. Nursing Research, 56, 9-17. 
Simpson, R.L. (2000). Medical errors, airplanes, and information technology.  
 Nursing Management, 31(6), 14-15. 
Singer, S.J., Gaba, D.M., Geppert, J.J., Sinaiko, A.D., Howard, S.K., & Park, K.C.  
(2003). The culture of safety: results of an organization-wide survey in 15 
California hospitals. Quality and Safety in Health Care. 12, 112-118. 
Stamps, P. (1997). Nurses and work satisfaction: An index for measurement.  
 Chicago: Health Administration Press. 
Taunton, R.L., Bott, M.J., Koehn, M.L., Miller, P.A., Rindner, E., Pace, K., et al.  
(2004). The NDNQI-adapted Index of Work Satisfaction. Journal of Nursing 
Measurement, 12, 101-122. 
The Joint Commission (n.d.). Performance measurement initiatives. Retrieved July  
     
153 
18, 2008, from 
http://www.jointcommission.org/PerformanceMeasurement/PerformanceMeas
urement/default.htm 
The Joint Commission (2008, July 9). Sentinel Event Alert: Behaviors that  
undermine a culture of safety. Retrieved July 18, 2008 from 
http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/SentinelEventAlert/sea_40.ht
m  
The W. Edwards Deming Institute®. (n.d.). Deming Prize. Retrieved June 20, 2007,  
 from http://deming.org/ 
Thornlow, D.K., & Stukenborg, G.J. (2006). The association between hospital  
characteristics and rate so preventable complication and adverse events. 
Medical Care, 44, 265-269. 
Unruh, L. (2003). Licensed nurse staffing and adverse outcomes in hospitals.  
 Medical Care, 41, 142-152. 
VanCott, H. (1994) Human errors: Their causes and reductions. In Bognar, M.S. 
(Ed.), Human Error in Medicine. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Vartak, S., Ward, M.M., & Vaughn, T.E. (2008). Do postoperative complications  
 vary by hospital teaching status? Medical Care, 46, 25-32. 
Verran, J.A., Mark, B.A., & Lamb, G. (1992). Psychometric examination of  
 instruments using aggregated data. Research in Nursing & Health, 18, 77-80. 
Vogus, T.J., & Sutcliffe, K.M. (2007). The Safety Organizing Scale: development  
     
154 
and validation of a behavioral measure of safety culture in hospital nursing 
units. Medical Care, 45, 46-54. 
von Bertalanffy, L.(1968) General systems theory. New York: George Braziller. 
 
Wachter, R.M. (2004). The end of the beginning: Patient safety five years after ‘To  
Err is Human’[Web exclusive]. Health Affairs, W4, 534-545. Retrieved April 
16, 2007 from 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/short/hlthaff.w4.534v1 
Watson, D.S. (2003). Creating the culture of safety. AORN Journal. 77, 268-271. 
 
Weick, K.E. (1987). Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. California  
 Management Review, 29, 112-127. 
Weick, K.E., & Roberts, K.H. (1993). Collective mind in organization: Heedful  
 interrelating on flight decks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 357-382. 
Weick, K.E., & Sutcliffe, K.M. (2001). Managing the unexpected: Assuring high 
  performance in an age of complexity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Sensemaking and organizing.  
 Organization Science, 16, 409-421.  
Weingart, S.N., Farbstein, K., Davis, R.B., & Phillips, R.S. (2004). Using a multi- 
hospital survey to examine the safety culture. Joint Commission Journal on 
Quality and Safety. 30(3). 125-132. 
Weingart, S.N., Iezzoni, L.I., Davis, R.B., Palmer, R.H., Cahalane, M., Hamel, M.B.,  
     
155 
et al. (2000). Use of administrative data to find substandard care: Validation of 
the complication screening program. Medical Care, 38, 796-806. 
Yates, G.R., Hochman, R.F., Sayles, S.M., & Stockmeir, C.A. (2004). Sentara  
Norfolk General Hospital: accelerating improvement by focusing on building a 
culture of safety. Joint Commission Journal of Quality and Safety, 30, 534-
542. 
Zhan, C., & Miller, M.R. (2003a). Administrative data based patient safety research:  
 A critical review. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 12, 58-63. 
Zhan, C., & Miller, M.R. (2003b). Excess length of stay, charges, and mortality  
attributable to medical injuries during hospitalization. JAMA, 290, 1868-1874. 
Zhan, C., Smith, M., & Stryer, D. (2006). Accidental iatrogenic pneumothorax in  
 hospitalized patients. Medical Care, 44, 182-186. 
Zohar, D., Livne, Y., Tenne-Gazit, O., Admi, H. & Donchin, Y. (2007). Healthcare  
climate: A framework for measuring and improving patient safety. Critical Care 
Medicine, 35, 1312-1317. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
156 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
A
 
C
ov
ar
ia
nc
es
 W
ith
in
 a
nd
 A
cr
os
s L
at
en
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 
W
or
k 
U
ni
t S
up
po
rt 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
Su
pp
or
t 
Pa
tie
nt
 S
af
et
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Q
O
C
 
Ta
sk
 
Te
am
 
D
ec
is
io
n
M
ak
g 
Su
pp
 
N
ur
se
 
M
an
ag
 
Pr
of
 
D
ev
el
 
N
sg
 
A
dm
in
 
A
ut
on
 
D
U
 
FT
R
 
IM
C
 
D
V
T 
Q
O
C
 
 0
.3
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ta
sk
 
 0
.3
0 
 0
.0
69
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Te
am
 
 0
.0
19
 
 0
.0
29
 
 0
.0
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
 0
.0
22
 
 0
.0
47
 
 0
.0
29
 
 0
.0
64
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ur
se
 
M
an
ag
e 
 0
.0
26
 
 0
.0
39
 
 0
.0
31
 
 0
.0
60
 
 0
.1
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD
 
 0
.0
10
 
 0
.0
28
 
 0
.0
18
 
 0
.0
48
 
 0
.0
46
 
 0
.0
68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
A
 
 0
.0
09
 
 0
.0
33
 
 0
.0
19
 
 0
.0
59
 
 0
.0
39
 
 0
.0
45
 
 0
.1
24
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
ut
on
 
 0
.0
22
 
 0
.0
43
 
 0
.0
30
 
 0
.0
40
 
 0
.0
39
 
 0
.0
25
 
 0
.0
29
 
 0
.0
37
 
 
 
 
 
D
U
 
-0
.0
22
 
-0
.0
03
 
-0
.0
27
 
 0
.0
03
 
-0
.0
22
 
 0
.0
13
 
 0
.0
14
 
-0
.0
41
 
 0
.9
90
 
 
 
 
FT
R
 
-0
.0
04
 
-0
.0
71
 
-0
.0
27
 
-0
.0
55
 
-0
.0
53
 
-0
.0
24
 
-0
.0
05
 
-0
.0
41
 
-0
.1
15
 
 0
.9
90
 
 
 
IM
C
 
 0
.0
12
 
 0
.0
25
 
-0
.0
01
 
 0
.0
40
 
 0
.0
31
 
 0
.0
43
 
-0
.0
13
 
-0
.0
44
 
 0
.1
17
 
-0
.1
27
0.
99
0 
 
D
V
T 
-0
.0
09
 
 0
.0
25
 
-0
.0
86
 
 0
.0
54
 
 0
.0
41
 
 0
.0
77
 
 0
.0
80
 
 0
.0
22
 
 0
.2
27
 
-0
.2
18
0.
23
1 
0.
99
0 
 N
ot
e.
 Q
O
C
= 
Q
ua
lit
y 
of
 C
ar
e,
 T
ea
m
= 
Te
am
w
or
k 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
kg
= 
D
ec
is
io
n 
M
ak
in
g,
 S
up
p 
N
s M
an
ag
= 
Su
pp
or
tiv
e 
N
ur
si
ng
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t, 
Pr
of
 D
ev
el
op
= 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
N
sg
 A
dm
in
= 
N
ur
si
ng
 A
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n,
 A
ut
on
= 
A
ut
on
om
y,
 D
U
= 
D
ec
ub
itu
s U
lc
er
, F
TR
= 
Fa
ilu
re
 to
 R
es
cu
e,
 IM
C
= 
In
fe
ct
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
ar
e,
 D
V
T=
 P
ul
m
on
ar
y 
Em
bo
lu
s o
r D
ee
p 
V
ei
n 
Th
ro
m
bo
si
s
     
157
NDNQI 
NATIONAL DATABASE OF NURSING QUALITY INDICATORS 
 
 
2005 NDNQI RN Satisfaction Survey-Revised  
 
 
The 2005 survey is presented in five sections. Part I contains items selected to 
represent the subscales of the NDNQI-Adapted Index of Work Satisfaction, Nursing 
Work Index, and Job Enjoyment Scale.  These items, phrased at the individual level, 
were added in response to participants’ concern that their individual feelings were 
not being considered. Parts II and III are measured at the work group, or unit level, 
just as other indicators included in the NDNQI are measured at the patient care unit 
level.  Part II is the NDNQI adaptation of Stamps’ (1997) Index of Work 
Satisfaction (adapted with permission of Dr. Paula Stamps) and the NDNQI 
adaptation of selected subscales of the Aiken and Patrician (2000) Nursing Work 
Index (adapted with permission from Dr. Aiken). Part II contains eleven subscales: 
Task, Nurse-Nurse Interactions, Nurse-Physician Interactions, Decision-Making, 
Autonomy, Professional Status, Pay, Supportive Nurse Management, Nursing 
Administration, and Professional Development.  Part III is the Job Enjoyment Scale, 
which is comprised of 7 items extracted from the Brayfield and Rothe (1951) 
questionnaire.  Part IV contains demographic and work contextual items relating to 
quality of care, floating and overtime, RN characteristics, preparation, and job plans.  
Part V contains 13 items added by ANA to collect information for the Nurse 
Competence in Aging Initiative. The items are posted on the RN Satisfaction Home 
Page (www.nursingquality.org) under the Instrument link.  The data collected from 
these items will not be included in the NDNQI RN Satisfaction Report.  Go to 
www.GeroNurseOnline.org for contact and other information on this initiative.  
 
Part II:  NDNQI-Adapted Index of Work Satisfaction 
 
Nurses with whom I work would say that: 
Response options:  strongly agree, agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, disagree, strongly 
disagree. 
Task:  
1. They are satisfied with the nursing care they provide to patients.  
2. They could do a better job if they did not have so much to do all the time. 
APPENDIX B 
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3. They have plenty of time to discuss patient care problems with other nursing 
service personnel. 
4. They have sufficient time for direct patient care.  
5. They have plenty of opportunity to discuss patient-care problems with other 
nursing service personnel. 
6. They could deliver much better patient care if they had more time with each 
patient. 
 
Nurse-Nurse Interaction:  
1. Nursing personnel pitch in and help each other when things get in a rush. 
2. It is hard for new nurses to feel “at home” on the unit. 
3. There is a good deal of teamwork among nursing personnel.  
4. They are satisfied with the interactions among the nursing staff.  
5. Nursing personnel are not as friendly and outgoing as they would like. 
6. The nurses on our unit support each other. 
 
Nurse-Physician Interaction:  
1. Physicians in general cooperate with nursing staff. 
2. They are not satisfied with their interactions with hospital physicians. 
3. There is a lot of teamwork between nurses and doctors on our unit. 
4. Physicians at this hospital look down too much on the nursing staff. 
5. Physicians respect the skill and knowledge of the nursing staff. 
6. Physicians at this hospital generally appreciate what the nursing staff do. 
 
Decision-Making:  
1. There is ample opportunity for nursing staff to participate in administrative 
decision-making processes. 
2. Administrative decisions at this hospital interfere too much with patient care. 
3. They are not satisfied with their participation in decision-making for the unit. 
4. They have all the voice they want in planning policies and procedures for the unit.  
5. Nursing administrators generally consult with the staff on daily problems.  
6. They have the freedom in their work to make important decisions.  
7. They can count on nursing administrators to back them up. 
 
Autonomy:  
1. They have sufficient input into the program of care for each of their patients. 
2. They have too much responsibility and not enough authority. 
3. Nurses have a good deal of control over their own work. 
4. They are frustrated sometimes because their activities seem programmed for them. 
5. They are required sometimes to do things on the job that are against their better 
professional judgment. 
6. Nurses need more autonomy in their daily practice. 
7. They are free to adjust their daily practice to fit patient needs. 
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Part II:  NDNQI-Adapted Nursing Work Index  
 
Nurses with whom I work would say that: 
Response options:  strongly agree, agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, disagree, strongly 
disagree. 
Professional Development: 
1. They have career development opportunities.   
2. They have access to regional and national conferences.   
3. They have access to active inservice programs for nurses.   
4. They have support for pursuing degrees in nursing.   
5. They have a preceptor program for newly hired RNs.   
6. They have clinical nurse specialists who provide patient care consultations.   
7. They have flexible work schedules.  
8. They have access to continuing education programs for nurses.   
9. They have opportunities for advancement.   
10. They are not satisfied with opportunities for professional development.  
 
Supportive Nursing Management: 
1. Their nurse manager is a good manager and leader.  
2. Their nurse manager is supportive of nurses.    
3. Their nurse manager backs up the nursing staff in decision making even in 
conflicts with physicians.  
4. They are not satisfied with their nurse manager.     
5. Their nurse manager consults with staff on daily problems.  
 
Nursing Administration: 
1. They are satisfied with the hospital chief nurse executive.   
2. Their hospital chief nurse executive is equal in authority to other top-level 
hospital executives.   
3. Their hospital chief nurse executive is visible to staff.    
4. Their hospital chief nurse executive is equal in power to other top-level hospital 
executives.   
5. Their hospital chief nurse executive is accessible to staff.   
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Part III: NDNQI-Adapted Job Enjoyment Scale 
 
 
Part IV:  Demographic and Contextual Item 
 
Quality of Care: 
In general, how would you describe the quality of nursing care delivered to patients 
on your  unit?   
 Response options: excellent, good, fair, poor 
3.  Over the past year, what has happened about the amount of overtime needed from 
RNs on your  unit?  
 Response options: increased, remained the same, decreased, don’t know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
161
 
References 
 
Aiken, L., & Patrician, P. A. (2000). Measuring organizational traits of hospitals: 
The Revised Nursing Work Index. Nursing Research, 49, 146-153. 
Brayfield, A., & Rothe, H. (1951). An index of job satisfaction. Journal of Applied 
Psychology,  
35, 307-311. 
Stamps, P. (1997). Nurses and work satisfaction: An index for measurement. 
Chicago: Health  
Administration Press.  
 
------------------------------------- 
2-14-05 
 
 
     
162
 
 
APPENDIX C 
NIS 
APPLICATION
 
 
August 15, 2008 
     
163
 
CENTRAL DISTRIBUTOR  
HCUP NIS APPLICATION The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) is available through the HCUP Central Distributor under 
the auspices of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The NIS database 
excludes data elements that could directly or indirectly identify individuals. Access to the files 
is open to users who sign a Data Use Agreement.  Users must agree to use the database for 
research and statistical purposes only and to make no attempts to identify individuals.  
For information on the NIS, see the “Overview of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample” at 
http:///www.hcup-us-ahrq.gov.  
Directions to Complete the HCUP NIS Application:  
1 Print or type all responses. An electronic copy is available on request.  
2 Complete Part I: Organization and/or Individual Requesting Use of the HCUP NIS   
 
3 Complete Part II: Selection of HCUP NIS (page 3).  
4 Determine the Total Payment Due and Select Payment Method (Part III).  
5 Read and sign the Indemnification Clause (Part IV).  
6 Complete the online HCUP Data Use Agreement Training Course and provide your 
Certification Code (Part V).  
 
7 Read and sign the Data Use Agreement for Nationwide Inpatient Sample.  
8 Submit the completed application (pages 2 -11):  
HCUP Central Distributor  
Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. 
8757 Georgia Avenue, 12
th
 Floor  
Silver Spring, MD 20910  
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Part I: Organization and/or Individual Requesting Use of the HCUP NIS General 
Information:  
Applicant Name:  
Position/Title:  
Organization (include Branch, Division, Department):  
Street Address:  
 
City: State: Zip Code: Phone Number: Fax:  
Internet Address:  
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Part II: Selection of HCUP NIS  
The price of the NIS has been set to cover the full costs associated with disseminating it to 
data requesters. The price includes labor costs related to handling inquiries, preparing data 
files, and copying documentation; and the costs associated with materials and shipping.  
Students in good standing may purchase any version of the NIS for $20.  Students must 
demonstrate that they are in fact a student by providing: 1) a copy of a valid student ID, OR 
2) a letter from the registrar’s office indicating that they are student in good standing, OR 3) 
a note or letter from a professor or program director verifying that they are in fact a student in 
good standing.  
If you have questions or want more information, please contact the HCUP Central Distributor 
by phone by e-mail at HCUPDistributor@AHRQ.gov.  
Database  Media/structure  Price  
NIS, 2006  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students  
NIS, 2005  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students  
NIS, 2004  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students 
NIS, 2003  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students 
NIS, 2002  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students 
NIS, 2001  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students 
NIS, 2000  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$200 All Others  
$20 Students 
NIS, 1999  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, 1998  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, Release 6, 1997  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, Release 5, 1996  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, Release 4, 1995  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, Release 3, 1994  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, Release 2, 1993  1 year of data in 2-CD set, compressed files in ASCII format  
$160 All Others 
$ 20 Students  
NIS, Release 1, 1988-
1992  
5 years of data in 6-CD set, compressed 
files in ASCII format  
$322 All Others  
$20 Students  
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Part III: Determine the Total Payment Due and Select Payment Method  
Total Payment Due  
If you need help determining the payment due, submit the completed application (pages 2-
11), without payment, to the HCUP Central Distributor and request an invoice. An itemized 
invoice will be faxed or e-mailed to you stating the total payment due, including taxes for 
applicants in Maryland. Note that the HCUP Central Distributor collects taxes only from 
applicants in Maryland. All other applicants are responsible for determining tax liability and 
remitting taxes directly to state and local taxing authorities.  
TOTAL PAYMENT DUE  
 NIS Data Cost From Part II: $_____________ 
 Tax (MD applicants only): $_____________ 
 Total Payment Due:  $_____________ 
 
Orders will not be filled until the completed application and 
full payment have been received. Payment Method  
The HCUP Central Distributor accepts purchase orders, and payment may be 
made by major credit card, check, or electronic funds' transfer.  
Paying by Credit Card  
Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are accepted. Your credit card is not 
charged until the day your order is shipped. A credit card receipt for your purchase 
is included with the order.  
Credit card information is accepted by mail or telephone. If you would like to mail the 
information, please complete items 1 – 10 of the Credit Card Payment form on the 
next page and mail it with your itemized invoice or completed application to the 
following address:  
HCUP Central Distributor  
Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. 
8757 Georgia Avenue, 12
th
 Floor  
    Silver Spring, MD 20910  
If you prefer to provide your credit card information by 
telephone, please call toll-free at (866) 556-4287 between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time.  
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Paying by Check  
Checks should be made payable to Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. Mail a check 
for the total payment due with your itemized invoice or completed application. The 
address is listed above.  
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Credit Card Payment Form  
If you would like to pay by credit card, please complete items 1 – 10 of this 
form and enclose it with your application. If you prefer to provide your credit 
card information by telephone, please call toll-free at (866) 5564287 between 
9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time.  
1.  Date:  
2.  Individual/Company Name:   
3.  Names On Credit Card:  
 
a. Please list the names on the credit card exactly as they are 
shown on the card.  
4.  Type Of Credit Card:  MASTERCARD  VISA AMERICAN EXPRESS  
5.  Amount:  
6.  Credit Card Number:   
7.  Expiration Date:  
8.  Credit Card Billing Address:  
9.  City, State & Zip Code:   
10.  Customer Signature:  
 
For Office Use Only  
Verbal Authorization For Signature:    Yes    No  
Person Requesting Credit Card Processing: 
_____________________________________________  
Requester’s Phone Number And Extension: 
_____________________________________________  
Project Code Number: 
________________________________________________________________  
Date Processed: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Invoice 
Numbers:____________________________________________________________ 
Paid: Input By: 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Part IV: Indemnification Clause  
Recipient shall indemnify and hold Thomson Healthcare Inc. and its directors, 
officers, employees, agents, affiliates and subsidiaries harmless from any and all 
losses, claims, damages, liabilities, costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs) arising out of any claim arising from 
any third parties, including but not limited to any or some combination of the several 
States comprising the United States of America and/or the Government of the 
United States of America, concerning Recipient’s use of the NIS data provided by 
Thomson Healthcare Inc.  Further, Recipient agrees that Thomson Healthcare Inc. 
shall not be liable to Recipient for any reason whatsoever arising out of the NIS data 
or the Recipient’s use of the NIS data.   
Recipient certifies and warrants that it has made no representations to Thomson 
Healthcare Inc. concerning any uses it (Recipient) intends to make of the NIS data 
provided by Thomson Healthcare Inc. under the terms and conditions of Thomson 
Healthcare Inc. contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  Further, Recipient agrees that no 
representation of Recipient as to the Recipient’s intended use of the NIS data was 
used to determine whether the Recipient’s request to use NIS data would be 
approved.    
Recipient shall indemnify and hold Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. (SSS) and its 
directors, officers, employees, owners, and agents harmless from any and all 
losses, claims, damages, liabilities, costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs) arising out of any claim arising from 
any third parties, including but not limited to any or some combination of the several 
States comprising the United States of America and/or the Government of the 
United States of America, concerning Recipient’s use of NIS data provided by SSS.  
Further, Recipient agrees that SSS shall not be liable to Recipient for any reason 
whatsoever arising out of the NIS data or the Recipient’s use of the NIS data.  
Recipient certifies and warrants that it has made no representations to SSS 
concerning any uses it (Recipient) intends to make of the NIS data provided by SSS 
under the terms and conditions of its contract with the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Further, 
Recipient agrees that no representation of Recipient as to the Recipient’s intended 
use of the NIS data was used to determine whether the Recipient’s request to use 
NIS data would be approved.  
Signed:          Date:  
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Part V: HCUP Data Use Agreement Training  
New Requirement: HCUP Data Use Agreement 
Training  
Because of the sensitive nature of the data contained in the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP) databases, there is a continued need to reinforce the safeguards and 
restrictions placed on use of the data.  All data purchasers and users of HCUP data must 
complete the HCUP Data Use Agreement (DUA) Training Course. This course emphasizes 
the importance of data protection, helps to reduce the risk of inadvertent violations, and 
describes your individual responsibility when using HCUP data.  The course will take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete and you will not be required to take it more than once.  
If you have not previously completed the HCUP DUA Training Course, please go to the 
HCUP-US website at http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/tech_assist/dua.jsp, complete the online 
HCUP DUA Training Course, and enter the certification number at the end of the course in 
the space provided below.  
HCUP DUA Training Course Certification Code 
_______________________________________  
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DATA USE AGREEMENT for the Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality  
This Data Use Agreement (“Agreement”) implements the data protections of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (Public Law 104-191) and the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) confidentiality statute.  Any individual 
(“data recipient”) seeking to obtain or use data in the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) 
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) maintained by the Center for 
Delivery, Organization, and Markets (CDOM) within AHRQ, must sign and submit this 
Agreement to AHRQ or its agent before access to the NIS may be granted.    
In accordance with HIPAA, the NIS may only be used or disclosed in the form of a limited 
data set, as defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR § 164.514(e)).  
The AHRQ confidentiality statute, Section 924(c) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
299c-3(c)), requires that data collected by AHRQ that identify individuals or establishments 
be used only for the purpose for which they were supplied. Data supplied to AHRQ for 
HCUP and disclosed in limited data set form are identifiable under the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
and are provided by the data sources only for research, analysis, and aggregate statistical 
reporting.  Therefore, data recipients may use HCUP data only for these purposes.  
No Identification of Persons–Any effort to determine the identity of any person contained in 
HCUP databases (including but not limited to patients, physicians, and other health care 
providers), or to use the information for any purpose other than for research, analysis, and 
aggregate statistical reporting, would violate the AHRQ confidentiality statute, the conditions 
of this Agreement, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Recipients of the data set are prohibited 
under the AHRQ confidentiality statute and the terms of this Agreement from releasing, 
disclosing, publishing, or presenting any individually identifying information obtained under 
this Agreement. AHRQ omits from the data set all direct identifiers that are required to be 
excluded from limited data sets as defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  It may be possible in 
limited situations, through deliberate technical analysis, and with outside information, to 
ascertain from the limited data sets the identity of particular persons. Considerable harm 
could ensue if this were to occur. Therefore, any attempts to identify individuals are 
prohibited and information that could identify individuals directly or by inference must not be 
released or published.  In addition, users of the data must not attempt to contact individuals 
for any purpose, including verifying information supplied in the data set.  Any questions 
about the data must be referred exclusively to AHRQ.  
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Use of Establishment Identifiers–Section 924(c) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
299c-3(c)) also restricts the use of any information that permits the identification of 
establishments for purposes other than those for which the information was originally 
supplied. Permission is obtained from the HCUP data sources (state data organizations, 
hospital associations, and data consortia) to use the identification of hospitals (when such 
identification appears in the data sets) for research, analysis, and aggregate statistical 
reporting. This may include linking institutional information from outside data sets for these 
purposes. Such purpose does not include the use of information in the data sets concerning 
individual establishments for commercial or competitive purposes involving those individual 
establishments, or to determine the rights, benefits, or privileges of establishments.  Users of 
the data must not identify establishments directly or by inference in disseminated material.  
In addition, users of the data must not contact establishments for the purpose of verifying 
information supplied in the data set.  Any questions about the data must be referred 
exclusively to AHRQ.  Misuse of identifiable HCUP data about hospitals would violate the 
AHRQ confidentiality statute and trigger its penalty provisions.  
The undersigned gives the following assurances with respect to the NIS data set:  
 I will not use and will prohibit others from using or disclosing the data set (or any part), 
except for research, analysis, and aggregate statistical reporting, and only as permitted 
by this Agreement.  
 I will ensure that the data are kept in a secured environment and that only authorized 
users will have access to the data.  
 I will not release or disclose, and will prohibit others from releasing or disclosing, any 
data that are individually identifiable under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, or any information 
that identifies persons, directly or indirectly, except as permitted under this Agreement 
and in accordance with the above-mentioned AHRQ confidentiality statute.  
 I will not release or disclose information where the number of observations (i.e., 
individual discharge records) in any given cell of tabulated data is less than or equal to 
10.  
 I will not release or disclose, and will prohibit others from releasing or disclosing, the 
data set (or any part) to any person who is not a member, agent, or contractor of the 
organization (specified below), except with the approval of AHRQ.  
 I will require others employed in my organization (specified below), and any agents or 
contractors of my organization, who will use or will have access to the data set, to sign a 
copy of this Agreement (specifically acknowledging their agreement to abide by its 
terms) and I will submit those signed Agreements to AHRQ or its agent before granting 
access.  
 I will not attempt to link, and will prohibit others from attempting to link, the discharge 
records of persons in the data set with individually identifiable records from any other 
source.  
 I will not attempt to use and will prohibit others from using the data set to learn the 
identity of any person included in the data set or to contact any such person for any 
purpose.  
 In accordance with the AHRQ confidentiality statute, I will not use and will prohibit others 
from using the data set concerning individual establishments (1) for commercial or 
competitive purposes involving those individual establishments; (2) to determine the 
rights, benefits, or privileges of individual establishments; or (3) to report, through any 
medium, data that could identify, directly or by inference, individual establishments.  
 When the identities of establishments are not provided in the data sets, I will not attempt 
to use and will prohibit others from using the data set to learn the identity of any 
establishment.  
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 I will not contact and will prohibit others from contacting establishments or persons in the 
data set to question, verify, or discuss data in the HCUP databases.  
 I acknowledge that the NIS contains data elements from proprietary restricted computer 
software (3M APR-DRGs, HSS APS-DRGs, and Medstat Disease Staging) supplied by 
private vendors to AHRQ for the sole purpose of supporting research and analysis with 
the NIS. While I may freely use these data elements in my research work using the NIS, 
I agree that I will not use and will prohibit others from using these proprietary data 
elements for any commercial purpose.  In addition, I will enter into a separate agreement 
with the appropriate organization or firm for the right to use such proprietary data 
elements for commercial purposes.  In particular, I agree not to disassemble, decompile, 
or otherwise reverse-engineer the proprietary software, and I will prohibit others from 
doing so.  
 I will indemnify, defend, and hold harmless AHRQ and the data organizations that 
provide data to AHRQ for HCUP from any or all claims and losses accruing to any 
person, organization, or other legal entity as a result of violation of this Agreement.  This 
provision applies only to the extent permitted by Federal and State law.  
 I will make no statement and will prohibit others from making statements indicating or 
suggesting that interpretations drawn are those of the data sources or AHRQ.  
 I will acknowledge in all reports based on these data that the source of the data is the 
“Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.”  
 
Safeguards. I agree to use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the data 
set other than as permitted by this Agreement.  
Permitted Access to Limited Data Set. I shall limit the use or receipt of the data set to the 
individuals who require access in order to perform activities permitted by this Agreement.  
This Agreement must be signed by all such individuals and submitted to AHRQ or its agent 
before access to the data set may be granted.  
Re-disclosure. I will not re-disclose (i.e., share) the data set (or any part), unless the 
individual who will receive the data has agreed in writing to be bound by the same 
restrictions and conditions that apply to me under this Agreement.  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule.  I agree not to use or disclose the data set in any manner that 
would violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule if I were a covered entity under the Privacy Rule.  
Agents and Contractors.  I shall ensure that any agents, including contractors and 
subcontractors to whom I provide the data set, agree in writing to be bound by the same 
restrictions and conditions that apply to me with respect to the limited data set.  
Reporting Violations of this Agreement. I agree to report any violations to AHRQ within 
twenty-four (24) hours of becoming aware of any use or disclosure of the limited data set in 
violation of this Agreement or applicable law.  
Term, Breach, and Termination of this Agreement.  This Agreement shall continue in full 
effect until the data recipient has returned all copies of the data set to AHRQ.  Any 
noncompliance by the data recipient with the terms of this Agreement will be grounds for 
immediate termination of the Agreement if, at the sole determination of AHRQ, the data 
recipient knew or should have known of such noncompliance and failed to immediately take 
reasonable steps to remedy the noncompliance.  
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Reporting to the United States Department of Health and Human Services. If the data 
recipient fails to remedy any breach or violation of this Agreement to the satisfaction of 
AHRQ, and if termination of the Agreement is not feasible, AHRQ shall report the recipient’s 
breach or violation to the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, and the recipient agrees that he or she shall not have or make any claims against 
AHRQ with respect to such report(s).  
I understand that this Agreement is requested by the United States Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality to ensure compliance with its statutory confidentiality requirement.  My 
signature indicates my Agreement to comply with the above-stated requirements with the 
knowledge that any violation of the AHRQ confidentiality statute is subject to a civil penalty 
of up to $10,000 under 42 U.S.C. 299c-3(d), and that deliberately making a false statement 
about this or any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the Federal 
Government violates 18 U.S.C. 1001 and is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or up to 
five years in prison.  Violators of this Agreement may also be subject to penalties under state 
confidentiality statutes that apply to these data for particular states.  
Signed:_____________________________________________ 
Date:_________________________ Print or Type Name of Data Recipient: 
____________________________________________________ 
Title:_____________________________________________________________________
__________ Organization: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Address:__________________________________________________________________
__________ City: _____________________________________ State: ________ ZIP 
Code: ______________ Phone Number: ____________________________ Fax: 
___________________________________ E-mail: 
_________________________________________________________________________
____ The information above is maintained by AHRQ for the purpose of enforcement of this 
Agreement.  This information may also be used by AHRQ to create an HCUP mailing list.  
The mailing list allows AHRQ to send users information such as notices about the release of 
new databases  
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APPENDIX D 
SID APPLICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 19, 2008  
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CENTRAL DISTRIBUTOR 
UNIFORM STATE APPLICATION  
Data Organizations participating in the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
(HCUP) have agreed to release their State Inpatient Databases (SID), State 
Ambulatory Surgery Databases (SASD), and State Emergency Department 
Databases (SEDD) through a Central Distributor under the auspices of the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).  This uniform application was 
designed by the participating Data Organizations to satisfy their requirements.  As 
such, the information requested in this application is for the Data Organizations. The 
information is not for AHRQ or the HCUP Central Distributor. AHRQ and the HCUP 
Central Distributor are facilitating access to the SID, SASD and SEDD, which are 
owned and regulated by the individual Data Organizations participating in HCUP.  
The Data Organizations dictate which data elements may be released through the 
HCUP Central Distributor. However, data elements in the SID, SASD, and SEDD 
are in a uniform HCUP format that is consistent across all states and years of HCUP 
data.  
Directions to Complete the Uniform State Application:  
1. Print or type all responses.  
2. Complete all applicable parts of this application.  
 Part I Organization and/or Individual Requesting Use of the HCUP 
Databases (page 2)  
  Part II Intended Use of Data and Project Activities  
  Part III Selection of HCUP Databases  
3. Determine the Total Payment Due and Select Payment Method (Part IV).  
4. Read and sign the Indemnification Clause (Part V, page 17).  
5. Complete the online HCUP Data Use Agreement Training Course and provide 
your Certification Code (Part VI, page 18).  
6. If purchasing the SID, read and sign the Data Use Agreement for HCUP State 
Inpatient Databases (Part VII, page 19).  
7. If purchasing the SASD, read and sign the Data Use Agreement for HCUP State 
Ambulatory Surgery Databases (Part VIII, page 23).  
8. If purchasing the SEDD, read and sign the Data Use Agreement for HCUP State 
Emergency Department Databases (Part IX, page 27).  
9. Submit the completed application (pages 2-31):  
HCUP Central Distributor  
Social & Scientific Systems, Inc.  
8757 Georgia Avenue, 12
th
 Floor Silver Spring, MD 20910  
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Part I: Organization and/or Individual Requesting Use of the HCUP 
Databases  
General Information:  
Applicant Name:  
Position/Title:  
Organization (include Branch, Division, Department):  
Street Address:  
 
City: State: ZIP Code: Phone Number: Fax:  
Internet Address:  
Type of Organization:  
Check the one box that best describes your organization.  
o University/college/teaching institution  
o Government agency  
o Managed care, insurer  
o Healthcare provider  
o Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical product 
firm  
o Trade association, lobbying group, consortium  
o Research organization, consultant  
o Other (describe in space provided)  
 
Check the one box that best characterizes the type of ownership of your 
organization.  
o Not-for-profit  
 
o For-profit  
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Part II: Intended Use of Data and Project Activities  
Describe the intended use of the data requested. Attach additional pages if 
necessary. Include:  
 Brief description of project(s) and intended use of the data (e.g., clinical 
research, health services research, analyses to address public policy issues, 
analyses to address private policy issues, creating products or tools such as 
quality measurements, severity adjustment software, etc.)  
 
 Brief description of the subject area(s) that you plan to investigate (e.g., health 
outcomes, quality, cost, utilization, access, markets, etc.)  
 
 
 Brief description of the potential uses of the final products that you may create 
using the data (e.g., papers, reports, tools, analyses for public domain and/or 
internal use, etc.)  
 
Please refer to Part VI “Data Use Agreement for HCUP State Inpatient Databases” 
(page 19), Part VII “Data Use Agreement for HCUP State Ambulatory Surgery 
Databases” (page 23), and Part VIII “Data Use Agreement for HCUP State 
Emergency Department Databases” (page 27) for complete descriptions of the 
acceptable uses of the HCUP SID, SASD, and SEDD. In general, the HCUP SID, 
SASD, and SEDD are available for the purpose of research and aggregate 
statistical reporting.  Attempts to identify individuals are strictly prohibited.  
Information that could identify individuals or establishments directly or by inference 
may not be released in disseminated materials. The data may not be re-released in 
any form without prior approval of the participating Data Organization(s).  
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HCUP Request:  
Check all boxes that describe the reasons for requesting the HCUP databases.  
o Research requires specific state(s).  
o Research requires variables only available in the selected states 
(e.g., encrypted patient ZIP  
o Codes, encrypted physician identifiers). Indicate variables below.  
 
Other (describe in space provided)  
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Part III: Selection of HCUP Databases  
Section I. Select State Inpatient Databases (SID)  
Mark boxes for the data you are requesting (see next page) and enter 
the total cost of requested data under the column titled “Total.”  
Please refer to the Databases section of the HCUP User Support 
Website (www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov) for detailed information about the SID. 
Not all HCUP data elements are available from every state.  
The participating Data Organizations dictate the price of the data.  Handling 
charges are already included. Some Data Organizations offer a price 
discount to AHRQ Grant recipients, and Arizona currently offers a discount 
to students.  
If you are not sure if you qualify for the AHRQ Grantee discount, 
please refer to Section IV.  AHRQ Grantee (page 14).  
Students in good standing may purchase the 2005-2007 Arizona SID for $20.  
Students must demonstrate that they are in fact a student by providing: 1) a 
copy of a valid student ID, OR 2) a letter from the registrar’s office indicating 
that they are student in good standing, OR 3) a note or letter from a 
professor or program director verifying that they are in fact a student in good 
standing.  
If you have any questions or want information on other years of data or more 
sensitive data elements for a state, please contact the HCUP Central 
Distributor by phone at (866) 556-4287 (toll free), fax at   
(866) 792-5313 (toll free), or e-mail at HCUPDistributor@AHRQ.gov.  
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Section II. Select State Ambulatory Surgery Databases (SASD)  
Mark boxes for the data you are requesting. Please refer to the Databases section of the 
HCUP User Support Website (www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov) for detailed information about the 
SASD. Not all HCUP data elements are available from every state.  
The participating Data Organizations dictate the price of the data.  Handling charges are 
already included. Some Data Organizations offer a price discount to AHRQ Grant recipients.  
If you are not sure if you qualify for this discount, please refer to Section IV. AHRQ Grantee 
(page 14).  Enter the total cost of requested data under the column titled “Total.”  
If you have questions or want information on other years of data or more sensitive data 
elements for a state, please contact the HCUP Central Distributor by phone at (866) 556-
4287 (toll free), fax at (866) 792-5313 (toll free), or e-mail at HCUPDistributor@AHRQ.gov.  
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Section III. Select State Emergency Department Databases (SEDD)  
Mark boxes for the data you are requesting (see next page) and enter the total cost of 
requested data under the column titled “Total”.  
Please refer to the Databases section of the HCUP User Support Website (www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov) for detailed information about the SEDD. Importantly, the SEDD contain only 
emergency department visits that do not result in hospitalizations. To complete an analysis 
on all emergency department visits, researchers should purchase the SEDD and the SID. 
Not all HCUP data elements are available from every state.  
The participating Data Organizations dictate the price of the data.  Handling charges 
are already included. Some Data Organizations offer a price discount to AHRQ Grant 
recipients, and Arizona currently offers a discount to students.  
If you are not sure if you qualify for the AHRQ Grantee discount, please refer to 
Section IV.  AHRQ Grantee (page 14).  
Students in good standing may purchase the 2005-2007 Arizona SEDD for $20.  Students 
must demonstrate that they are in fact a student by providing: 1) a copy of a valid student 
ID, OR 2) a letter from the registrar’s office indicating that they are student in good 
standing, OR 3) a note or letter from a professor or program director verifying that they are 
in fact a student in good standing.  
If you have any questions or want information on other years of data or more sensitive data 
elements for a state, please contact the HCUP Central Distributor by phone at (866) 556-
4287 (toll-free), fax at (866) 792-5313 (toll free), or e-mail at HCUPDistributor@AHRQ.gov  
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Section IV. AHRQ Grantee  
Some states offer a discounted price for AHRQ Grant Recipients.  If you are an AHRQ 
Grantee and intend to use the data requested for a currently funded AHRQ project, you are 
entitled to the discounted price and should mark your data request accordingly. Include the 
name of the principal investigator, title, and the corresponding grant number in the space 
provided below. Other types of grants are non-applicable. The Uniform State Application in 
no way constitutes a grant application.  
The Research Grant Application Form PHS 398 is to be used in applying for AHRQ grants.  
This form is available online from the National Institutes of Health Web site at the following 
URL:  
http://www.nih.gov/grants/funding/phs398/phs398.html  
Copies of the PHS 398 Grant Application Form are also available from:  
AHRQ Publications Clearinghouse  
P.O. Box 8547  
Silver Spring, MD 20907-8547  
Telephone: (800) 358-9295  
 
If you are requesting data at the AHRQ Grantee discounted price, please provide the 
following information:    
Name of Principal Investigator / Title:  
AHRQ Grant Number:  
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Part IV: Determine the Total Payment Due and Select Payment Method  
Total Payment Due  
If you need help determining the payment due, submit the completed application (pages 2-
31), without payment, to the HCUP Central Distributor and request an invoice. An itemized 
invoice stating the total payment due, including taxes for applicants in Maryland, will be 
faxed or e-mailed to you.  Note that the HCUP Central Distributor collects taxes only from 
applicants in Maryland.  All other applicants are responsible for determining tax liability and 
remitting taxes directly to state and local taxing authorities.  
TOTAL PAYMENT DUE  
 Total SID Data Cost From Section I: $_____________ 
 Total SASD Data Cost From Section 
II: $_____________ 
 Total SEDD Data Cost From Section 
III: $_____________ 
 Tax (MD applicants only): $_____________ 
 Total Payment Due:  $_____________ 
 
Orders will not be filled until the completed application and a purchase 
order or full payment have been received.  
Payment Methods  
The HCUP Central Distributor accepts purchase orders, and payment 
may be made by major credit card, check, or electronic funds' transfer.  
Paying by Credit Card  
Visa, MasterCard and American Express are accepted. Your credit card is 
not charged until the day your order is shipped. A credit card receipt for 
your purchase is included with the order.  
Credit card information is accepted by mail or telephone. If you would like 
to mail the information, please complete items 1 – 10 of the Credit Card 
Payment form on the next page and mail it with your itemized invoice or 
completed application to the following address:  
HCUP Central Distributor  
Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. 
8757 Georgia Avenue, 12
th
 Floor  
Silver Spring, MD 20910  
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If you prefer to provide your credit card information by telephone, please call toll-free 
at (866) 556-4287 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time.  
Paying by Check  
Checks should be made payable to Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. Mail a 
check for the total payment due with your itemized invoice or completed 
application. The address is listed above.  
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Credit Card Payment Form  
If you would like to pay by credit card, please complete items 1 – 10 of this form and enclose 
it with your application. If you prefer to provide your credit card information by telephone, 
please call toll-free at (866) 556-4287 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time.  
1.  Date:  
2.  Individual/Company Name:   
3.  Names On Credit Card:  
Please list the names on the credit card exactly as they are shown on the card.  
 
4.  Type Of Credit Card:  MASTERCARD  VISA AMERICAN EXPRESS  
5.  Amount:  
6.  Credit Card Number:   
7.  Expiration Date:  
8.  Credit Card Billing Address:  
9.  City, State & ZIP Code:  
10.  Customer Signature:  
 
For Office Use Only  
Verbal Authorization For Signature:   Yes   No  
Person Requesting Credit Card Processing: ______________________________  
Requestor’s Phone Number And Extension: ___________________________________  
Project Code Number: ______________________________________________  
Date Processed: __________________________ Invoice Numbers Paid: ____________  
Project Code: ______________________________  
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Part V: Indemnification Clause  
Recipient shall indemnify and hold Thomson Healthcare Inc. and its directors, 
officers, employees, agents, affiliates and subsidiaries harmless from any and all 
losses, claims, damages, liabilities, costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs) arising out of any claim arising from 
any third parties, including but not limited to any or some combination of the several 
States comprising the United States of America and/or the Government of the 
United States of America, concerning Recipient’s use of SID, SASD, or SEDD data 
provided by Thomson Healthcare Inc. Further, Recipient agrees that Thomson 
Healthcare Inc. shall not be liable to Recipient for any reason whatsoever arising out 
of the SID, SASD, or SEDD data or the Recipient’s use of the SID, SASD, or SEDD 
data.  
Recipient certifies and warrants that it has made no representations to Thomson 
Healthcare Inc. concerning any uses it (Recipient) intends to make of the SID, 
SASD, or SEDD data provided by Thomson Healthcare Inc. under the terms and 
conditions of Thomson Healthcare Inc. contract with the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Further, 
Recipient agrees that no representation of Recipient as to the Recipient’s intended 
use of the SID, SASD, or SEDD data was used to determine whether the 
Recipient’s request to use SID, SASD, or SEDD data would be approved.    
Recipient shall indemnify and hold Social & Scientific Systems, Inc. (SSS) and 
its directors, officers, employees, owners, and agents harmless from any and all 
losses, claims, damages, liabilities, costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs) arising out of any claim arising 
from any third parties, including but not limited to any or some combination of the 
several States comprising the United States of America and/or the Government 
of the United States of America, concerning Recipient’s use of SID, SASD, or 
SEDD data provided by SSS. Further, Recipient agrees that SSS shall not be 
liable to Recipient for any reason whatsoever arising out of the SID, SASD, or 
SEDD data or the Recipient’s use of the SID, SASD, or SEDD data.  
Recipient certifies and warrants that it has made no representations to SSS 
concerning any uses it (Recipient) intends to make of the SID, SASD, or SEDD data 
provided by SSS under the terms and conditions of its contract with the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality. Further, Recipient agrees that no representation of Recipient as to the 
Recipient’s intended use of the SID, SASD, or SEDD data was used to determine 
whether the Recipient’s request to use SID, SASD, or SEDD data would be 
approved.    
Signed:         Date:  
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Part VI: HCUP Data Use Agreement Training  
New Requirement: HCUP Data Use Agreement 
Training  
Because of the sensitive nature of the data contained in the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP) databases, there is a continued need to reinforce the safeguards and 
restrictions placed on use of the data.  All data purchasers and users of HCUP data must 
complete the HCUP Data Use Agreement (DUA) Training Course.  This course emphasizes 
the importance of data protection, helps to reduce the risk of inadvertent violations, and 
describes your individual responsibility when using HCUP data.  The course will take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete and you will not be required to take it more than once.  
If you have not previously completed the HCUP DUA Training Course, please go to the 
HCUP-US website at http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/tech_assist/dua.jsp, complete the online 
HCUP DUA Training Course, and enter the certification number at the end of the course in 
the space provided below.  
HCUP DUA Training Course Certification Code 
_______________________________________  
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DATA USE AGREEMENT for the State Inpatient Databases 
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality  
This Data Use Agreement (“Agreement”) implements the data protections of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (Public Law 104-191) and the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) confidentiality statute.  Any individual 
(“data recipient”) seeking to obtain or use data in the State Inpatient Databases (SID) from 
the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) maintained by the Center for Delivery, 
Organization, and Markets (CDOM) within AHRQ, must sign and submit this Agreement to 
AHRQ or its agent before access to the SID may be granted.    
In accordance with HIPAA, the SID may only be used or disclosed in the form of a limited 
data set, as defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR § 164.514(e)).  
The AHRQ confidentiality statute, Section 924(c) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
299c-3(c)), requires that data collected by AHRQ that identify individuals or establishments 
be used only for the purpose for which they were supplied. Data supplied to AHRQ for 
HCUP and disclosed in limited data set form are identifiable under the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
and are provided by the data sources only for research, analysis, and aggregate statistical 
reporting.  Therefore, data recipients may use HCUP data only for these purposes.  
No Identification of Persons–Any effort to determine the identity of any person contained in 
HCUP databases (including but not limited to patients, physicians, and other health care 
providers), or to use the information for any purpose other than for research, analysis, and 
aggregate statistical reporting, would violate the AHRQ confidentiality statute, the conditions 
of this Agreement, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Recipients of the data set are prohibited 
under the AHRQ confidentiality statute and the terms of this Agreement from releasing, 
disclosing, publishing, or presenting any individually identifying information obtained under 
this Agreement. AHRQ omits from the data set all direct identifiers that are required to be 
excluded from limited data sets as defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  It may be possible in 
limited situations, through deliberate technical analysis, and with outside information, to 
ascertain from the limited data sets the identity of particular persons. Considerable harm 
could ensue if this were to occur. Therefore, any attempts to identify individuals are 
prohibited and information that could identify individuals directly or by inference must not be 
released or published.  In addition, users of the data must not attempt to contact individuals 
for any purpose, including verifying information supplied in the data set.  Any questions 
about the data must be referred exclusively to AHRQ.  
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Use of Establishment Identifiers–Section 924(c) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
299c-3(c)) also restricts the use of any information that permits the identification of 
establishments for purposes other than those for which the information was originally 
supplied. Permission is obtained from the HCUP data sources (state data organizations, 
hospital associations, and data consortia) to use the identification of hospitals (when such 
identification appears in the data sets) for research, analysis, and aggregate statistical 
reporting. This may include linking institutional information from outside data sets for these 
purposes. Such purpose does not include the use of information in the data sets concerning 
individual establishments for commercial or competitive purposes involving those individual 
establishments, or to determine the rights, benefits, or privileges of establishments.  Users of 
the data must not identify establishments directly or by inference in disseminated material.  
In addition, users of the data must not contact establishments for the purpose of verifying 
information supplied in the data set.  Any questions about the data must be referred 
exclusively to AHRQ.  Misuse of identifiable HCUP data about hospitals would violate the 
AHRQ confidentiality statute and trigger its penalty provisions.  
The undersigned gives the following assurances with respect to the SID data set:  
 I will not use and will prohibit others from using or disclosing the data set (or any part), 
except for research, analysis, and aggregate statistical reporting, and only as permitted 
by this Agreement.  
 I will ensure that the data are kept in a secured environment and that only authorized 
users will have access to the data.  
 I will not release or disclose, and will prohibit others from releasing or disclosing, any 
data that are individually identifiable under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, or any information 
that identifies persons, directly or indirectly, except as permitted under this Agreement 
and in accordance with the above-mentioned AHRQ confidentiality statute.  
 I will not release or disclose information where the number of observations (i.e., 
individual discharge records) in any given cell of tabulated data is less than or equal to 
10.  
 I will not release or disclose, and will prohibit others from releasing or disclosing, the 
data set (or any part) to any person who is not a member, agent, or contractor of the 
organization (specified below), except with the approval of AHRQ.  
 I will require others employed in my organization (specified below), and any agents or 
contractors of my organization, who will use or will have access to the data set, to sign a 
copy of this Agreement (specifically acknowledging their agreement to abide by its 
terms) and I will submit those signed Agreements to AHRQ or its agent before granting 
access.  
 I will not attempt to link, and will prohibit others from attempting to link, the discharge 
records of persons in the data set with individually identifiable records from any other 
source.  
 I will not attempt to use and will prohibit others from using the data set to learn the 
identity of any person included in the data set or to contact any such person for any 
purpose.  
 In accordance with the AHRQ confidentiality statute, I will not use and will prohibit others 
from using the data set concerning individual establishments (1) for commercial or 
competitive purposes involving those individual establishments; (2) to determine the 
rights, benefits, or privileges of individual establishments; or (3) to report, through any 
medium, data that could identify, directly or by inference, individual establishments.  
 When the identities of establishments are not provided in the data sets, I will not attempt 
to use and will prohibit others from using the data set to learn the identity of any 
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establishment.  
 I will not contact and will prohibit others from contacting establishments or persons in the 
data set to question, verify, or discuss data in the HCUP databases.  
 I will indemnify, defend, and hold harmless AHRQ and the data organizations that 
provide data to AHRQ for HCUP from any or all claims and losses accruing to any 
person, organization, or other legal entity as a result of violation of this Agreement.  This 
provision applies only to the extent permitted by Federal and State law.  
 I will make no statement and will prohibit others from making statements indicating or 
suggesting that  
 interpretations drawn are those of the data sources or AHRQ.  
 I will provide an abstract and reference for any published research material resulting 
from the use of these HCUP State Inpatient Databases to the HCUP Central Distributor.  
 I will acknowledge in all reports based on these data that the source of the data is the 
specific state(s) or data organization(s) that submitted data to the HCUP (e.g., “state 
name(s), State Inpatient Databases (SID), Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
(HCUP), Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.”  
 
Safeguards. I agree to use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the data 
set other than as permitted by this Agreement.  
Permitted Access to Limited Data Set. I shall limit the use or receipt of the data set to the 
individuals who require access in order to perform activities permitted by this Agreement.  
This Agreement must be signed by all such individuals and submitted to AHRQ or its agent 
before access to the data set may be granted.  
Re-disclosure. I will not re-disclose (i.e., share) the data set (or any part), unless the 
individual who will receive the data has agreed in writing to be bound by the same 
restrictions and conditions that apply to me under this Agreement.  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule.  I agree not to use or disclose the data set in any manner that 
would violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule if I were a covered entity under the Privacy Rule.  
Agents and Contractors.  I shall ensure that any agents, including contractors and 
subcontractors to whom I provide the data set, agree in writing to be bound by the same 
restrictions and conditions that apply to me with respect to the limited data set.  
Reporting Violations of this Agreement. I agree to report any violations to AHRQ within 
twenty-four (24) hours of becoming aware of any use or disclosure of the limited data set in 
violation of this Agreement or applicable law.  
Term, Breach, and Termination of this Agreement.  This Agreement shall continue in full 
effect until the data recipient has returned all copies of the data set to AHRQ.  Any 
noncompliance by the data recipient with the terms of this Agreement will be grounds for 
immediate termination of the Agreement if, at the sole determination of AHRQ, the data 
recipient knew or should have known of such noncompliance and failed to immediately take 
reasonable steps to remedy the noncompliance.  
Reporting to the United States Department of Health and Human Services. If the data 
recipient fails to remedy any breach or violation of this Agreement to the satisfaction of 
AHRQ, and if termination of the Agreement is not feasible, AHRQ shall report the recipient’s 
breach or violation to the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human 
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Services, and the recipient agrees that he or she shall not have or make any claims against 
AHRQ with respect to such report(s).  
 
I understand that this Agreement is requested by the United States Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality to ensure compliance with its statutory confidentiality requirement.  My 
signature indicates my Agreement to comply with the above-stated requirements with the 
knowledge that any violation of the AHRQ confidentiality statute is subject to a civil penalty 
of up to $10,000 under 42 U.S.C. 299c-3(d), and that deliberately making a false statement 
about this or any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the Federal 
Government violates 18 U.S.C. 1001 and is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or up to 
five years in prison.  Violators of this Agreement may also be subject to penalties under state 
confidentiality statutes that apply to these data for particular states.  
Signed:_____________________________________________ 
Date:_________________________  
Print or Type Name of Data Recipient: 
____________________________________________________  
Title:_____________________________________________________________________
__________  
Organization: 
________________________________________________________________________  
Address:__________________________________________________________________
__________  
City: _____________________________________ State: ________ ZIP Code: 
______________  
Phone Number: ____________________ Fax:__________________________________  
E-mail: 
_____________________________________________________________________  
The information above is maintained by AHRQ for the purpose of enforcement of this 
Agreement.  This information may also be used by AHRQ to create an HCUP mailing list.  
The mailing list allows AHRQ to send users information such as notices about the release of 
new databases and errata when data errors are discovered.  
Please include me on the HCUP mailing list.  
 
 
 
